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ABSTRACT
This thesis is about foundationalism in epistemology. It distinguishes between different 
forms of foundationalism and defends one particular version of this doctrine. Chapter 1 
gives  an  account  of  the  motivations  for  foundationalism,  including  the  so-called 
epistemic  regress  argument.  It  criticizes  recent  accounts  of  the  core  doctrines  of 
foundationalism, such as those of Michael Williams and Ernest Sosa,  and proposes a 
different account according to which foundationalism is the view that (a) some of our 
beliefs must be non-inferentially justified, (b) perception is a source of non-inferential 
justification, and (c) perception is a basic source of such justification. Chapter 2 gives an 
account of traditional foundationalism and tries to identify both what is right with it and 
what is wrong with it. It argues that the basic insight of traditional foundationalism can be 
detached from some of the other doctrines with which it was associated by the traditional 
foundationalists. That insight concerns the role of perceptual awareness or acquaintance 
as a regress-terminating source of epistemic justification. Chapter 3 exploits this idea in 
defending  a  more  modest  form  of  foundationalism  according  to  which  ordinary 
perceptual  beliefs  may  be  foundational.  Chapters  3  and  4  focus  on  two  influential 
arguments against the view that ordinary beliefs about the world around us can be non-
inferentially justified by perception. The first argument trades on the alleged fallibility of 
perceptual justification, the second on its defeasibility. It is shown that neither argument 
poses  a  genuine threat  to  the more  modest  version of  foundationalism that  I  defend. 
Chapter 5 compares perception with other sources of non-inferential justification such as 
memory and testimony. It defends the view that perception is a privileged source of non-
inferential  justification,  even  if  it  isn't  the  only  source  of  such  justification.  It  also 
contrasts foundationalism with traditional forms of externalism such as reliabilism and 
explains why the latter should not be counted as a form of foundationalism.  
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL
PREFACE
When I  first  encountered foundationalism as  a  topic  in  epistemology I  had a  certain 
understanding of what it was supposed to be. I thought that foundationalism was roughly 
the view that not all of our justification could be inferential and that perception is the 
basic source of justification that is not inferential. So foundationalism, as I understood it, 
was a  doctrine both about  the structure of  human knowledge or justification,  and its 
sources. This initial impression was strengthened when I read Contemporary Theories of 
Knowledge by Pollock and Cruz. They claim:
The simple motivation for foundations theories is the psychological observation 
that we have various ways of sensing the world and that all knowledge comes to 
us via those senses. The foundationalist takes this to mean that our senses provide 
us with what are then identified as epistemologically basic beliefs. We arrive at 
other  beliefs  by reasoning (construed broadly).  Reasoning,  it  seems,  can only 
justify us in holding a belief if we are already justified in holding the beliefs from 
which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification. 
Only perception can do that. We thus acquire the picture of our beliefs forming a 
kind  of  pyramid,  with  the  basic  beliefs  provided  by  perception  forming  the 
foundation, and all other justified beliefs being supported by reasoning that traces 
back ultimately to the basic beliefs (Pollock & Cruz 1999: 29).
Though Pollock and Cruz ultimately mishandle this insight they remain virtually the only 
commentators in this area to acknowledge the importance of perception. Their book had a 
lasting impact on my thinking. 
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I thought that if I had correctly understood foundationalism it was pretty obviously true. 
Although some of our beliefs are justified because we have inferred them from other 
things that we are justified in believing it seemed obvious to me that they cannot all be 
justified  in  this  way.  Some  of  our  beliefs  must  be  non-inferentially  justified  and 
perception is the obvious source of such justification. How then could foundationalism – 
which says just this – fail to be true?
It  came  as  something  of  a  surprise,  then,  when  I  discovered  that  not  only  is 
foundationalism not a position that most philosophers think is true. It is a position that 
most philosophers think is false. That left me puzzled: how could so many philosophers 
be so critical of a position that seems to get so much right? This thesis is to a large extent 
a direct product of that puzzlement and a more or less direct attempt to resolve it. 
The first  thing that  I  discovered when I  starting reading more widely was that  other 
people  don’t  all  understand  foundationalism  in  the  way  that  I  did.  The  historical 
foundationalists – people like C. I. Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and A. J. Ayer - agreed 
that our knowledge of the world rests upon a foundation of basic beliefs and that those 
beliefs are not justified in the way that the rest of our beliefs are justified. But while I 
took basic beliefs to include ordinary beliefs about objects and events in the world around 
us, the historical foundationalists took them to be beliefs about our own minds.1 And 
1 It sounds odd to say the foundational beliefs include ‘ordinary beliefs’ about the world. Aren’t ordinary 
beliefs supposed to be the beliefs that are supported by more basic beliefs? If the former are basic, what 
would be an example of a non-basic belief? This problem arises where we assume we can individuate the 
foundational beliefs in terms of their subject-matter. We will see later this is a mistake: foundational beliefs 
are  not  ‘about’ any  particular  subject-matter.  What  distinguishes  these  beliefs  is  the  source  of  their 
justification. Here, all I mean is that the foundational beliefs might include beliefs like this: ‘the squirrel is 
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while  I  thought  that  the  basic  beliefs  are  justified  by  perception  the  historical 
foundationalists claimed those beliefs are infallible and so either justify themselves or are 
justified by some sort of special introspective awareness. This seemed a long way from 
the rather commonsensical doctrine that I had always taken foundationalism to be. 
In recent years foundationalism has enjoyed something of a renaissance. Unfortunately, 
the form of foundationalism that is popular nowadays is a long way from the position that 
I  call  foundationalism.  Sometimes  called  ‘formal  foundationalism’,  the  new 
foundationalism is a bland doctrine that normally involves no more than a commitment to 
the  idea  that  epistemological  properties  like  justification  supervene  on  non-
epistemological ones. Since this makes just about everyone a foundationalist it’s not a 
position that I felt very excited about defending. 
I think that foundationalism is a substantive doctrine though not the very unattractive 
doctrine  the  historical  foundationalists  made  it  out  to  be.  Foundationalism,  as  I 
understand it, has got three basic components. The first is that there must be such a thing 
as non-inferential justification and there must be because otherwise we face a vicious 
epistemic  regress.  This  is  the  least  contentious  of  what  I  regard  as  the  three  basic 
elements of foundationalism. I think that the so-called epistemic regress argument for 
foundationalism is a good one and I will explain why in chapter 1. Later in later chapters 
3 and 4 I will counter various arguments that are supposed to show that there could not be 
any such thing as non-inferential justification. 
on the fence’ ‘Ross is at the party’ and so on. This is something more traditional foundationalists denied.
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The second component of foundationalism is that one of the sources of non-inferential 
justification is perception. Standard undergraduate textbooks on foundationalism tell us 
that the basic or foundational beliefs are either self-justified or need no justification. Such 
beliefs are obviously not justified by perception. Robert Audi, Keith Lehrer, and Jonathan 
Dancy all think of basic beliefs in this way. So what I am representing as the second 
essential  component  of  foundationalism  is  one  that  very  few  standard  discussions 
acknowledge. 
One reason for this discrepancy is an excessive focus on Descartes and the idea that he is 
really the paradigm foundationalist. I think that is a mistake. If you want some paradigm 
foundationalists you should look to people like Locke and Hume – philosophers who on 
the face of it couldn’t have less in common with Descartes. In fact, it’s not at all obvious 
to me that Descartes is a foundationalist. What is important to foundationalism isn’t the 
idea  that  the  foundations  of  our  knowledge  are  self-justifying,  but  that  they  are 
perceptually justified and Descartes certainly didn’t think that. 
The idea that perception is a source of non-inferential justification will be the focus of 
Chapters 2 and 3. When I say that perception is a source of non-inferential justification I 
take it  that  the beliefs  perception can non-inferentially justify are,  or include,  beliefs 
about non-psychological reality, like the belief that the squirrel is on the fence. So I just 
mean perception in the ordinary sense. In contrast when the historical foundationalists 
said  that  ‘perception’ is  a  source  of  non-inferential  justification  they  didn’t  mean 
perception in the ordinary sense. What they meant by perception is closer to what we 
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would call introspection and what Locke called ‘inner perception’. The beliefs that they 
thought perception can non-inferentially justify are beliefs about psychological reality 
rather than beliefs about the world around us. 
These  further  claims  are  neither  sensible  nor  essential  to  foundationalism.  Historical 
foundationalism therefore represents a perversion of an otherwise sensible thought. This 
perversion will be the topic of chapter 2. Chapter 3 will explore a sensible version of the 
sensible  thought.  I  will  show how we  can  hang onto  what  is  right  about  traditional 
foundationalism without committing ourselves to its less attractive features. 
Many people might agree with me up to this point. They could think, yes – there is such a 
thing as non-inferential justification and yes - perception is a source of such justification. 
But  there  is  nothing  special  about  perception;  there’s  also  testimony  for  example. 
Foundationalism as I understand it, denies that there is nothing special about perception. 
It is the view that among our sources of non-inferential justification perception is a basic 
source.  What I  mean by this is,  roughly,  that the other sources could not function as 
sources of justification at all unless perception is also a source of justification. 2 Although 
this view seems to me to be pretty obviously correct it has recently come under attack. I 
will be responding to some of these attacks in chapter 5. 
This is the view I want to defend and these are the places I will be defending it. It should 
2 Notice that is weaker that the claim Pollock attributes to foundationalism in the passage quoted. He claims 
perception is the  only source of justification other than reasoning. I claim merely that it is ‘a’ source of 
justification distinct from reasoning and, in some sense yet to be explained, a basic source. Still, it is not the 
only source. 
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be clear that the position I want to defend is ultimately very different from traditional 
foundationalism. Nonetheless,  it  bears important  similarities  to that  view.  An obvious 
question, therefore, is whether the standard objections to that view also apply to my view. 
That depends on what the standard objections are. One is that there are no self-justifying 
beliefs.  Clearly,  this  is  not  a  good  objection  to  my  view  since  on  my  view 
foundationalism is not committed to thinking that there are any such beliefs. The basic 
beliefs  are  justified  by  perception  and  beliefs  that  are  justified  by  perception  are 
obviously not self-justified. 
A different objection is that foundationalism is committed to the ‘myth of the given’. 
What is  that? If  the ‘myth’ just  involves thinking that perception is a source of non-
discursive justification, then it is not a myth. It is true. But if what people who press this 
objection are really saying is  it  is  only in the context  of certain social  practices  that 
perception is a source of justification, then I am not denying that. I am not claiming that 
perception is an autonomous source of justification in that sense.
I  think  that  perception  can  non-inferentially  justify  beliefs  about  non-psychological 
reality.  These  beliefs  do  not  draw their  justification from other  justified  beliefs.  The 
justification that perception provides is belief-independent in this sense. It might depend 
on beliefs in some other sense. 
This is a distinction we should draw even in cases in which one’s justification does derive 
from  other  beliefs.  So  people  who  press  this  objection  are  either  they  are  denying 
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something that is obviously true; or they are insisting on a point that I don’t need to 
dispute.
So that’s it. In short I am really just going back to the very simple idea with which we 
began and which got me thinking about foundationalism in the first place. I think that 
foundationalism is  still  a  live  option  in  epistemology.  One  thing  that  can  make  this 
difficult to see is a commitment to externalism. Unlike many externalists I understand 
perception to involve conscious access to  the world.  So insisting on the centrality of 
perception just means insisting on the centrality of consciousness. If we only interested in 
reliable belief forming mechanisms there is no reason why we should take consciously so 
seriously. 
This approach has interesting parallels with John Campbell’s view of though. His view, 
very roughly, is that it is consciousness of the world that makes it possible for us to think 
about it. My view, very roughly, is that it is consciousness of the world that makes it 
possible for us to know about it. What could possibly be more obvious? 
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL
CHAPTER 1: WHAT IS FOUNDATIONALISM?
1. Introduction
This  thesis  will  defend  a  form  of  foundationalism  in  epistemology.  I  think  that 
foundationalism is an overwhelmingly natural view about the structure and sources of 
epistemic justification – that is, a view about what it is to have reasons for our beliefs 
about the world in such a way that these beliefs can constitute knowledge. Not everyone 
agrees. In the literature a tradition has grown up according to which foundationalism is a 
much less attractive doctrine than I will claim. So one thing that I am doing in this thesis 
is taking on a certain tradition of interpretation. 
The tradition that I am opposing is long standing and still has very much the status of 
orthodoxy. It takes foundationalism to be a doctrine involving a commitment to certain 
characteristic claims. One central component of that doctrine is the idea that there are 
‘epistemically  basic  beliefs’.  By  epistemically  basic  I  mean  beliefs  that  are  not 
inferentially justified. Here is an example of an inferentially justified belief: I believe that 
England can no longer win the Ashes and my justification for that belief derives from my 
justification for believing they have performed poorly in the past three tests. This is an 
example of an inferentially justified belief.  So when I  talk about  beliefs that  are  not 
inferentially justified - or beliefs that are ‘non-inferentially’ justified, as I will often say - 
I just mean beliefs that are not justified in that way. This is not a positive account of what 
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does justify these beliefs and I am not going to give you a positive account at this stage. 
All that is important is that such beliefs are not inferentially justified. According to the 
tradition that I am opposing, the foundationalist is at the very least someone who thinks 
that there are such beliefs. 
This is one thing that any foundationalist has got to think, but it is not all she needs to 
think according to this tradition. Michael Williams makes this point well. 
Basic  beliefs  are  the  stock  in  trade  of  epistemological  foundationalists… 
According to foundationalism all justification starts with basic beliefs and flows 
“upward”  from them. However,  there  is  more to  foundationalism than this.  If 
foundationalism were no more than a structural-descriptive account of everyday 
knowledge it is hard to see why everyone would not be a foundationalist. Didn’t 
we  just  agree  that  there  are  lots  of  things  we “just  know”? So  aren’t  we  all 
foundationalists? The answer is “No”. The theoretical commitments of traditional 
foundationalists are extensive (Williams 2005: 203)
So what are these further commitments? Williams goes on to mention the following four:
(1)  Traditional  foundationalism  is  substantive,  rather  than  merely  formal. 
According  to  substantive  foundationalism,  the  class  of  basic  beliefs  is 
theoretically tractable.  In particular, there are non-trivially specifiable kinds of 
beliefs, individuated by broad aspects of their content, that are fitted to play the 
role of terminating points for chains of justification. The distinction between basic 
and non-basic beliefs is thus ontological rather than merely methodological. (2) 
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Traditional foundationalism is  strong.  Basic  beliefs,  or  terminating judgements 
are indubitable or (a slightly weaker notion) incorrigible. Basic beliefs are always 
basic  knowledge.  (3)  Traditional  foundationalism  is  atomistic.  Basic  beliefs 
provide absolute terminating points for justificatory chains. To do so, basic beliefs 
must  be  independently  both  epistemically and  semantically of  other  justified 
beliefs. Since basic beliefs constitute  encapsulated items of knowledge, there is 
no  objection in  principle  to  the  idea  of  a  first  justified  belief.  (4)  Traditional 
foundationalism  is  radically  internalist.  The  justification-making  factors  for 
beliefs, basic and otherwise, are all open to view, and perhaps even actual objects 
of awareness. At the base level, when I know that P, I am always in a position to 
know that I know that P, and perhaps even always  do know that I know that P 
(Williams 2005: 203-4). 
In a similar vein, Ernest Sosa claims that:
Classical foundationalism in epistemology is the view that:
(i) every infallible, indubitable belief is justified
(ii) every belief deductively inferred from justified beliefs is itself justified, 
and
(iii) every belief that is justified is so in virtue of (i) or (ii) above (Sosa 2000: 
14). 
Williams and Sosa are not alone. The view that they describe, according to which there is 
a  layer  of  epistemically  basic  beliefs,  distinguished  in  terms  of  their  content  and 
supporting everything else that we know, is how most people in the literature understand 
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foundationalism. I have said that I want to defend foundationalism, but I do not want to 
defend the very unattractive position that Williams and Sosa describe. As others have 
pointed out it is doubtful that we have so many indubitable, incorrigible, beliefs or that 
these beliefs would provide enough of a foundation for the rest of what we know. Most 
ordinary beliefs about the world – like the belief that there is squirrel on the fence or the 
belief that Ross is on the mend - can be mistaken, they can be doubted, and they can be 
rationally revised. Such beliefs therefore cannot provide the foundations we are alleged to 
need. It is doubtful any can. Foundationalism is therefore a form of scepticism and that is 
not a very attractive position to want to defend. 
I am not going to be defending what people like Williams and Sosa call foundationalism. 
My conception of foundationalism is different from and better than the standard view one 
finds in the literature. When I say that I want to defend foundationalism, I mean I want to 
defend what I  call  foundationalism. I  am therefore proposing a distinctive account of 
what foundationalism really is, as well as a defence of the doctrine so defined.
So what do I call foundationalism and how does it differ from how these other authors 
understand that doctrine? As mentioned above, I take foundationalism to be a view about 
the  structure of epistemic justification (a) and a view about its  sources (b) & (c). With 
respect to (a) I take foundationalism to be a view about the structure of justification that 
is motivated by something traditionally called ‘the epistemic regress argument’. I will be 
spelling out that argument shortly. The important point for now is that foundationalism is 
a view about how - in very general terms - you have to conceive of epistemic justification 
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in  order to  respond satisfactorily to  that  argument.  The foundationalist  claims that  in 
order to respond to the problem that argument raises we have to distinguish between 
inferentially  and  non-inferentially  justified  beliefs.  As  previously explained  the  latter 
beliefs are justified, but they do not draw their justification from other beliefs in the way 
in  which my justification for  believing that  England cannot  win the Ashes  draws its 
justification from my belief they lost the first three tests, or the way my justification for 
believing that Socrates is mortal derives from my justification for believing that he is a 
man and that all men are mortal. The foundationalist claims that as well as inferentially 
justified beliefs such as these there are also non-inferentially justified beliefs. This is 
what Williams and Sosa mean when they talk about ‘epistemically basic beliefs’. So I am 
agreeing with them to at least this extent. Epistemically basic beliefs are beliefs that are 
non-inferentially justified and according to (a) the foundationalist is someone who thinks 
there are such beliefs.  
This is not yet the full-blown characterisation of foundationalism that one normally finds 
in the literature, although it may also be familiar. Nowadays some people think that (a) is 
all there is to foundationalism. Even those who don’t, like Williams and Sosa, often give 
the impression that is what is really essential to foundationalism. Thus, Jonathan Dancy 
writes:
The claim that there are two forms of justification, inferential and non-inferential, 
is the core of any form of foundationalism in the theory of justification (Dancy 
1985: 56). 
This deflationary reading is gaining in popularity. It appeals to those who find traditional 
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foundationalism excessively baroque, but who can’t  quite bring themselves to believe 
that all justification is inferential. 
I  think the  deflationary reading is  too deflationary;  I  think that  is  not  all  there is  to 
foundationalism.  I  am rejecting  Dancy’s  deflationary  reading  just  as  firmly  as  I  am 
rejecting the traditional reading. 
I am rejecting the deflationary reading because foundationalism is also essentially a view 
about the sources of epistemic justification - about where justification comes from. Or so 
I claim. This is where (b) and (c) come in: with respect to (b) the foundationalist claims 
that perception or observation is a distinctive source of non-inferential justification; with 
respect to (c) she claims, further, that perception is a basic source of such justification – 
that perception is a basic way in which we come to know about the world around us. 
These  commitments  will  be  spelt  out  further  in  due  course,  but  this  is  the  core  of 
foundationalism as I understand it. It is a commitment to these three claims that I claim 
really  marks  foundationalism out  as  a  philosophically  interesting  position  and which 
distinguishes it from its historical rivals, rather than those traditionally focused on in the 
literature.3 
I  will  return  to  the  deflationary  reading  at  the  end  of  this  section.  How  does  my 
3 That does not make foundationalism equivalent to ‘empiricism’. The latter is a view about concepts on 
one important reading, whereas what I call foundationalism is a view about the structure and sources of 
epistemic justification. It says nothing about concepts and indeed, is perfectly compatible with the denial of 
empiricism in that sense. 
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conception  of  foundationalism differ  from the  standard  view with  which  we  began? 
Consider the characterisation Williams offers. On his view, foundationalism isn’t just an 
abstract  view  about  the  overall  structure  of  justification  or  the  claim  that  there  are 
inferentially and non-inferentially justified beliefs as (a) claims. The foundationalist is 
committed to highly substantive doctrines about the sorts  of beliefs that  can be non-
inferentially justified and what it is about them that enables them to be so justified. As 
Williams emphasizes,  foundationalism isn’t  merely ‘formal’.  In  contrast,  I  claim that 
foundationalism is a generic style of response to a certain argument. As far as (a) goes, 
foundationalism is compatible with lots of more specific views about how our beliefs fit 
into the abstract structure of inferential and non-inferential justification dictated by the 
regress argument. It certainly doesn’t require that the non-inferentially justified beliefs be 
indubitable, infallible, or theoretically tractable, and semantically encapsulated items of 
knowledge. 
With respect to (b) I claim the foundationalist is someone who holds that perception is a 
source of non-inferential justification. The traditional definition, by contrast, makes no 
mention of perception at all. Far from requiring that perception be the basic source of 
such justification as (c) goes on to claim, the views of Williams and Sosa are compatible 
with thinking that it is not a distinctive source of justification at all. On their views there 
must be non-inferential justification but there is no requirement that it must derive from 
perception or that perception enjoys any other sort of epistemological privilege as I claim 
it  does.  I  think  that  such  a  position  wouldn’t  be  recognizable  as  a  form  of 
foundationalism; it is certainly not what I understand by that name. 
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So there can be little doubt that the two characterisations differ in a fundamental way. If 
that is how they differ, what makes my view any better? Three things make my view 
preferable  to  the  view  one  standardly  finds  in  the  literature.  First,  on  my  view 
foundationalism has  at  least  some chance  of  being true.  That  seems a  pretty remote 
prospect if foundationalism is understood in the way that Williams and Sosa understand 
it.  I  think  there  is  no  point  in  saddling  people  or  positions  with  commitments  that 
inevitably have the consequence that what they say is false. But even if foundationalists 
actually did think what Williams and Sosa suggest they thought, they needn’t have done. I 
am offering them a philosophically respectable alternative. I am telling you what they 
should have thought, regardless of what they actually thought.
Second, as I characterise it foundationalism is an intuitively appealing position. This will 
become clearer is due course. The basic point though, is very simple: some of our beliefs 
really do seem to depend for their justification on that of other beliefs, and some of them 
do not, and there nothing more ordinary or ‘naïve’ than the idea that perception is a basic 
way  of  acquiring  knowledge  of  the  world  around  us.  This  is  basically  what  the 
foundationalist  claims.  My  view  therefore  gives  foundationalism  roots  in  our 
commonsense  thought  about  knowledge  and  justification.  In  contrast,  Williams 
specifically aims to rule out this possibility. As he characterises it foundationalism is a 
distinctively philosophical position. His “most fundamental point” is that:
even if, at some level of abstraction, ordinary justification appears to accord with 
formal  foundationalism  this  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  we  ought  to  be 
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foundationalists of the traditional kind…The question of whether there are basic 
beliefs cannot be decided by appeal to commonsense examples. This is because 
‘basic belief’ is a theoretical concept, subject to stringent theoretical requirements. 
These  do not  derive  straightforwardly from the  desire  to  understand everyday 
justification. Rather, they are set by certain explanatory goals that are distinctively 
philosophical (Williams 2005: 204).
Thirdly, only my characterisation carves up the debate in a historically meaningful way. 
This is important since foundationalism is a label with a partly historical basis. On my 
view it is clear why coherentism and reliabilism, for instance, do not count as versions of 
foundationalism. They do not count because these positions do not hold that perception is 
a basic source of justification. According to the coherentist, all justification derives from 
coherence among one’s beliefs  (BonJour 1985: esp. 87-222). According to the reliabilist, 
it derives from the fact that one’s beliefs are formed with a reliable process (Goldman 
1986). The former is not a view on which there is such a thing as distinctively perceptual 
justification all; neither is a view on which perception is a basic source of justification. 
Such views therefore won’t count as forms of foundationalism as I understand it and that 
is as it should be. 
It is also clear who does qualify as a foundationalist. On my view it is clear why Locke 
and Aristotle qualify,  as well  as more self-conscious foundationalists like C. I.  Lewis 
(1946) and A. J. Ayer (1956). They qualify because they all have views on which the 
relevant inferential / non-inferential distinction is drawn and on which  perception is a 
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basic source of non-inferential justification, despite the otherwise significant differences 
between them. These thinkers may not all understand the deliverances of the senses in the 
way in which we would, but all allow that perception or observation (in some sense) 
plays  an irreducible justificatory role.  This  is  a  distinctively foundationalist  idea as  I 
conceive of foundationalism. 
So my position enables us to carve up the debate in a historically sensitive way. The same 
is not true on the standard view. As Williams and Sosa characterise it, foundationalism is 
a  highly specific doctrine.  I  will  argue later  that  it  is  doubtful  whether there are  any 
foundationalists in Williams’s sense. Even paradigm foundationalists like Russell (1912) 
and C. I. Lewis (1946) did not think that we could individuate the class of epistemically 
basic beliefs by aspects of their content. For thinkers such as these it was the epistemic 
source of these beliefs, rather than their subject–matter that was important. But even if 
these particular thinkers did somehow come out as foundationalists, it is obvious that the 
position Williams describes is not one that has been very widely held. It applies at best to 
a  very  small  minority  of  thinkers.  This  sits  oddly  next  to  the  central  role  that 
foundationalism plays in epistemological discussions and makes it hard to see why we 
should be interested in the position so characterised.
At this point proponents of the standard view are apt to fall back upon the deflationary 
characterisation touched upon earlier. For those familiar with the literature the following 
objection may have been brewing for some time. “It is true”, they will say “that the view 
just characterised accurately describes what we might call ‘substantive foundationalism’. 
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But that was always just intended as a label for a particular historical position, roughly, 
the view held and debated at the beginning of the 20th century by thinkers like Russell and 
Ayer. There is, however, a more general view that deserves the name foundationalism and 
which we can use when we want to understand why foundationalism enjoys the broader 
historical and philosophical significance that it does. This position we can call ‘formal 
foundationalism’”. 
Formal foundationalism is closer to the commitment that I have labelled (a). As Williams 
characterises it, it just involves a commitment to the existence of ‘epistemically basic’ or 
non-inferentially justified beliefs. Sosa is more explicit: he takes formal foundationalism 
to  embody  a  commitment  to  the  supervenience  of  epistemic  justification  on  non-
epistemic features. He writes: 
We need to distinguish, first, between two forms of foundationalism: one formal, 
the  other  substantive.  A  type  of  formal  foundationalism  with  respect  to  a 
normative or evaluative property F is the view that the conditions (actual and 
possible)  within  which  F  would  apply  can  be  specified  in  general,  perhaps 
recursively. Substantive foundationalism is only a particular way of doing so and 
coherentism is another (Sosa 2000: 14). 
We needn’t worry about exactly how these formulations of formal foundationalism relate 
to  one  another  since  the  basic  strategy  fails  in  either  case.  The  substantive 
characterisation proved too narrow to  be useful  in  delineating the essential  nature of 
foundationalism, the more formal characterisations in  contrast  are far too broad. It  is 
unclear which historical positions would fail to count as versions of foundationalism so 
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characterised. Coherentism certainly counts, as Sosa himself acknowledges. And while he 
is happy to accept that, it is a very paradoxical result. Foundationalism is a label with a 
partly historical basis and to apply it to positions that have so little in common with those 
historically  called  ‘foundationalist’  ultimately  leads  only  to  scepticism  about  the 
significance of the label. 
I think we should avoid characterisations that have this consequence. My characterisation 
provides  a  way  of  understanding  foundationalism  on  which  it  is  both  genuinely 
substantive and true.
2. The Epistemic Regress Argument
Now that we have some sense of what foundationalism is supposed to be we can discuss 
whether  there  are  any  good  arguments  for  that  view.  I  said  that  I  would  be  taking 
foundationalism to be a view about justification that is motivated at least in part by the 
‘epistemic  regress  argument’.  What  is  that  argument  and  how  does  it  motivate  the 
position I’m calling foundationalism? 4 While there is broad agreement on the importance 
of this argument in motivating foundationalism there is less consensus on the form it 
should take.5 In  the literature several  different  arguments  purport  to  be the epistemic 
4 Regress arguments occur in other philosophical settings. Gilbert Ryle uses one to draw a conclusion about 
the nature of voluntary action viz. that voluntary acts can’t be acts caused by a prior act of will if acts of 
will are themselves voluntary (Ryle 1949). Searle uses one in connection with intentionality (Searle 1983).
5 Evidence of its importance is legion. Thus, Alston claims that the main reason for being a foundationalist 
is  “the  seeming  impossibility  of  a  belief’s  being  mediately  justified  without  resting  ultimately  on 
immediately justified belief” (Alston 1976: 182); Pryor calls it “the most famous argument in favour of 
non-inferential  justification”  (Pryor,  2005:  184);  BonJour  claims  “the  main  reason  for  the  impressive 
durability of foundationalism is not any overwhelming plausibility attaching to the main foundationalist 
thesis in itself, but rather the existence of one apparently decisive argument, which seems to rule out all 
non-sceptical alternatives to foundationalism” (BonJour 1978:1); and Bernecker and Dretske maintain “The 
driving force behind foundationalism has always been the threat of an infinite regress” (Bernecker and 
Dretske 2000: 231). 
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regress argument. 
Sometimes people have in mind a dialectical  regress in which subjects  are invited to 
defend their  beliefs in the context of an argument.  This is how BonJour presents the 
argument in the following passage:
The most obvious, indeed perhaps the only obvious way to show that an empirical 
belief  is  adequately  justified  (in  the  epistemic  sense)  is  by  producing  a 
justificatory argument: the belief that p is shown to be justified by citing some 
other (perhaps conjunctive) empirical belief, the belief that Q, and pointing out 
that P is inferable in some acceptable way from Q. Proposition Q, or the belief 
therein,  is  thus offered as a reason for accepting proposition P…[But] for the 
belief that P to be genuinely justified by virtue of such a justificatory argument, 
the belief that Q must itself already be justified in some fashion; merely being 
inferable  from  an  unsupported  guess  or  hunch,  for  example,  can  confer  no 
genuine justification. Thus the putative inferential justification of one empirical 
belief immediately raises the further issue of whether and how the premises of 
this inference are justified…empirical knowledge is threatened with an infinite 
and apparently vicious regress of epistemic justification. Each belief is justified 
only if an epistemically prior belief is justified, and that epistemically prior belief 
is justified only if a still  prior belief is justified, and so on, with the apparent 
result, so long as each new justification is inferential in character, that justification 
can never be completed indeed can never even really get started – and hence that 
there is no empirical justification and no empirical knowledge (BonJour 1985: 18-
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19). 
The  dialectical regress, as I will call it, is concerned with what it takes for subjects to 
show that  they  are  justified.  You  challenge  me  to  defend  my belief  and  in  order  to 
respond successfully to that challenge I must adduce some considerations in its defence 
thereby showing you that my belief is justified.6 
This is not the only target of epistemic regress arguments.  Other presentations of the 
argument focus more on what it takes for subjects to be justified in believing what they 
do. They aim to find out whether or not a subject is justified in a given belief and if so 
what makes it the case that she is justified.7 This is how DePaul presents the argument in 
the following passage: 
According to this ancient argument, when we consider a belief that is justified and 
ask how it is that the belief is justified, we are typically led to another belief that 
supports the first. When we ask about the second belief, we may well be lead to a 
third. The third may in turn lead to a fourth, and so on. But how long can things 
6 This is even more explicit in Peter Klein’s presentation of the argument. He asks us to imagine Fred and 
Doris in conversation “Fred asserts some proposition, say p. Doris says something – who knows what – that 
prompts Fred to believe that he had better have reasons for p in order to supply some missing credibility. 
So, Fred gives his reason, r1, for p. Now Doris asks why r1 is true. Fred gives another reasons, r2. This 
goes on for a while until Fred…arrives at what he takes to be a basic proposition, say b’. (Klein 2005: 133). 
Presentations of the regress do not often explicitly claim it concerns what it takes to show that a belief is 
justified. The argument is merely presented in such a way that is what it concerns, whether or not that is 
acknowledged. 
7 The regress  argument  is  often  thought to  be an  ancient  argument.  Ancient  presentations are  equally 
ambiguous. Thus, Sextus Empiricus asks whether reasoning can ever legitimately lead to assent and writes: 
‘the mode based upon regress ad infinitum is that whereby we assert that the thing adduced as a proof of 
the matter  proposed needs a  further proof,  and this  again another,  and so on ad infinitum, so that  the 
consequence is suspension [of assent], as we possess no starting point for our argument...we have the mode 
based upon hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being forced to recede ad infinitum take as their starting point 
something which they do not establish but claim to assume as granted simply and without demonstration. 
The mode of circular reasoning is the form used when the proof itself which ought to establish the matter of 
inquiry requires confirmation derived from the matter; in this case being unable to assume either in order to 
establish  the  other  we  suspend  judgement  about  both”  (Sextus  Empiricus  1967:  166-9).  In  contrast, 
Aristotle  employs a  version  of  what  I  am calling  the  justification-making  regress  to  show that  some 
justification must be non-inferential (Aristotle, 1993: A3). 
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go for in this fashion? There would seem to be only three possibilities: the chain 
of beliefs either goes on forever, circles back upon itself, or stops. Finding the 
first two possibilities unacceptable, Foundationalists opt for the third, holding that 
there are some beliefs that are justified, but that are not justified by any further 
beliefs. The regress stops with such basic or foundational beliefs, and any other 
beliefs  that  are  justified  must  be  supported  by  the  foundational  basic  beliefs 
(DePaul 2001: vii). 
I’m going to call this the justification-making regress to distinguish it from the dialectical 
regress.8 Very often,  however,  one  finds  elements  of  both  in  the  context  of  a  single 
presentation. This is evident in the quotation from BonJour and it is also clear in the 
following passage from Dancy:
Suppose that all justification is inferential. When we justify belief A by appeal to 
beliefs B and C, we have not yet shown A to be justified. We have only shown 
that,  it  is  justified  if  B  and  C  are.  Justification  by  inference  is  conditional 
justification only; A’s justification is conditional upon the justification of B and C. 
But if all inferential justification is conditional in this sense, then nothing can be 
shown  to  be  actually,  non-conditionally  justified.  For  each  belief  whose 
8 Similarly,  Susan Haack claims:  “Suppose A believes that  p.  Is  he justified in believing that p? Well, 
suppose he believes that p on the basis of his belief that q. Then he is not justified in believing that p unless 
he is justified in believing that q. Suppose he believes that q on the basis of his belief that r. Then he is not 
justified in believing that q, and hence not justified in believing that p, unless he is justified in believing 
that r. Suppose he believes that r on the basis of his belief that s. Then he is not justified in believing that r, 
and hence not justified in believing that q, and hence not justified in believing that p unless…. Now either 
(1) this series goes on without end; or (2) it ends with a belief which is not justified; or (3) it goes round in 
a circle; or (4) it comes to an end with a belief which is justified but not by the support of any further 
beliefs.” Haack claims that if (1-3) is the case, then A’s belief that p is not justified and goes on: “If (4), 
however, if the chain ends with a belief which is justified but not by the support of any further belief, A is 
justified  in  believing  that  p.  So,  since  (4)  is  precisely  what  Foundationalism  claims,  only  if 
Foundationalism is true is anyone ever justified in any belief. (Foundationalism is the only tolerable - non-
sceptical-  alternative.)”  (Haack 1993:  22).  For other  statements  of  the justification-making regress  see 
(Quinton 1973: 119) and (Pryor 2005).
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justification  we  attempt,  there  will  always  be  a  further  belief  upon  whose 
justification that of the first depends, and since this regress is infinite no belief 
will ever be more than conditionally justified…The regress argument therefore 
drives us to suppose that there must be some justification which is non-inferential 
if we are to avoid the sceptical consequence of admitting that no beliefs are ever 
actually justified (Dancy 1985: 55-6).  
On the face of it, Dancy confuses the two different things just distinguished. He starts 
with a claim about what it takes to show that a belief is justified and concludes with a 
claim about whether or not the belief in question is justified.  This is an easy mistake to 
make, however, since the word ‘justify’ is ambiguous and can be used to refer to both. 
Pryor calls attention to these different uses of the verb in the following passage:
On the first construal, ‘justifying’ a belief in P is a matter of proving or showing 
the  belief  to  be  just  (or  reasonable  or  credible).  (Here  we  can  include  both 
arguments whose conclusion is P, and arguments whose conclusion is that your 
belief in P is epistemically appropriate, or is likely to be true.) By extension, we 
can also talk about things justifying beliefs; in this extended sense, a thing counts 
as justifying a belief if it’s something you’re in a position to use to prove or show 
your belief to be just…There’s also a second way to construe the verb ‘justify’, 
which sees it as akin to the verbs ‘beautify’ and ‘electrify’. When a combination 
of light and colour beautifies a room, it’s not proving that the room is beautiful; 
rather, it’s making the room beautiful. Similarly, on this understanding, justifying 
a belief is a matter of making a belief just or reasonable, rather than a matter of 
showing the belief to be just (Pryor 2005: 194).
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We have seen that it is possible to initiate a regress argument using either notion. The 
important  point  is  that  the  regresses  thereby  initiated  will  differ.  One  will  concern 
whether a given belief has been shown to be justified; the other, whether a given belief is 
justified.9
 
Given  that  they  differ,  which  do  we  have  reason  to  prefer?  When  I  talk  about 
foundationalism as a position that is motivated in part by the regress argument what I 
mean  is  that  it’s  a  position  motivated  by  the  justification-making  version  of  that 
argument. This is the more fundamental version of the argument for several reasons. It is 
the more prevalent, and we’ll see shortly that it is by far the more plausible of the two 
arguments,  but  the  most  important  reason  is  that  it  is  only  the  justification-making 
version of the argument which threatens us with a truly unacceptable epistemological 
conclusion. It is only the justification-making regress which threatens to show that none 
of our beliefs is justified. The dialectical regress, in contrast, only promises to show that 
we cannot, or have not, shown that our beliefs are justified. The latter conclusion, while 
somewhat counter-intuitive, is not one we must do everything we can to avoid.10 
9 In requiring that the subject respond to the question about what makes it the case she is justified it is easy 
to miss the fact that the questioning effectively goes higher-order: if she replies, she gives expression to a 
belief about what she thinks makes it  the case that she is justified.  To ask what justifies this  belief is 
therefore to ask what justification she has for believing that she has a given justification. This is easy to 
miss, since it’s easily confused with the case in which one appeals to beliefs as a source of justification. In 
the latter case, the beliefs one appeals to must be justified. To ask what justifies those beliefs is therefore 
not to ask a higher-order question. But that is that quite unlike the dialectical case; in that case I merely 
give expression to a belief in saying what makes it the case that I am justified. 
10 This is especially plausible when one thinks about what it takes to show that something is the case. 
Alston draws attention to this in the following passage “showing by its very nature requires the exhibition 
of grounds. Furthermore, grounds must be different from the proposition to be shown. (This latter follows 
from the pragmatic aspect of the concept of showing. To show that p is to present grounds that one can 
justifiably accept without already accepting p. Otherwise showing would lack the point that goes towards 
making it what it is” (Alston 1976: 178-9).
29
Things would be different if we had some reason to link these two notions of justification 
and tie the conditions under which a belief can be justified with the conditions under 
which one has shown that it is justified. On certain views of justification one cannot be 
justified unless one can show that one is justified. Dancy’s mistake may not then be a 
mistake but a substantive claim about the nature of justification. This is a view about 
justification  with  eloquent  exponents.  Thus  McDowell  describes  ‘the  time  honoured 
connection in our discourse between reasons the subject has for believing as she does and 
reasons she can give for thinking that way’ and criticises writers like Peacocke for having 
to ‘sever’ that connection (McDowell 1994: 162-166). 
There is  clearly something to the picture of justification that McDowell  recommends 
here. It is certainly true that when we have reasons for our beliefs, we can very often give 
them. It  is also true that we normally expect other people to be able to give us their 
reasons (the very young think that we should be able to do that indefinitely) and we 
frequently take the fact that others can’t give us their reasons as a sign that they do not 
really have any. That is partly why, as Austin pointed out, the question of why the subject 
believes as she does can be asked not just out of “respectful curiosity”, but pointedly; her 
inability to answer can only reveal that she ought not to have been so bold (Austin 1979: 
78).  These  are  no  doubt  some of  the  reasons  the  dialectical  regress  can strike  us  as 
plausible. When one has reasons, the normal expectation is that one will be able to give 
them.
However, this is just an expectation and it is defeasible. At least, that is how I will be 
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talking about justification. When I talk about justification I  am going to allow that a 
subject can have reasons or justification for believing what she does without necessarily 
being able to show that she has them, much as a person can be honest or funny without 
necessarily being able to defend the claim that she is honest or funny when under attack. 
This seems the more natural usage and the more plausible. At the most basic level talk of 
justification is a way of appraising someone who is doing well in her thoughts; there is no 
reason to think that necessarily brings with it the ability to show that you are justified.11 
The  latter  requires  that  you  recognise  that  you  are  justified  and  have  the  ability  to 
articulate and perhaps even defend the grounds upon which that is so. This looks like a 
more sophisticated cognitive achievement. Even where we are able to defend the claim 
that we are justified it is still important to distinguish between what it is that shows that 
we  are  justified  and  what  it  is  which  makes  it  the  case  that  we  are  justified.  Not 
everything that plays one role may be capable of playing the other. In order to show that 
you are justified you have to adduce claims to that effect, which claims are expressive of 
your  beliefs.  Showing  that  you  are  justified  may therefore  always involve  appeal  to 
beliefs. We will see shortly that it is crucial to foundationalism that being justified does 
not.
None of this to deny that there is something gripping about, what we might call, the 
‘internalism’ McDowell  here  expresses  -  the  idea  that  when  one  is  justified  one’s 
justification ought to be somehow ‘available’ to one. It is very plausible to think that for 
something to be your reason as opposed to just a reason, or for it to be what makes you 
justified in believing, it has to accessible to you: it has to be a basis upon which you can 
11 Alston claims this as an “elementary point” (Alston 1976: 178). 
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justifiably form a belief, not just a basis upon which a belief could be so formed. But 
since it is not in virtue of your ability to articulate your reasons as your reasons that they 
count as yours we can acknowledge what is right about this line of thought without going 
as far as McDowell. They can be your reasons or what makes you justified in believing 
what you do even if you cannot state that fact when pressed, much less defend it under 
questioning.12 It  is  also plausible to think that  reasons  must  possess  a certain sort  of 
‘evidence’ or perspicuity. They must be the sorts of things of which you are somehow 
aware: if they do not consciously reveal the world as being a certain way, what leads you 
to believe it to be one way rather than another? Again though that doesn’t warrant going 
as far as McDowell. What reasons make manifest, first and foremost, is the layout of the 
world, not their own status as reasons. It is the latter, however, that one would require for 
showing that one is justified.
As I understand it, then, justification is the sort of thing you can have without necessarily 
being able to show that you have it however often the two may in fact accompany one 
another. And when I talk about foundationalism as a position motivated in part by the 
epistemic regress argument I mean it’s a position motivated by the justification-making 
version of that argument. 
So how does that argument motivate what I am calling foundationalism? Recall that the 
argument starts  from reflection on cases of inferential  justification – that  is,  cases in 
12 If one models accessibility as, in effect, belief – so that for a given fact to be accessible is for you to 
believe that fact obtains –there would be a much tighter connection between what is accessible and what is 
capable of being articulated (assuming beliefs are capable of being articulated). But we have no reason to 
model accessibility in that way.
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which one’s justification derives from other things that one has justification for believing. 
This is how many of our beliefs do seem to be justified. For instance, I may believe that 
Tony Blair will not win another election because I believe his policy in Iraq has been so 
unpopular  with  the  electorate.  That  belief  may be  what  makes  it  the  case  that  I  am 
justified in my belief about his electoral  prospects.  Or I may believe that Socrates is 
mortal because I believe that Socrates is a man and that all men are mortal. Some people 
call that ‘mediate justification’ since other beliefs, in this case my beliefs about foreign 
policy and mortality, mediate my justification. I’m going to stick with inferential though, 
since it is an important part of the reason why those further beliefs justify me that there is 
an acceptable inference between them and the belief they are claimed to justify. The fact 
that Blair’s policies have been unpopular with the electorate makes it likely that he will 
not win: my beliefs thus stand in a relation of probabilification. In other cases the relation 
will be one of implication: that Socrates is a man and all men are mortal implies that 
Socrates is mortal.13
According to the epistemic regress argument where we have a belief that is justified we 
can ask what makes it the case that belief is justified: we can ask why the subject believes 
as she does or what justifies her in that belief. So in answer to the question what justifies 
my belief about Blair’s electoral prospects we can appeal to my belief about his foreign 
policy. But what justifies this belief? If I don’t have any reason to believe his policy has 
been unpopular then I won’t have any reason to believe that he will not win. So what 
13 It is important to what I am calling inferential justification that the inference be available between one’s 
beliefs. Some people think that all justificatory relations obtain in virtue of inferential relations between a 
subject’s attitudes, whether or not the attitudes involved are beliefs. This will not make all justification 
inferential in the sense in which I am interested. I’ll return to this issue in chapter 3. 
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justifies me in the belief about his foreign policy? Here again the answer may involve 
appeal to beliefs and what justifies these beliefs may be yet further beliefs still. But how 
far can things carry on in this fashion? 
On the face of it there seem to be only four ways in which the justificatory regress can 
pan out:
1. The regress ends with a belief that is not justified. While it is not justified it is still 
able to justify other beliefs.
2. The regress goes on forever: the belief that p is justified by the belief that q, and 
the belief that q is justified by the belief that r, and the belief that r is justified 
by….and so on, ad infinitum.
3. The regress circles back upon itself: the belief that p is justified by the belief that 
q, and the belief that q is justified by the belief that r,  and the belief that r is 
justified by the belief that p.
4. The  regress  ends  with  a  belief  that  is  non-inferentially  justified:  while  it  is 
justified, it does not draw it’s justification from other justified beliefs.
If this is the choice with which the regress presents us, what would be a good response? 
According to the position that I am calling foundationalism it is only if the fourth option 
is correct, and some of our beliefs are non-inferentially justified, that any of our beliefs 
are  justified  at  all.  This  is  how  the  regress  argument  motivates  foundationalism. 
According to this argument foundationalism is the only alternative to the view that none 
of our beliefs is justified. This ought to make it irresistible to all but the most sceptically 
minded.14
14 It is also possible to frame the argument in terms of knowledge. Just as we ask why one believes p, so too 
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Now we know what the regress argument is supposed to be, we can ask whether it is any 
good.  The  argument  is  an  argument  by  elimination  so  the  case  in  favour  of 
foundationalism is only as good as the case against scepticism and the other options (1-
3).  I  am not  going to  defend the  rejection  of  scepticism,  but  I  will  now defend the 
rejection of the three alternatives. While they all enjoy support in some quarters, a strong 
case can be made against each of them. The case against them is strong insofar as it relies 
upon assumptions about justification that it is overwhelmingly plausible to make. It may 
be possible to give them up, but why do so unless we really have to? 
The  first  option  claims  that  the  regress  ends  with  an  unjustified  belief.  While  it  is 
unjustified  it  is  still  able  to  justify  other  beliefs.  How can a  belief  that  is  not  itself 
justified, justify other beliefs? Many writers take that to be obviously impossible. Thus, 
Susan Haack simply states without further ado:
If A believes that p on the basis of his belief that q, then he is not justified in 
believing that p unless he is justified in believing that q  (Haack 1993: 22).
Haack is not alone. The idea that beliefs must be justified in order to justify other beliefs 
is intuitive and it is grounded in a picture of the way in which beliefs confer justification 
that makes a lot of broader sense. 
Take any central case in which one belief justifies another belief and it seems to do so in 
virtue of  inferential  relations  between the propositions believed.  The reason why my 
we also ask how one knows p. It is easy to use the latter to initiate a regress: much of what we know we 
know because we have inferred those things from other things that we know, but could all our knowledge 
be like this? Not according to the foundationalist.
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belief  about  Blair’s  unpopular  foreign policy justifies  my belief  that  he will  not  win 
another election is that it stands in a relation of probabilification to the latter. Similarly, 
the reason why my beliefs that Socrates is a man and all men are mortal justifies me in 
believing that Socrates is mortal, is that the former imply the latter. Inferential relations 
are therefore an important part of the story as far as beliefs go. But it is obviously not 
enough for one belief to justify another that it merely stand in inferential relations like 
these to it. That would make it far too easy to be justified since every belief stands in an 
infinite number of such relations to all manner of other beliefs (including itself). 
Of course, such relations might explain why I believe certain things, given what else I 
believe. They might in that sense make it rationally intelligible that I believe as I do. But 
they do not, by themselves, give me any justification to believe those things, since they 
do not, by themselves, give me any reason to suppose that things actually are as my 
beliefs  represent  them as  being  This  is  what  Laurence  BonJour  is  getting  at  in  the 
following passage. He writes:
For the belief that p to be genuinely justified by virtue of such a justificatory 
argument, the belief that q must itself already be justified in some fashion; merely 
being inferable from an unsupported guess or hunch, for example, can confer no 
genuine justification (BonJour 1985: 18).
BonJour’s thought is that merely appealing to inferential relations will not do. This seems 
right; we want justification to be a guide to how things actually are in the world. We want 
it to have a connection with truth and mere inferential relations do not secure that. 
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So we need a further constraint and this is precisely the role played by the requiring the 
beliefs involved be justified. By specifying that the ‘inputs’ to this potential inference be 
justified we plug the intuitive justificatory gap that merely believing something leaves 
open.15 This gives us a picture of the way in which beliefs confer justification according 
to which justificatory status is  inherited. Beliefs justify other beliefs to which they are 
suitably related and they do so by passing on their own justification. This is a compelling 
picture and it explains why an unjustified belief cannot make another belief justified. A 
belief cannot pass on justification it does not itself possess, just as I cannot inherit your 
car if you do not yourself possess one.16 If so then the first option according to which the 
regress ends with an unjustified belief is a non-starter.
Up  until  now  I  have  talked  rather  loosely  about  the  way  in  which  beliefs  confer 
justification.  Actually  the  claim being  made  here  is  a  claim about  inference  and the 
conditions under which the fact one’s beliefs stand in inferential relations to one another 
is  capable of conferring justification. I am claiming that inference, in this sense, is a 
conditional vehicle of justification; it only confers justification where the input beliefs are 
already justified. Dancy makes a similar point in the following passage:
Inference is basically a matter of moving from premises to conclusion along an 
acceptable path. If the premises are unjustified there will be no justification for 
the conclusion  - at least not by this inference (Dancy 1985: 55).
15 In other cases perhaps the sort of ‘attitude’ involved might plug that gap. But this is not plausible in the 
case of belief: the mere fact that one believes something, together with the fact that what one believes 
implies or probabilifies something else, isn’t enough to confer justification on the latter. Here, we must 
specify that the attitude (viz. belief) have a certain additional property, namely that of being justified.
16 In a similar vein, Jose Zalabardo claims “When a proposition p obtains warrant inferentially, it inherits it 
from other propositions to which it is suitably related. And p cannot inherit from other propositions warrant 
that the latter don’t possess” (Zalabardo, unpublished).
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This  makes  inference  an  essentially  dependent form  of  epistemic  justification:  its 
existence and functioning as a source of justification depends upon the existence and 
functioning of some other source of justification.17 
This is why we need to distinguish between the conditions under which justification is 
inferential,  and  the  conditions  under  which  it  derives  from  beliefs.  Beliefs  may  be 
capable of furnishing us with a different sort of justification. In that case it may not be 
true  that  they  must  be  justified  in  order  to  confer  justification.18 However,  this 
justification will not be inferential justification. This response will then no longer be a 
version of the first option; it will be a version of the fourth. It is hard to imagine what that 
role might be and that makes it tempting to frame the conclusion that I have drawn about 
inference as a conclusion about beliefs more generally and the conditions under which 
they are capable of furnishing us with justification. Strictly speaking, though, I have only 
argued for  the  claim about  beliefs  insofar  as  they confer  justification by standing in 
inferential relations to other beliefs. I claim that in those circumstances, beliefs can only 
make other beliefs justified where they are themselves justified. 
This  is  a very plausible  idea and it  rules  out  the first  option according to which the 
regress ends with an unjustified belief. Notice though that is not part of a general claim 
17 See also (Ginet 2005: 148-9).
18 Suppose I have the unjustified belief that Fino is matured in contact with air. Can’t that belief still make 
me justified in believing that I have at least one belief? If so it is not true that only justified beliefs can 
make other beliefs justified, since my belief about Fino is not justified. Perhaps this makes sense; either 
way it would not be a case of inferential justification since there are no appropriate inferential relations 
between these two beliefs. There are appropriate inferential relations between the belief that I believe that 
Fino is matured in contact with air and the belief that I have at least one belief. But it is not obvious the 
former belief is unjustified; it  is my views about Fino that are unjustified, not my views about what I 
believe about Fino.
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about justifiers; it is a specific claim about inferentially justified beliefs. It says they can 
only confer justification where they are themselves justified. For all that’s been said there 
may be other things which can make a subject justified – other things which can confer 
justification upon a belief – about which it doesn’t even make sense to wonder whether or 
not they are themselves justified. As we will that possibility is central to foundationalism. 
What about the second option? Is there anything wrong with supposing that the regress 
goes  on ad infinitum? Since  we do have actually have  an infinite  number of  beliefs 
supporting  each and every one of  our  beliefs,  this  response  cannot  be the only non-
sceptical way of terminating the regress.19 Assuming it is unacceptable to claim that none 
of  our  beliefs  is  justified,  the  possibility  of  an  infinite  regress  cannot  show  that 
foundationalism  doesn’t  accurately  describe  the  actual  justificatory  structure  of  our 
beliefs. This may be all the foundationalist needs, but I think we are entitled to a stronger 
conclusion in any case since ‘infinitism’ does not succeed in articulating a justificatory 
structure our beliefs could possibly enjoy (whether or not they actually enjoy it). Or so I 
will now argue.
The reason is very simple and takes us back to the point made at the end of the previous 
discussion in connection with the proposal that the regress ends with an unjustified belief. 
We are now considering a response according to which the regress goes on ad infinitum 
with each belief inferentially justified by some further belief. However. I have already 
19 Some self-styled ‘infinitists’ are not committed to thinking we must actually have an infinite number of 
beliefs. Peter Klein thinks our beliefs merely become more justified, the greater the number of beliefs we 
have in support of them. This is not a version of ‘infinitism’ as I understand that position; it is a version of 
coherentism (as Klein himself acknowledges) (Klein 2005).
39
argued that inference is an essentially dependent source of justification: its existence and 
functioning as a source of justification depends upon the existence and functioning of 
another source of justification. Given that is so, it is not possible that inference could be 
the only source of justification. It is not intelligible that it could be the only way in which 
justification is conferred upon a subject’s beliefs as the present response envisages since 
it  is not an autonomous source of justification in that sense.  If that is right,  then the 
second option according to which the regress goes on ad infinitum is no good either.20
What about  the third option according to which the regress  circles back upon itself? 
According to this option what justifies my belief that it rained last night might be my 
belief that the grass is wet and what justifies my belief that the grass is wet might be my 
belief that it rained last night. Does this make sense? It looks like a case in which a belief 
effectively justifies itself and that seems to defeat the whole point of requiring that beliefs 
be justified in the first place. 
The obvious inadequacy of this response brings out even more clearly the underlying 
inadequacy of inference as a source of justification and helps explain why we should 
think that it is a fundamentally dependent form of epistemic justification. If inference 
were not a dependent source of justification as I have claimed it is unclear why circularity 
of this sort wouldn’t be acceptable. After all, one of the beliefs that every belief stands in 
20 Here is another way to see that: arguments are only as good as their starting points. This is what I mean 
when I  say that  inference is  a  conditional  vehicle  of  justification  -  whether  it  succeeds in  conferring 
justification depends on whether the starting points are any good. An infinite regress is compatible with the 
starting points being all good or being all bad. The fact that, for every belief there is some further belief that 
would support it doesn’t suffice to determine whether they do support it. All it rules out is the possibility 
that if any of the beliefs in the series is justified, then they aren’t all justified given that each has successors 
that would justify it. But if inferential relations don’t suffice to determine whether any is good though then 
something else must be necessary. 
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inferential relations to is itself; the belief that p stands in a relation of implication to the 
belief  that  p.  So  if  inferential  relations  between  one’s  beliefs  were  sufficient  for 
justification (if inference could in that sense be one’s sole source of justification) then one 
could be justified in believing anything whatsoever provided only that one does believe 
it. 
This is totally unacceptable: beliefs are not justified simply in virtue of being held and 
they do  not  in  that  way justify  themselves.21 Indeed,  this  misses  the  whole  point  of 
requiring that beliefs be justified in the first place. The original idea was that there should 
be something which functions as a reason why the belief is likely to be true and makes it 
something you ought to believe, something over and above the mere fact you do believe 
it. Thinking of inference as a dependent source of justification as I have done enables us 
to explain why circularity of this sort is unacceptable. Given that is so the third option 
according to which the regress goes round in such circles is also no good.
Having just said that I want to acknowledge that this is not the only way that people have 
understood  the  suggestion  that  the  regress  ‘circles’ back  upon  itself.  According  to  a 
position known as coherentism the objection just raised goes wrong in assuming a ‘linear’ 
conception of conception. According to the coherentist’s holistic alternative we are not to 
think of justification being passed from one belief to the next, eventually landing up back 
with  the  belief  with which the series  begun.  Rather,  justification is  a  property of  an 
individual’s entire set of beliefs. Specifically, it is that property the set enjoys when it’s 
21 Thus Quinton writes: ‘For a belief to be justified it is not enough for it to be accepted, let alone merely 
entertained: there must also be good reason for accepting it’ (Quinton 1973: 119).
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individual members ‘cohere’ with one another and it accrues to each individual belief in 
virtue of its membership of such a set of beliefs.
This is a very implausible account of what justifies our beliefs, but I do not want to take 
issue with it here. The important point is that this strategy effectively appeals to beliefs 
that are non-inferentially justified in terminating the regress. In fact, it says that all of our 
beliefs are non-inferentially justified, since it says that they are all justified by the fact 
they belong to a coherent set of beliefs and that is not where justification comes from in 
standard cases of inferential justification. 
What I mean by this is that the relations the coherentist appeals to are not inferential 
relations of the usual sort - they are not like the relation that Socrates is a man and all 
men are mortal stand in to the belief that Socrates is mortal - they are far more extensive 
and encompass all  of an individual’s beliefs.  There is also a difference in the sort  of 
access  the  subject  has  to  those  relations  and the  role  they play in  getting  her  to  be 
justified. In the Socrates case, there’s a fairly robust sense in which I believe that Socrates 
is mortal because I believe that he is a man and that all men are mortal; the latter beliefs 
really are operative in getting me to believe as I do, and if I had different beliefs on that 
front,  I’d  adjust  my beliefs  about  his  mortality  accordingly.  This  is  quite  unlike  the 
holistic case, where it is doubtful whether I am aware of the relevant facts about all my 
beliefs  and  their  inter-relations  (or  could  even  easily  become  aware  of  them),  and 
doubtful these facts are in any way operative in getting me to believe as I do. This may be 
the basis on which certain coherentist epistemologists form their beliefs, but it is clearly 
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not the basis upon which most of us do so.22
Finally,  though, even the coherentist  doesn’t  just  appeal to facts about the inferential 
relations between our beliefs, however extensive we take the set to be. She also has a 
story to tell about why the fact that one’s beliefs cohere makes them likely to be true, and 
hence why it should be a justification that they provide. For instance, Davidson appeals to 
the fact that beliefs are by nature veridical (Davidson 2000). This ought to remove any 
remaining temptation to call this a case of inferential justification, in the ordinary sense. 
We certainly do not ordinarily appeal to facts about the nature of beliefs in making sense 
of inferential justification. Coherentism is therefore a version of the fourth strategy which 
I have associated with foundationalism, rather than the third.
I  am not  claiming  that  coherentism is  a  particularly  plausible  version  of  the  fourth 
strategy or that there is nothing awkward about so characterising it. I am just claiming 
that overall it is better seen as a version of the fourth strategy which appeals to a non-
inferential  source of justification,  than to one which maintains that  all  justification is 
inferential in the relevant sense. In the end, though, it may be more accurate to say the 
coherentist simply rejects the framework of inferential and non-inferential justification 
within which the regress is  set.  After  all,  that  position is  one according to which all 
beliefs have the same source of justification; they are all justified by the fact they are 
22 Intuitively to  be  justified  in  believing  p  is  to  believe  p  on  the  basis  of  the  facts  which  give  you 
justification to believe p. This is hard for the coherentist to make sense of, since it is very hard to see how a 
belief’s inter-relations to all other beliefs could be the ‘basis’ on which you adopt it. The only obvious way 
of making sense of this is to suppose you believe p on the basis of a coherentist meta-argument claiming 
that the belief that p coheres with the rest of one’s beliefs, and that beliefs which cohere are likely to be 
true. This makes sense of how such facts could intelligibly be the basis upon which one believes but it is 
clearly  very  implausible  as  a  description  of  the  basis  upon  which  most  people  form  their  beliefs. 
Coherentism therefore leaves most people’s beliefs unjustified and that isn’t much of a recommendation. 
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members of a coherent set. Ironically, it may turn out that the best way of bringing out the 
difference between coherentism and more traditional versions of the fourth response is 
not by stressing the idea that some justification is non-inferential (since that is something 
the coherentist thinks is true of all beliefs) but by stressing the idea that some justification 
is  actually  inferential  (some of  it  really  does  derive  from other  things  that  we  have 
justification for believing). Intuitively, not all beliefs have the same source of justification 
and this is something the coherentist denies.
So I  have  claimed that  inferential  justification is  a  fundamentally dependent  form of 
epistemic justification and I have rejected options (1-3) on that ground. However, I have 
also suggested that subtle variations of those options ought to count as versions of the 
fourth strategy. It is now time to consider this option – the option according to which the 
regress  ends  with  a  belief  that  is  non-inferentially  justified.  Would  this  be  a  good 
response to the regress?
On  the  face  of  it,  yes  it  would.  Unlike  the  other  three  options  there  is  nothing 
immediately implausible about the suggestion that the regress ends with a belief that is 
non-inferentially justified.23 Some people deny that a belief can be justified by anything 
other than its inferential relations to other justified beliefs. But there is nothing intuitive 
about this view. It rests entirely upon philosophical arguments that we will  later find 
wanting.  Given  that  options  (1-3)  are  no  good,  and  that  there  is  nothing  intuitively 
problematic with the fourth option, the regress argument does look like a good argument 
23 Of course, it is much harder to see how one would stop the dialectical regress in this way. How can one 
show that a belief is justified other than by producing a justificatory argument in its favour? See also (Pryor 
2005: 193-4).
44
in favour of thinking that there must be such a thing as non-inferential justification.
But  is  it  a  good  argument  in  favour  of  foundationalism?  It  is  certainly  not  a  good 
argument in favour of foundationalism in the traditional sense. Nothing in this argument 
supports  the  demand  for  a  layer  of  non-inferentially  justified  or  epistemically  basic 
beliefs  distinguished  in  terms  of  their  content  or  enjoying  the  sorts  of  strong 
epistemological privileges that Williams and Sosa describe. All this argument supports is 
the claim that there must be some beliefs that are non-inferentially justified; there must be 
some beliefs that do not draw their justification from their inferential relations to other 
justified beliefs. It  doesn’t tell us anything about the sorts of beliefs that can be non-
inferentially justified or what it is about them that enables them to play that role. Any 
substantive  claims  on  that  score  are  totally  unmotivated.  The  regress  argument  is 
therefore not a good argument in favour of foundationalism as traditionally conceived.
Is it  a good argument in favour of foundationalism in my sense? I have claimed that 
foundationalism is a view about the structure of justification (a) and a view about its 
sources (b) & (c). With respect to (a) I have claimed that foundationalism is a view about 
the structure of justification that is motivated by the epistemic regress argument. The 
foundationalist  claims  that  we  must  acknowledge  the  existence  of  non-inferentially 
justified beliefs in order to respond satisfactorily to that argument. This is precisely what 
we have just seen the regress does establish, given that the other three alternatives are no 
good and that scepticism is false. So the regress argument is a good argument in favour of 
(a).  That  is  hardly surprising  though since  (a)  simply commits  the  foundationalist  to 
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whatever it  is  one  needs  to  solve  that  problem. Once one  sees  foundationalism as  a 
response to the regress argument it is easy to see that my response is a better response to 
that  argument  than the  traditional  view,  since  my view is  actually motivated by that 
argument. The traditional view, by contrast, commits itself to all sorts of things that just 
aren’t relevant to solving that problem. 
Of course someone might now say: why call that view ‘foundationalism’? In a way this is 
a  good question.  As we have just  seen the regress  argument  only gets you as far  as 
thinking there must be some non-inferential justification. This cannot be all there is to 
foundationalism; it is far too permissive. We have seen that slightly modified versions of 
options (1-3) all appeal to non-inferential sources of justification on one reading, yet it 
would be wrong to think of those positions as forms of foundationalism in any serious 
sense.  This  is  why (a)  is  only one component  of the position I  call  foundationalism. 
Foundationalism isn’t just a view about the overall structure of justification. It is also a 
view about the sources of justification. This is the point of (b) and (c). A foundationalist 
also  thinks  that  perception  is  a  distinctive  and  privileged  source  of  non-inferential 
justification. 
So is the regress argument a good argument in favour of these claims? No. The regress 
argument doesn’t say anything about where justification actually comes from; it just tells 
us where it doesn’t come from. So the regress argument is therefore not a good argument 
in favour of foundationalism in my sense sense since it doesn’t on its own get you all 
three components of that position. It is a good argument for (a) but not for (b) or (c).
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Of  course,  once  we  get  as  far  as  acknowledging  the  existence  of  non-inferential 
justification  an  overwhelmingly  natural  question  presents  itself:  where  does  such 
justification come from? There is then a very natural progression from this view to full-
blown foundationalism in my sense, since the natural answer to this question is to advert 
to the senses. This is an independently plausible claim about where justification actually 
comes from and the beauty of this response is that it looks like it provides just the kind of 
non-inferential justification that we need – the sort of justification, that is, which doesn’t 
land us back with a form of the regress. Unlike inference, perception isn’t an essentially 
dependent form of epistemic justification. It doesn’t merely spread around justification 
that is already there or require antecedently justified beliefs as inputs. It can be what, in 
the first instance, gives us justification to believe; it is a source of new justification. 
But this response, however natural, is not mandated by the regress; it is not something 
that argument establishes. This is not to deny that the story one tells about how or why 
the senses are a privileged source of justification might not be tacitly informed by the 
picture of justification underlying the regress, or that rivals like coherentism might not 
run counter the spirit of that argument. I have already pointed out that coherentism sits 
oddly  next  to  the  idea  that  there  are  both  inferential  and  non-inferential  sources  of 
justification,  and  it  repudiates  the  linear  conception  of  justification  underlying  that 
argument by denying that we can meaningfully ask after the justification of an individual 
belief  without  settling  the  status  of  all  the  rest.  We  will  see  in  later  chapters  how 
foundationalism is more in keeping with the spirit of the regress. My point is merely that 
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the  foundationalist’s  claims  about  the  primacy  of  perception  and  about  where  non-
inferential  justification  comes  from are  not  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  regress 
argument. 
This  is  a  strength  rather  than  a  weakness  in  the  foundationalist’s  argument  since  it 
depends upon considerations that even those who claim not to be moved by the regress or 
its  linear  conception  of  justification ought  to  take  seriously.  Views  like  coherentism, 
which fail to do so, and which deny that there is any such thing as distinctively perceptual 
justification are therefore doubly wide of the mark. The fact that they aren’t ruled out by 
the regress is not enough to save them given that this is not the only thing to be said in 
favour  of  foundationalism.  Foundationalism  is  also  motivated  by  the  desire  to 
accommodate  the  obvious  fact  that  perception  plays  a  justificatory  role  and  that  is 
something the coherentist denies. This is a reason not to take that position seriously quite 
aside from concerns about the regress.
3. Conclusion
In conclusion,  I  have argued that the epistemic regress argument doesn’t  establish as 
much as  some have thoughts  since  it  doesn’t  establish foundationalism. It  is  a  good 
argument  in  favour  of  one  component  of  that  view,  but  not  the  other.  This  is  not  a 
problem for my view, however, since I am not taking foundationalism to be motivated 
solely by the  regress  argument.  The regress  argument  motivates  the  foundationalist’s 
claims about the overall  structure of justification.  But foundationalism is also a  view 
about its sources. Specifically, it is the view that perception or observation is the basic 
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source of justification. This is not motivated by the regress argument and nor is it meant 
to be.  It  is an independently plausible claim about where justification actually comes 
from. The next chapter will explore two very different ways in which a foundationalist 
can try and hold onto it. 
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL
CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONALISTS
1. Introduction
In chapter 1 I offered a certain characterisation of foundationalism. Foundationalism is a 
view  about  the  structure  of  epistemic  justification  and  a  view  about  its  sources. 
Specifically,  it’s  the  view  that  (a)  some  of  our  beliefs  must  be  non-inferentially 
justification, and that (b) perception is not only a source of such justification, but (c) a 
basic source of such justification. If you look at what actual historical foundationalists 
have  said  though,  their  position  seems  to  be  quite  different  from  what  I’m  calling 
‘foundationalism’. They don’t appear to be committed to (b), let alone (c). And they are 
committed to, or at least endorse, a series of further claims that I don’t talk about at all. 
Historically,  foundationalists  had  distinctive views about  the  content  or  nature of  the 
basic or non-inferentially justified beliefs, the source of our knowledge of them, and the 
epistemic credentials  of such beliefs.  I  am silent  about  these further  claims.  I  do not 
commit the foundationalist to them; and, in fact, my view is that these further claims are 
almost certainly false. So there’s a discrepancy; while I commit the foundationalist to (a), 
(b), and (c), foundationalists historically endorsed a very different set of claims.
Someone might therefore say: ‘you can call your position ‘foundationalism’ if you like, 
but that is not a label that makes any historical sense. Your position is just too different 
from  those  historically  called  foundationalist  so  to  insist  on  calling  it  that  is  just 
50
anachronistic’. My reply to this objection is that we have to distinguish between what the 
historical foundationalists thought and what they should have thought – that is, between 
those claims they actually endorsed and those they were committed to endorsing. What 
I’ll be arguing in this chapter is that historical foundationalists needn’t have committed 
themselves to these further claims and, what’s  more,  they shouldn’t  have done. They 
needn’t have done because you don’t need to think these further things in order to deal 
with the epistemic regress argument. And they shouldn’t have done for lots of familiar 
reasons; most obviously, you end up with an implausible and unworkable account of what 
actually justifies most of our beliefs. 
Insofar as the historical foundationalists really did commit themselves on this score, their 
position is no good. This is the moral of the first half of this chapter. But this chapter is 
not all negative. Foundationalism isn’t just important assuming we ignore everything that 
foundationalists ever actually said. Some of the considerations motivating these thinkers 
were understandable and a lot of what they thought was almost right. Or so I will argue. 
In  particular,  I  will  argue  that  although  traditional  foundationalists  might  not  have 
explicitly asserted (b) or (c) they did, in effect, think something like that. They thought 
that  observation  or  perception  (albeit  of  a  funny  sort)  was  a  source  of  justification 
fundamentally distinct from reasoning or inference. There is something importantly right 
about that. Unfortunately in their case other commitments got in the way and prevented 
them from seeing that straight. Under the weight of these additional commitments that 
idea  got  perverted  and  ultimately  transposed  into  something  importantly  different. 
Nonetheless, the original insight – the real driving force – is one that we should hold onto 
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and  in  chapter  3  I’ll  show how we  can  do  so  without  being  foundationalists  in  the 
traditional sense.
What I really want to do in this chapter, then, is to save historical foundationalism from 
itself. I want to show why all the things which traditionally got these thinkers into trouble 
are things they didn’t need to think. And I also want to show why my own position, 
which doesn’t endorse these further claims, still deserves the label ‘foundationalism’. It’s 
not just that the label fits if you leave aside everything the foundationalists historically 
thought. It fits in a historically meaningful sense since the two positions are ultimately 
driven by the same basic intuition. In both cases that intuition is a good one.
2. Historical Foundationalism
So who are these ‘historical foundationalists’ and what did they actually think?  While 
this label is perhaps most famously associated with early twentieth century thinkers such 
as Russell, Lewis, Chisholm, and Ayer, it can also be applied to early figures like Locke. 
They all thought that some of our beliefs must be non-inferentially justified and they all 
had a distinctive view about what could be justified in this way and why. It’s those views 
which distinguish historical foundationalism from the version of foundationalism that I’ll 
eventually be arguing we should adopt. Three claims, in particular, stand out. They are all 
part of the positive account of the non-inferentially justified or basic beliefs. I am going 
to call them the Subject-Matter, the Source, and the Status, Proposals respectively.
First, historical foundationalists had a distinctive view about the nature or content of the 
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epistemically basic beliefs. They thought that only beliefs about our own psychological 
states could be non-inferentially justified. In particular, they thought that ordinary beliefs 
about non-psychological reality - like the belief that there is a squirrel on the fence - 
could not be non-inferentially justified. For them the foundational knowledge was limited 
to knowledge of our own minds. Any belief about how things are in the world external to 
one’s own mind depends for its justification on inferences one can make from beliefs that 
are about one’s own mind. I’m going to call this the Subject-Matter Proposal since it’s a 
claim about the sorts of things that we can be non-inferentially justified in having beliefs 
about.
Second, historical foundationalists had a distinctive account of how we are in a position 
to form justified beliefs about our own minds. To claim that such beliefs are epistemically 
basic or non-inferentially justified is merely to say what doesn’t justify them; it says that 
they do not get  their  justification from their  inferential  relations to  other beliefs.  But 
we’re also owed a positive account of what does justify these beliefs. The traditional 
answer was ‘observation’. You are in a position to justifiably make judgement about your 
own psychological states because you ‘observe’ or are ‘acquainted’ with or are otherwise 
somehow aware of those states, and form your beliefs about them on that basis. This is 
why  such  beliefs  are  not  inferentially  justified  since  observation  is  not  a  form  of 
inference. It offers a fundamentally different model of how we can be in a position to 
make judgements. I am going to call this the  Source Proposal since it is a claim about 
where the justification for basic beliefs comes from, given that it doesn’t come from other 
justified beliefs.
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The third defining feature of historical foundationalism is an account of the epistemic 
status of beliefs about our own psychological states. They had impressive epistemological 
credentials according to the historical foundationalists and were commonly held to be 
both infallible (that is, incapable of being mistaken) and indefeasible (incapable of being 
rationally revised). This is what I’m calling the Epistemic Status Proposal.
These three proposals help to define historical foundationalism. What is the relationship 
between  them? In  the  secondary  literature  it  is  common to  stress  the  third  proposal 
concerning the  epistemic  status  of  beliefs  about  our  own psychological  states  (Audi, 
1998,  BonJour  1985,  Dancy  1985,  Lehrer  2000,  Pollock  &  Cruz  1999.  Traditional 
foundationalists  it  is  claimed had a  particular  view about  non-inferential  justification 
according  to  which  only beliefs  that  were  incapable  of  being  mistaken  or  rationally 
revised could be justified in this way. After all, if a belief could be mistaken it would be 
as much in need of epistemic support as any other belief and so could hardly provide the 
secure foundations upon which the others rest. Beliefs about non-psychological reality, 
like the belief that there is a squirrel on the fence, can be mistaken. But beliefs about 
psychological reality cannot and it is because these beliefs can’t be mistaken that they can 
provide the secure foundations that we need. Thus Dancy writes:
How is  it  that  beliefs  about  our  present  sensory states  need  no  support  from 
others, while all other beliefs require such support? The answer comes from the 
third  element  of  classical  foundationalism:  this  is  that  our  beliefs  about  our 
present sensory states are infallible. It is because of this that they can play the role 
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ascribed to them in this form of empiricism; beliefs about our present sensory 
states can be our basis – can stand on their own two feet and support the rest – 
because they are infallible (Dancy 1985: 53-4).
On this reading the overall  account is  driven by a certain view about non-inferential 
justification and what it would take for any belief to be justified in this way. This view 
explains why beliefs about our own psychological states are epistemically basic, as the 
Subject  Matter  proposal  claims,  since  it’s  only  those  beliefs  which  can  plausibly  be 
thought to enjoy such an exalted status. And it also explains why such beliefs have the 
epistemic source that they do, since observation is the basis upon which these beliefs are 
held on the traditional account. I am therefore going to call this the epistemological route 
to historical foundationalism. 
This explanation is probably the right one in some cases.24 It seems to be the picture that 
Russell has – he has a certain epistemological view about what it would take for any 
belief to be non-inferentially justified and that drives him to look for things which meet 
these requirements. The things he comes up with are so-called sense-data and ourselves. 
We can be mistaken in our beliefs about how things are in the world around us, but it is 
less obvious that we can be mistaken in our belief about the things that Russell picks on. 
The idea that we have privileged access to the self is widespread and not without appeal, 
and it was thought equally hard to make sense of error in the case of sense-data since the 
latter are mind-dependent objects that have exactly the properties they appear to have. 
Such objects were said to be ‘self-intimating’ to the subject upon whom their existence 
24 The precise nature of the epistemological view is open to question. In chapter 4 I will argue that it is  
indefeasibility rather than infallibility, which really drives this account. This is not the standard view one 
now finds in the literature.
55
depends.  According  to  Russell  these  are  the  things  with  which  we  are  ‘acquainted’. 
Moreover, it is our acquaintance with them that then explains how we are in a position to 
know about them. We are in a position to know or justifiably form beliefs about them 
insofar as we are aware of them in this special way and believe what we do on that basis. 
So acquaintance or awareness is the source of our justification, where that is essentially 
observation of a special sort of object (Russell 1912). 
In other cases, however, this is not the right order of explanation. In the case of someone 
like Locke it’s not so much that he has a special view about non-inferential justification, 
which then leads him to look for beliefs which could be justified in this way. Rather, he 
takes it for granted that observation is a source of justification and just happens to have a 
particular  metaphysical  view about  what  it  is  that  we actually  observe.  This  view is 
independently motivated. It claims that we do not perceive objects in the external world, 
at least not directly. We only really perceive our own ideas. For someone like Locke this 
is why it’s only beliefs about the latter that can be non-inferentially justified; we do not 
observe the former and so observation trivially isn’t available to justify our beliefs about 
them. The epistemic status of basic beliefs then falls out of this, since the things which 
Locke thinks we actually perceive happen to be such that  we cannot  be mistaken or 
rationally  revise  our  beliefs  about  them when we form those  beliefs  on  the  basis  of 
observation.
 
I’m going to call this the metaphysical route to historical foundationalism since it starts 
from a particular metaphysical picture of what it is that we observe. In both cases beliefs 
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about mind-independent objects depend on inferences we can make from beliefs about 
our own psychological states. But in Locke’s case there is no prior commitment to the 
idea  that  if  we  did  observe  such  objects,  observation  still  couldn’t  non-inferentially 
ground our beliefs about them. He just has other reasons for thinking we don’t observe 
mind-independent  objects.  The  overall  account  is  therefore  driven  by a  metaphysical 
view about what it is that we actually observe, rather than an epistemological view about 
the  conditions  under  which  observation,  per  se,  can  be  a  source  of  non-inferential 
justification. 
These are two different routes to the position that I’m calling historical foundationalism. 
Clearly in the case of many historical figures one can find elements of both. I am not 
claiming that these two motives operate entirely independently of one another, merely 
that in certain cases one is more pronounced than the other.  
At first glance historical foundationalism looks more like the position that Williams and 
Sosa describe and which I rejected in the first chapter than what I call foundationalism. In 
fact, however, not even historical foundationalists thought that the class of epistemically 
basic beliefs are ‘theoretically tractable’ as Williams requires. In particular, they did not 
think that there were ‘non-trivially specifically kinds of beliefs individuated by broad 
aspects of their content that are fitted to play the role of terminating points for chains of 
justification’ (Williams 2005: 203). The emphasis on content is absolutely crucial to the 
orthodox  view  one  finds  in  the  literature,  but  it  is  completely  foreign  to  historical 
foundationalism. On the historical account what is important about beliefs about one’s 
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own psychological states isn’t some aspect of their content; it is not that there’s a certain 
subject matter ‘the self and its states’ about which one is guaranteed not to be mistaken. 
These beliefs are special because - and only because - we form them on a certain basis, 
namely on the basis of acquaintance with (or observation of) those very states. 
According  to  the  historical  foundationalists,  acquaintance  or  observation  consciously 
presents us with the facts that make what we believe true: it makes those facts ‘manifest’ 
to us by consciously revealing them to us and that is why we are in an epistemically 
favourably position to make judgements about them. For the historical foundationalists, 
then, it’s the epistemic source of belief about our own psychological states rather than 
their content that is important in explaining why such beliefs can be justified in a way 
that doesn’t derive from the justification of other beliefs.25 The standard view one finds in 
the literature leaves this out altogether. 
The easiest way to see why that is so important is to think about cases in which we hold 
beliefs about our own psychological states on non-observational grounds. In such cases 
we won’t get the same explanation of why the beliefs in question are justified if I am 
right. If it is in virtue of the circumstances in which one comes to entertain the relevant 
belief  that  one  is  in  a  position  justifiably to judge,  then we shouldn’t  expect  beliefs 
formed in different circumstances to be justified in the same way, despite the fact that 
they concern the same topic. In fact, this is exactly what we find. 
25 I am not claiming these two things are totally distinct. Clearly it’s because such beliefs are ‘about’ what 
they are about (viz. our own minds) that they can be justified in the way that they are justified, that is, by 
observing our own mind. If they were about something else altogether, observation could not justify them. 
Still, it is the latter which explains why they are justified, not some aspect of their content.
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Consider the following case from Pollock and Cruz:
Consider  shadows on snow. Because shadows on white  surfaces  are  normally 
grey, most people think that shadows on snow are grey. But a discovery made 
fairly early by every landscape painter is that they are actually blue. A person 
having the general belief that shadows on snow are grey may, when queried about 
how a  particular  snow-shadow looks to  him, reply that  it  looks grey,  without 
paying any serious attention to his percept. His belief about how it looks is based 
upon his general belief rather than inspection of his percept, and is accordingly 
wrong. This shows that the belief is not incorrigible…Suppose further you’re your 
inductive evidence is faulty and you are unjustified in believing that shadows on 
white  surfaces  are  grey.  Then  you  are  unjustified  in  believing  that  the  snow 
shadow looks grey (Pollock & Cruz 1999: 58-60).26 
Cases are like are often thought to be a problem for the foundationalist; and they would 
be if the orthodox view were right and the foundationalist really was trying to delineate 
basic beliefs in terms of their content as Williams and others assume. 
I’m going to call that the Propositional Assumption since it claims that the foundationalist 
aims to articulate a set of propositions that we are non-inferentially justified in believing. 
This assumption goes unchallenged in the literature, but it is not an assumption to which 
26 Here is a different example (also based on an case of Pollock’s): suppose I have an alarm clock and I 
notice that every time the alarm goes off a light red light flashes in the lower left hand corner of my visual 
field and it appears red to me. A big bee now suddenly comes on the scene and hovers perilously close to 
my nose. Not surprisingly I forget all about the alarm clock and focus on the bee in the middle of my visual 
field. But I then hear the alarm go off and that gives me inductive grounds for believing that ‘it appears to 
me as if there is a red light flashing’ even if, having been so preoccupied with the bee, I fail to notice that is 
how things appear to me. 
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the  historical  foundationalists  were  committed,  as  my  characterisation  makes  clear.27 
They don’t think that any old beliefs about one’s own psychological states must be non-
inferentially justified. It is only beliefs that one holds on the basis of observing those 
states, and not all beliefs that are ‘about’ one’s own psychological states need to be held 
on that basis.28 
Pollock and Cruz consider that response, but duly reject it. They write:
There is a response to this counter-example which has considerable intuitive pull, 
at least initially. This is to agree that not all beliefs about how things appear to us 
are prima facie justified, but those based upon being appeared to in that way are. 
Taken literally, this makes no sense. Prima facie justification is a logical property 
of propositions. A proposition cannot have such a property at one time and fail to 
have it at another  (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 60-1).
In fact this does make sense - provided that one is not committed to the Propositional 
Assumption.  If  I  am right  the  historical  foundationalists  were  not  committed  to  this 
assumption; they think exactly what Pollock and Cruz think they cannot think and this is 
possible precisely because they do not aim to articulate a set of propositions we are non-
inferentially justified in believing in the way that he assumes.29  
27 Bill Brewer appears to be committed to this assumption, though not in the name of foundationalism. 
Brewer claims that in entertaining the content of a perceptual state one thereby necessarily recognises its 
truth, and hence has reason to endorse that content. This is how he thinks that our perceptual experiences 
provide reasons for our judgements about the world. (Brewer 1999: esp. 204-6).
28 How does this relate to what I earlier called the Subject-Matter Proposal? The latter lists the sorts of 
things we can be non-inferentially in having beliefs about. According to the traditional foundationalists that 
meant our own minds. This is not what the Propositional Assumption claims; it claims we can identify a set 
of propositions we  are non-inferentially justified in believing. But whether we are inferentially or non-
inferentially justified in believing some proposition depends on more than just what basis propositions like 
that can be held; it depends on what basis the proposition in question are held and that requires looking at 
more than the content of the beliefs involved.
29 Unfortunately they draw the wrong conclusions about foundationalism from their own examples. This is 
because he falsely assumes that foundationalism is a ‘doxastic’ theory. In the passage just quoted he goes 
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This is easy to overlook since we don’t normally hold beliefs about our own minds on 
other grounds. According to the historical foundationalists observation of one’s own mind 
is the canonical ground for beliefs about it. Not surprisingly therefore observation turns 
out to be the ground upon which these beliefs are in fact always held since there is no 
reason not to hold those beliefs on observational grounds, if such grounds are genuinely 
available. Still, it is not impossible to hold such beliefs on other grounds, even on the 
traditional account, and that tell us something important about historical foundationalism.
This is a much more attractive account of the source of our justification for beliefs about 
the mind, since there is no aspect of their content to which we can plausibly appeal in any 
case. In the literature it is often objected that beliefs about one’s own psychological states 
aren’t  ‘self-evident’.  Unlike  the  thought  that  whoever  is  tall  is  tall,  say,  the  mere 
entertaining of propositions about one’s own psychological states does not put one in a 
position to know whether or not they are true.30 This is very plausible. However, it is only 
an objection to the foundationalist if we assume that they must appeal to a subject’s grasp 
of the content of basic beliefs to explain why such beliefs are justified in a way that 
on: “the claim actually being made here is presumably a different one, viz., that when we are appeared to in 
a certain way, that in and of itself can make us at least defeasibly justified in believing that we are appeared 
to in that  way...later in this  book we will  endorse a  theory providing such a foundation for epistemic 
justification, but notice that such a theory is no longer a doxastic theory. The justifiedness of beliefs is no 
longer determined exclusively by what we believe. What percepts we have is also relevant. Thus this is not 
a way of saving doxastic foundationalism’ (Pollock 1999: 61). I don’t know how they first came to the 
conclusion that foundationalism is a doxastic theory.
30 One could try and argue that  the relevant content is  only available in the presence of  its  presented 
subject-matter, so that it is impossible even to frame thoughts about one’s own psychological states in other 
circumstances.  But  that  is  implausible  and  it  has  problematic  consequences  in  other  areas;  if  the 
foundations are really that limited, it’s even less plausible to suppose they suffice to support everything else 
that we know. Moreover, it’s unclear to what extent this account succeeds in preserving a pure subject-
matter account. What is special about the particular circumstances in which one comes to entertain these 
thoughts, if not the fact that one is consciously presented with the items about which one judges? In that 
case though do we really have anything more than a mere re-labelling of a source based account? 
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doesn’t  derive  from the  justification  of  other  beliefs.31 This  is  just  a  mistake.  Self-
evidence isn’t the only alternative to inferential justification. Observation is another and 
that I suggest is precisely what the historical foundationalists did appeal to. 
So I have now explained what the historical foundationalists actually thought and why 
what they thought is different from what they are usually portrayed as having thought. 
Broadly  speaking,  they  thought  that  basic  beliefs  are  beliefs  about  one’s  own 
psychological  states;  what  justifies  such  beliefs  is  the  fact  that  one  observes  or  is 
acquainted with one’s own psychological states; and that beliefs held on such a basis are 
epistemically privileged. This makes historical foundationalism a lot more plausible and 
interesting than it is often thought to be. Observation does seem to be a fundamental way 
in which we get in a position to know things. So if it is true that we do observe our own 
mental states this will constitute an appealing account of what justifies our beliefs about 
them. 
But  ‘more  plausible’  does  not  mean  ‘plausible’  and  in  other  respects  historical 
foundationalism remains distinctly odd. Even if we do observe our own mental states 
they are presumably not the only things that we observe or, indeed, the most obvious. 
Intuitively, we also observe objects and events in the world external to our minds, like 
squirrels sitting on fences. Historical foundationalists deny that this is so and that looks a 
long way from the truth. The next section will look at just far away they got.
31 Some historical figures we often think of as foundationalists may have thought that; perhaps Descartes 
did. I don’t think that these thinkers – that is, those who give no weight to observation – deserve to be seen 
as foundationalists. If that means that Descartes does not count as a foundationalist, so much the better. I 
don’t see that there is anything problematic about that.
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3. Revisionary Epistemology
The previous section looked at what the historical foundationalists actually thought. In 
any event it is clear this is not what they should have thought. This is so for a number of 
familiar reasons. The most obvious and the most powerful concerns what we are to say 
about the justification of beliefs that aren’t about our own psychological states. Even if 
traditional foundationalism does provide a satisfactory account of what justifies beliefs 
that are about our own minds, we have as yet no account of what justifies beliefs about 
the world external to our minds. Most of our beliefs fall into the latter category, so the 
foundationalist  had  better  have  a  good  answer  to  this  question.  The  answer  they 
traditionally gave was inference: beliefs about the world draw their justification from 
inferences we can make from beliefs about our own minds. This is hardly surprising. 
Foundationalists are committed to the view that all of our beliefs are either inferentially 
or non-inferentially justified. Beliefs about the world don’t qualify as non-inferentially 
justified  on  the  traditional  view,  so  they  must  be  inferentially  justified  (if  they  are 
justified at all), and it is hard to see what else to appeal to as premises other than beliefs 
about one’s own mind. 
This  view  is  subject  to  fatal  objections.  It  is  implausible  as  a  description  of  the 
psychological process by which we form beliefs about the external world. Such beliefs 
don’t appear to be formed on the basis of any kind of reasoning or conscious inference; 
they normally seem to be formed directly on the basis of perception or other’s say-so. 
Further, it  is implausible as an account of the justificatory status of such beliefs. The 
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precise nature of the problem here will depend on the details of the particular account 
given. On one view, our own mental states (including our ideas and ‘sense-data’) are held 
to be distinct from mind-independent objects in the physical world, and to stand in for or 
represent them. On another view, they partly constitute them. 
The latter view, known as ‘phenomenalism’, seems to call into question the existence of 
genuinely  mind-independent  objects;  while  the  former,  commonly  called  ‘indirect 
realism’, will have to rely on general bridging principles linking our ideas or sense-data 
with the objects  in the world that  they are held to represent.  In the second case,  the 
problem concerns the justification of the bridging principles. One possibility is that they 
are general causal principles stating that ideas or sense-data of such-and-such a sort are 
reliably correlated with (or caused by) physical objects of such-and-such a sort. Given 
such general principles, one’s own psychological states can serve to indicate how things 
are in the world around one; they can be a sign that they exist for one who knows the 
relevant  principles.  However,  it  is  a  familiar  point  that  our  justification  for  these 
principles appears not to be independent of our justification for beliefs about the world. 
Michael Martin makes this point in the following passage:
If  we  inquire  into  our  reasons  for  believing  that  certain  kinds  of  object  are 
normally  responsible  for  certain  kinds  of  experience  then  we  cannot  avoid 
appealing to  past  perceptual  beliefs  concerning our  encounters  with particular 
objects of that kind as part of our justification for these beliefs. If this is so, it 
suggests that perceptual beliefs about particular objects must ground our general 
beliefs about the causal connections between types of experience and the types of 
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things in the world, which cause them rather than vice-versa (Martin 1995: 42).
This is a problem assuming that the relevant bridging principles figure as premises in an 
inference to some conclusion about the world. If Martin is right, our justification for these 
premises is not independent of the conclusion it is meant to establish. This is a possibility 
we earlier rejected in connection with the epistemic regress. 
Another possibility, though, is that the relevant inference is abductive: the existence of 
such and such state of affairs in the world being held to be the best explanation of our 
enjoying  the  mental  goings-on  that  we  do.  Here,  the  problem  is  to  say  why  that 
hypothesis  - that things in the external world are thus and so - should really be the ‘best’ 
explanation of the course of one’s mental life. Ruling out other explanations, like the 
hypothesis  of  a  Berkelian  God keeping  the  perceptible  world  in  existence  from one 
moment  to  the  next,  is  a  familiar  problem  which  it  unclear  how  the  traditional 
foundationalist can hope to solve.
These questions lack satisfactory answers. The literature documenting why that is so is 
vast and it is not one to which I intend to add. My claim is that even if the traditional 
foundationalists did have a satisfactory account of what justifies beliefs about our own 
psychological states, they lack a satisfactory account of what justifies beliefs that aren’t 
about  our  own  psychological  states.  This  makes  traditional  foundationalism  a  fairly 
radical form of scepticism since most of our beliefs fall into the latter category and that is 
a position we have reason to reject.
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However,  historical  foundationalism doesn’t  just  fail  on  its  own  terms.  Even  if  that 
position  could  successfully  reconstruct  our  justification  for  beliefs  about  the  mind-
independent world using only the resources it permits itself viz. premises about the mind-
dependent world, the very idea of such a reconstruction is independently objectionable. It 
is objectionable since it is not as if we do not ordinarily have views about what actually 
justifies  us  in  such  beliefs.  These  views  are  wildly  at  odds  with  what  the  historical 
foundationalist says. So that account is an essentially revisionary account. This is another 
reason to reject it unless we have some special reason to suppose our ordinary views are 
mistaken on this score.
To see this, take a case in which I stop you on the street to ask the whereabouts of a shop 
that I am interested in finding. Suppose, being a local, you know and give expression to 
that knowledge, and that I simply take your for word for it and believe the shop to be 
where you have told me. In this case, and others like it, it is very natural to think that 
what justifies me is simply the fact that you have told me where the shop is.32 We could 
try and reconstruct my justification in inferential terms, perhaps using premises about 
what I take it you have said, and the likelihood that you are not lying and so on. But in 
many cases it is doubtful that we could do so satisfactorily. It is not often that I will have 
much justification for the relevant premises and if  I  am not justified in believing the 
premises of my argument then I will not be justified in any conclusion that I infer on their 
basis.33 But even if we could do this it still wouldn’t change the fact that the natural view 
32 Or, if one prefers, my having learnt from you where it is (McDowell 1998b).
33 In a similar vein McDowell writes “if we make the ancillary premises seem strong enough to do the trick, 
it merely becomes dubious that the tourist has them at his disposal; whereas if we weaken the premises, the 
doubt attaches to their capacity to transmit, across the argument, the right sort of rational acceptability for 
believing its conclusion to amount to knowledge...Let it be the most favourable case we can imagine. Let 
the hearer have all kinds of positive evidence that the speaker is speaking his mind: a steady honest-looking 
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is that my justification is not inferential. The natural view, and the view we all give in 
these cases, is that my justification derives from your having told me. This is to appeal to 
a non-inferential source of justification. 
The point I am making here is really very simple. We do have intuitions about how our 
beliefs are justified and it is normally pretty easy to get people to acknowledge when 
their justification is tacitly inferential – even in cases in which it mightn’t initially seem 
to be so. There is, however, no reason to suppose that this must be so in the present case; 
very often the intuition that my justification derives from having been told and not from 
the tacit availability of an inference is stubborn.
This intuition is even more robust in other cases. Consider a case in which I look out of 
the window and see that there’s a squirrel sitting on the back fence. This is the sort of 
thing that most of us think we are sometimes in the best possible position to judge – the 
light is good, there is nothing blocking my view, and so on. Again it might be possible to 
reconstruct  my justification  for  believing  that  the  squirrel  is  sitting  there  using  only 
premises  about  how  things  are  for  me,  psychologically  speaking,  and  some  general 
principles linking things being that way for me psychologically and the likelihood things 
gaze, a firm dry handclasp, perhaps years of mutual reliance. Surely it is always possible for a human being 
to act capriciously, out of character? And even if the speaker is speaking his mind, how firm a hold can the 
hearer possibly have on the premises, needed on this view, that the speaker is not somehow misinformed 
about the subject matter of the conversation? However favourable the case, can the hearer really be said to 
know that his informant can be relied on now, in such a way that his verdict can be used in a non-question-
begging certification that what he has acquired is an epistemically satisfactory standing? The supposition 
that  the  informant  is,  perhaps  uncharacteristically,  misleading  the  hearer  or,  perhaps  surprisingly, 
misinformed about the topic is not like the typical suppositions of general sceptical arguments (e.g. ‘Maybe 
you are a brain n a vat”),  where, it  is  at  least arguable that  no real possibility is expressed. In  Simon 
Blackburn’s phrase, mistakes and deceptions by putative informants are ‘kinds of things that happen’. It is 
not clear that the approach I am considering can make out the title to count as knowledge of any beliefs 
acquired  from  someone  else’s  say-so.  And  too  much  overturning  of  intuitions  must  surely  make  it 
questionable whether the general account of knowledge is a good one’ (McDowell 1998b: 418-20).
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really  are  that  way  in  the  world  external  to  my  mind.  This  is  what  the  historical 
foundationalist thinks we must do. But even if we could, it still wouldn’t change the fact 
that this is a very strange and baroque account of what justifies that belief. The natural 
view (and the one that we all actually give when asked) appeals to what we perceive. 
Intuitively, it’s the fact that I can see that the squirrel is sitting on the fence that gives me 
reason for believing as I do, not beliefs which, in all likelihood I don’t actually have 
about the way things look and how that makes it likely things really are so. The latter is 
totally unmotivated. The obvious and simple view of these matters is just to stick with 
what we actually all say when asked justificatory questions and what we say is things like 
‘because I can see that squirrel is sitting on the fence’.34 
So, even if the historical foundationalists could successfully reconstruct our justification 
for beliefs about the mind-independent world in inferential terms this still would still not 
be a reason to think that what they say is actually true; that it accurately describes what, 
in actual fact, justifies those beliefs. Their account is revisionary of our ordinary views 
about what grounds or justifies those beliefs and that is a reason to reject it all else being 
equal. 
I  have  now  given  you  some  reasons  why  historical  foundationalists  shouldn’t  have 
34 When pressed we often retreat to claims about looks. Faced with the question ‘But how do you know that 
it’s really a squirrel you see?’ we will often say something more guarded, like ‘well it at least looks like a 
squirrel’. But the fact that we retreat to claims like this when under attack does not show they are the 
grounds upon which we initially judged. Thus, Williamson writes “it is a fallacy to assume that retreats in 
the face of doubt always reveal a pre-existing structure of justification. Someone may be simultaneously 
disposed to retreat to premises about appearances if put under pressure by idealists about the external world 
and to retreat to premises about brain scans if  put  under pressure by eliminativists  about the mind.  In 
responding to a doubt, we look for ground that it does not undermine, but where that ground is depends on 
the doubt. That we can be made to retreat to a place does not  show that  it  s where we started from” 
(Williamson, forthcoming). 
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thought what they actually thought. An obvious question is: did they need to think these 
things?  The  epistemic  regress  argument  certainly  doesn’t  commit  them  to  such  a 
restrictive  view.  The  regress  argument  demands  that  some  of  our  beliefs  be  non-
inferentially justified, but it doesn’t say anything about which beliefs can be justified in 
that  way  or  what  it  takes  for  a  source  to  be  capable  of  furnishing  us  with  such 
justification. The problem with inference is that it is an essentially dependent source of 
epistemic  justification;  in  order  for  it  to  furnish  us  with  justification  it  requires 
antecedently justified beliefs as inputs. So the same had presumably better not be true of 
a non-inferential source; it must furnish us with justification that does not derive from the 
justification we have to believe other things. But observation or ‘acquaintance’ certainly 
looks like it can play that role. The sort of justification it provides us with does not derive 
from other justified beliefs; it offers a different model of what it is to be in a position to 
know about the world. 
So if the historical foundationalist are right to think that we do observe our own mental 
states,  they’ll  be  right  to  conclude  that  our  beliefs  about  them are  non-inferentially 
justified. Many philosophers think there is no reason to suppose we do observe our own 
mental states. But there is certainly no reason to think that we only observe our own 
mental  states;  or  that  observation  is  necessarily  the  only  source  of  non-inferential 
justification. If not, there is no reason to believe the historical foundationalist when they 
say that only beliefs about our own psychological states can be non-inferentially justified.
Things  might  be  different  given  a  different  understanding  of  the  regress  argument. 
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Sometimes people think the problem that argument raises is temporal. If for every belief 
that is justified there must be some further belief that one is be justified in believing 
before one can be justified in the first, how could justification ever get started.35 They 
conclude that there must be some beliefs that can be justified prior to any other beliefs 
being  justified;  there  must  be  some beliefs  that  we  can  in  that  way start  from. The 
problem with beliefs about objects in the world external to our minds is that it doesn’t 
look like a subject can have those beliefs (let alone be justified in them) unless she has 
lots of other beliefs. I can’t believe that the squirrel is on the fence unless I have the 
concept  squirrel and that  plausibly requires me to have certain sorts  of  beliefs about 
squirrels.  I  may have  to  believe  that  squirrels  are  animals.  This  requires  I  have  the 
concept  animal and that plausibly requires me to have yet further beliefs. Beliefs about 
objects in the world external to our minds therefore do not look like they can stop the 
regress, if the regress is understood in temporal terms. They aren’t beliefs that we can in 
that way start from.
Traditional foundationalists tended to think that the same was not true of beliefs about 
our  own  psychological  states  (Lewis  1946).  They  had  a  certain  view  of  how  our 
psychological concepts get their meaning according to which one could possess them 
without having to have lots of other beliefs. That meant they could claim that a subject 
didn’t even need to have other justified beliefs in order to be justified in believing things 
on the basis of acquaintance or observation. One could be justified in believing of the 
red-y brown squirrel-ish shaped sense-data that one currently perceives that that looks 
brown to me irrespective of what other beliefs one happens to have. This belief would be 
35 For a presentation of the argument along temporal lines see (Moore 2002: 122-3).
70
‘semantically free-standing’ as well as epistemically freestanding. Not only would it not 
draw its justification from other beliefs, it wouldn’t even require their existence. 
This is what Michael Williams is getting at when he says that according to the traditional 
foundationalists, basic beliefs represent ‘semantically encapsulated items of knowledge’ 
(Williams  2005:  204).  I  agree  with  Williams  that  this  is  what  lots  of  traditional 
foundationalists thought. I also think it would be a reason to follow them in privileging 
beliefs about the mind if we had any reason to accept this view of concepts or this view 
of the regress. But we have no reason to accept this view of concepts and no reason to 
take the temporal regress seriously. Maybe you can’t be justified in believing anything 
about the world around you until you believe lots of things about it – maybe justification, 
to that extent, emerges en masse. So what? In order for there to be any justified beliefs 
there don’t  need to be any beliefs that are  justified before all  the rest.  This is  just  a 
separate issue from the issue of whether or not all your justification could derive from the 
justification you have to believe other things. Your justification can be non-inferential, 
even if it’s not possible to be justified in that way without also being justified in believing 
lots of other things.36 In that case your justification will not derive from other beliefs, 
though it will in a sense depend on them (since it will require their existence). This is not 
a problem though, since it is only the former that we have reason to worry about. It is the 
36 The following example from James Pryor nicely illustrates this point: ‘Consider: in order to have the 
concept of a unicorn I may need to believe (i) that unicorns have hooves, and (ii) that unicorns have horns. 
Now suppose I acquire evidence that a virus has killed all hoofed creatures. Since I believe unicorns to be 
hoofed creatures, I form the belief (iii) that no unicorns currently exist. It is clear that (ii) plays no role n 
justifying this belief. This shows that there can be propositions that you need to believe in order to have 
certain  concepts  (you  need  to  believe  (i)  in  order  to  have  the  concept  of  a  unicorn)  without  those 
propositions  mediating  your  justification  for  every  belief  involving  the  concept  Now  (iii)  is  not  an 
immediately justified belief. But it serves to make my point. We can see the same phenomenon with beliefs 
that are good candidates to be immediately justified like (iv) If any unicorn exists, it is identical with itself. 
(ii) plays no more role in justifying that belief than it plays in justifying (iii)’ (Pryor 2005: 198). 
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derivation of justification that the epistemic regress worries about and we avoid that by 
requiring that your justification not derive from other beliefs (whether or not it depends 
upon them).37
 
So the further commitments of historical foundationalism are not needed to deal with the 
epistemic regress problem. What,  then, could have lead these thinkers away from the 
obvious view of these matters just sketched and towards their own peculiar alternative? 
In the previous section I mentioned two possible sources of motivation for that view – 
one  metaphysical,  the  other  epistemological.  The  metaphysical  route  to  historical 
foundationalism claims that we don’t actually perceive objects in the world around us. 
Contrary to what we all ordinarily think, we only really perceive things which stand in for 
or represent those objects - mind-dependent objects, commonly called ‘ideas’ or ‘sense-
data’.  This  would  explain  why perception cannot  non-inferentially  justify  our  beliefs 
about non-psychological reality. If perception does not make us aware of objects in the 
world external to our minds, why should it give us any reason to believe that they are one 
way  rather  than  another?  What  explanation  could  we  possibly  give?  An  intuitive 
justificatory gap remains, which gap can only be plugged by appeal to general bridging 
principles of the sort to which proponents of this view really did appeal.
Despite what proponents of this view thought, however, there is no good reason to think 
that perception doesn’t put us in touch with the mind-independent objects in the world 
that it seems to, or therefore that we are only ever aware of mind-dependent replicas.38 
37 Cf. (Burge 2003: 503-48). 
38 I am not denying that they had arguments for this view. I am denying that they had good arguments for 
that view. Most of the considerations adduced in support appeal to facts about illusions and hallucinations 
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Moreover, even if perception did work in the way they thought, that still leaves open the 
possibility that there are sources of non-inferential justification other than perception – 
sources like testimony. As yet, nothing has been said to block that move. 
The metaphysical  route  to  historical  foundationalism is  therefore  a  non-starter.  If  we 
really do perceive objects in the world around us, why isn’t perception available to non-
inferentially justify our beliefs about them, just as it  justifies our beliefs about mind-
dependent objects on the traditional account? For those of us willing to accept that we do 
perceive objects in the world external to our own minds, only the epistemological route to 
historical foundationalism remains. 
The epistemological route appeals to a certain view about non-inferential justification and 
what  it  would  take  for  any  belief  to  be  justified  in  that  way.  As  it  is  standardly 
reconstructed in the literature the reasoning goes like this: (1) if a belief can be mistaken, 
it can’t be non-inferentially justified, (2) beliefs about the world can be mistaken. So (3) 
beliefs about the world can’t be non-inferentially justified. According to what I’ll call the 
Simple  Reading this  is  precisely  the  sort  of  reasoning  that  lead  the  historical 
foundationalists away from the intuitively appealing idea that perception is available to 
non-inferentially justify our beliefs about the external world. This establishes the negative 
part of the traditional thesis: beliefs about the world can’t be basic. The positive claim 
and try to generalise something from that case to the normal case; the time-lag argument and the argument 
from  illusion  are  both  examples  traditionally  appealed  to  in  this  connection  (Ayer  1956  is  a  prime 
example). For a detailed discussion of the argument from illusion in all its forms see Michael Martin’s 
forthcoming  book  ‘Uncovering  Appearances’  (forthcoming,  OUP).  In  contrast,  Locke  thought  that 
introspection revealed that  the immediate objects  of perception were our  own ideas.  He writes:  ‘What  
Perception is, ever one will know better by reflecting on what he does himself, when he sees, hears, feels, 
etc. or thinks, than by any discourse of mine. Whoever reflects on what passes in his own Mind, cannot 
miss it.’ (Locke 1975: 143).
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that beliefs about one’s own psychological states can be basic then goes through provided 
only that one assumes that the same is not true of the latter and this is precisely what 
thinkers like Russell and Ayer thought. 
The Simple Reading dominates the literature and the view it gives expression has the 
status of orthodoxy. I think that it is mistaken as a reading of traditional foundationalism. 
Thinkers like Ayer were ultimately more concerned with the conceivability of mistakes, 
than  their  possibility.  Nonetheless,  there  is  clearly  some point  to  the  idea  that  what 
motivates denying that beliefs about non-psychological reality can be non-inferentially 
justified is the thought that non-inferentially justified beliefs would have to be peculiarly 
epistemically privileged. The Simple Reading is just the most popular way of spelling out 
what these privileges would amount to. 
In chapter 4 I will argue that the relevant privilege is indefeasibility:  it’s the fact that 
beliefs about our own psychological states are indefeasible rather than the fact that they 
are  infallible  which accounts  for  their  special  historical  status.  Properly diffusing the 
epistemological motivation for historical foundationalism will thus have to wait till later. 
At first glance, however, this line of thought does little to motivate the move away from 
the  obvious  sounding  thought  that  perception  is  available  to  non-inferentially  justify 
beliefs about the world. Why should we accept that the mere fact a belief is capable of 
being mistaken means that it must be inferentially justified? Even if we were to assume 
that what justifies a belief must rule out the possibility the belief is mistaken, and so 
conclude that (insofar as perception fails to do that) perception fails to justify our beliefs 
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all by itself, it still wouldn’t follow that perceptual justification is tacitly inferential. To 
say that  a  belief  is  inferentially justified  is  to  make a  claim about  the  nature  of  the 
positive support it enjoys and where that support comes from; it says that it comes from 
its  inferential  relations  to  other  justified  beliefs.  But  even  if  we’d  conceded  that 
perception cannot justify our beliefs about the world all by itself, so that something else 
must  be  necessary,  it  wouldn’t  follow that  what  more  is  necessary is  other  justified 
beliefs. Much less that perception itself plays no role at all, and is entirely supplanted by 
beliefs about what one seems to perceive and inferences one can make from these to 
beliefs about the world. This is what would need to be true for one’s justification to be 
inferential.  To  be  inferential  one’s  justification  must  derive  exclusively  from  the 
inferential  relations  one’s  belief  bears  to  other  justified  beliefs.  This  is  where  the 
traditionalist foundationalist assumes that one’s justification must come from in this case, 
but so far no good argument for that view is in sight.
We will return to the epistemological roots of historical foundationalism in chapters 3 and 
4. At this stage I merely hope to have put the traditionalist on the defensive and shown 
that theirs is a position we have good reason to reject all else being equal. Given that this 
is so, someone might well ask: why bother taking it seriously to begin with? This is a 
good  question.  The  short  answer  is  that  traditional  foundationalism  gets  something 
fundamentally right. Spelling this out is the aim of the final section of this chapter.
4. The Idea of the Empirical
What does historical foundationalism get right? What it gets right, I suggest, is the idea 
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that perception or observation is a source of justification that is genuinely distinct from 
inference. That is to say, that one is in a position to justifiably make judgments about 
things in virtue of being aware of them, and that we cannot explain why that is so via any 
sort of analogy with the inferential case. 
But is it true that perception is a source of justification that is distinct from inference? It 
might be objected that this couldn’t possibly be true because perception itself always 
involves  inference  and that  it  follows  from this  that  perceptual  justification  can’t  be 
distinct  from inferential  justification.  In  what  sense,  however,  is  inference  always  a 
component of perception? One possibility is that perception involves conscious inference 
from beliefs, say beliefs about how things appear to one. This really would a threat to the 
claim that there is a sharp distinction between perceptual and inferential justification but 
there is no reason to think that perception always, or even commonly, involves inference 
in this sense. 
A  different  possibility  is  that  perception  involves  always  involves  some  form  of 
unconscious  processing  or  ‘binding’.  This  is  not  something  that  either  the  historical 
foundationalists or I need to deny. Perception might be ‘inferential’ in that sense, but this 
has  little  bearing  on  the  intuitive  distinction  between  inferential  and  non-inferential 
justification. A genuinely inferential justification is one that proceeds from premises that 
the subject doing the inferring believes. There is no suggestion that sub-personal binding 
or information processing proceeds in this way. To describe perceptual justification as 
inferential solely on the basis of the involvement of sub-personal processing in perception 
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is to deprive the notion of inference of its usual connotations. If one is prepared to do that 
then one can of  course insist  that  there is  no real  difference between perceptual  and 
inferential  justification.  The  problem,  however,  is  that  there  is  a  perfectly  intuitive 
distinction between these two forms of justification and that is a good reason not to think 
of what our perceptual systems do as ‘inferring’. When I see that there is a squirrel on the 
fence  and I  don’t  in  any interesting  sense  infer  that  there  is  a  squirrel  on  the  fence 
inferring  is  the  sort  of  thing that  one  does  when one  is  presented with  signs  of  the 
presence of a squirrel not when one is presented with the squirrel itself.39
The  view  that  perception  provides  a  fundamentally  different  model  of  what  it  is  to 
justifiably make judgements in this sense is very intuitive. Some prominent theories deny 
that is so, but they are very hard to believe. Coherentists think that our only real model of 
epistemic justification is provided by inference, broadly conceived (Davidson 2000: 154-
163). They think our grasp of what it is to be justified is provided by the thought that 
there exist logical relations within our system of beliefs. Such theories seem incredible 
precisely because there is nothing intuitive about restricting justification in this way or 
ignoring the obvious fact that we do have other models of justification one of which is 
provided by perception. Any case in favour of a more restrictive view must therefore rest 
upon philosophical argument. As we will see in the next chapter the arguments just aren’t 
that good and that just leaves the presumption in favour of perception standing. 
This  presumption is  one  to which the  historical  foundationalist  ultimately fails  to  do 
justice.  Still,  it  remains  one to which they try to  do justice.  As I  have  characterised 
39 For a different view see (Harman 1973: esp. Ch. 11).
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foundationalism, it is one to which any foundationalist must try to do justice since that is 
just  what (b) commits them to. As I characterise it,  foundationalism isn’t just a view 
about  the structure of epistemic  justification as  (a) clams, it  is  also a  view about  its 
sources.  Specifically,  it  is  the  view  that  perception  is  a  source  of  non-inferential 
justification.  (a)  merely  draws  a  distinction  in  abstract  space  –  it  claims  there  is  a 
distinction between inferential and non-inferential sources of justification. (b) says the 
second  class  is  not  empty;  it  says  that  perception  is  a  non-inferential  source  of 
justification. 
I  have  claimed  that  this  is  an  overwhelmingly  natural  view  that  is  as  important  in 
motivating foundationalism as the regress argument. Indeed in one sense it is simply the 
flip side of that coin, since it  is an account of the source of the justification that the 
regress says must exist.  Without such an account foundationalism looks half-baked or 
incomplete. That is why in chapter 1 I said that foundationalism is an intuitive view. As I 
characterise it, the desire to acknowledge the seemingly obvious fact that perception is a 
source of justification distinct from reasoning is essential to foundationalism. I am going 
to call this idea the Idea of the Empirical. 
This  idea  has  shaped  epistemological  reflection  since  Aristotle,  and  it  is  crucial  to 
motivating foundationalism. Yet it is almost universally ignored in the literature. Pollock 
and Cruz are one of just a handful of commentators to recognise the role it  plays in 
motivating foundationalism. They write:
The simple motivation for foundations theories is the psychological observation 
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that we have various ways of sensing the world, and that all knowledge comes to 
us via those senses. The foundationalist takes this to mean that our senses provide 
us with what are then identified as epistemologically basic beliefs. We arrive at 
other  beliefs  by reasoning (construed broadly).  Reasoning,  it  seems,  can only 
justify us in holding a belief if we are already justified n holding the beliefs from 
which we reason, so reasoning cannot provide an ultimate source of justification. 
Only perception can do that. We thus acquire the picture of our beliefs forming a 
kind  of  pyramid,  with  the  basic  beliefs  provided  by  perception  forming  the 
foundation, and all other justified beliefs being supported by reasoning that traces 
back ultimately to basic beliefs (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 29).40
The most straightforward way to accommodate this insight is to think that perception is a 
source of non-inferential  justification and that what it  non-inferentially justifies us in 
believing depends on what we actually perceive. Hence, given that we do perceive mind-
independent objects in the world around us, perception is available to non-inferentially 
justify our beliefs about them.
I have claimed that the historical foundationalists sort of saw that but in their case that 
insight  was  twisted.  Under  the  weight  of  their  extraneous  metaphysical  and 
epistemological  views  the  original  idea  was  transformed  into  something  importantly 
different and much less plausible. In their case it is not perception as we ordinarily think 
of  it  that  plays  the  ultimate  grounding  role;  it  is  a  special  sort  of  perception 
(‘acquaintance’), or the perception of a special sort of object (our own ‘ideas’). 
40 Notice that in this passage they are also making a stronger point: viz. that perception is the ‘only’ source 
that is privileged in this way. This is not a view to which I commit the foundationalist. (c) merely claims 
that perception is ‘a’ basic source of non-inferential justification.
Still, even here the centrality and importance of ordinary perception is not completely lost 
sight of. This is straightforwardly so on the metaphysical view, since that is just meant to 
be  an  account  of  ordinary  perception,  but  one  can  see  it  even  on  the  more 
epistemologically motivated versions of the view.41 Russell is perhaps the thinker whose 
view is maximally unfavourable to the one that I describe. He certainly eschews talk of 
‘perception’ in favour of talk about ‘acquaintance’. But while this ought to be a label for a 
special epistemological relation that one can stand in to a state of affairs, it is clear that 
Russell effectively models acquaintance upon ordinary perception. The latter provides his 
only really worked out picture of what acquaintance might be.42 Moreover, features of 
ordinary perception play an indispensable role in explaining why it is that acquaintance 
should  justify a  subject  in  believing anything whatsoever.  It  is  because  acquaintance 
affords us conscious awareness of those states of affairs it purports to justify us in judging 
about in the way that we naively suppose perception does; and because we form our 
beliefs  on that  basis,  that  we  are  justified  in judging  as  we  do.  Ordinary perception 
therefore functions as the paradigm upon which these other notions are modelled, even 
for someone like Russell. 
This  is  importantly  different  from the  way  in  perception  may  be  a  paradigm  for  a 
reliabilist  or  on  other  non-foundational  theories.  It  may well  be  true  that  among the 
reliable  belief  forming mechanisms that  we actually have  perception is  the  one  with 
41 Clearly, they also took themselves to be offering an account of how one is in a position to know about 
what one believes, say.
42 Russell also thought that we were acquainted with universals and my analysis is harder to apply to that 
cases  since  Russell  certainly did  not  think  that  we  perceived  universals  (Russell  1912:  esp.  28).  But 
universals are normally thought to be a problem for his view. The fact they sit rather awkwardly may well 
be a reflection of the fact that Russell is effectively working with a perceptual model.
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which we are most familiar, or best equipped to understand, or know the most about. It 
may  be  for  that  reason  that  it  functions  as  a  ‘paradigm’ in  reliabilist  theories  of 
knowledge; it is certainly the example most of them tend to use. However, the reliabilist 
wants to abstract away from features of perception other than its reliability. Perception is 
only a paradigm because of what it illustrates about reliability – other features of it are 
irrelevant to saying why it should be a source of justification. This is possible because 
perception does not provide us with our basic picture of what justification is like for a 
reliabilist. Our basic picture of justification is furnished by the idea the idea of a reliable 
belief forming mechanism and that is an entirely general claim (Goldman 1986). It is one 
that we could grasp independently of thinking about  perception or any other specific 
source, even if (in the genesis of understanding), it is one that we only actually come to 
see is true by reflecting upon particular cases. 
This  is  fundamentally  different  from the  role  that  I  suggest  perception plays  for  the 
foundationalist. For the foundationalist, perception is not just illustrating a general moral. 
Its status as a source of justification is sui generis. That is part of what I mean when I say 
that perception is not just a source of non-inferential justification but a  basic  source of 
non-inferential justification. This is what (c) claims and that is the third component of the 
position I call foundationalism. Further discussion of (c) will have to wait until chapter 5. 
The important point at this stage is that we can make sense of the idea that perception is a 
source of non-inferential justification (and a potentially basic source at that) even as far 
as the historical foundationalists are concerned.
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5. Conclusion
The next chapter will offer a positive account of how perception can be a source of non-
inferential justification for beliefs about the world external to our minds. You don’t have 
to be a reductionist to think that a foundationalist must say something further about why 
perception should be a source of justification for beliefs about what we perceive. Here, 
the historical foundationalist may be thought to be at a distinct advantage since on their 
view it is impossible for you to be mistaken in the beliefs that you form on the basis of 
‘perception’. The same presumably isn’t true if we take perception to involve a relation to 
mind-independent  objects.  Beliefs  about  non-psychological  reality  can  be  mistaken. 
According to  the  Simple Reading that  is  precisely what  launches the retreat  inwards 
towards beliefs about our own psychological states with all its attendant difficulties. This 
is the orthodox view one finds in the literature. The next chapter will look at what a more 
modest foundationalist can say in response. As we will see, we needn’t be quite as modest 
as the orthodox would have us believe. 
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FOUNDATIONALISM AND THE IDEA OF THE EMPIRICAL
CHAPTER 3: THE ARGUMENT FROM FALLIBILITY
1. Introduction
The take home message of the previous chapter was that there’s a good idea underlying 
traditional foundationalism, but that traditional foundationalism goes about developing 
this idea in the wrong way. The good idea is that perception is a distinctive source of non-
inferential justification. Where traditional foundationalism goes wrong is in its account of 
the sorts of beliefs that perception can justify. Traditional foundationalism has a narrow 
conception of the scope of perceptual justification; it  claims that perception can only 
justify beliefs about psychological reality – that is, beliefs about our own ideas or sense-
data  -  and  this  is  what  ultimately  gets  that  position  into  all  the  trouble  previously 
discussed. 
If it’s a good idea to think that perception is a source justification but a bad idea to adopt 
a narrow conception of the scope of perceptual justification, there’s an obvious way of 
holding onto the good idea without holding onto the bad idea. The obvious way is to 
adopt a broad conception of the scope of perceptual justification. The Broad View, as I 
am  going  to  call  it,  says  simply  that  among  the  beliefs  that  perception  can  non-
inferentially justify are beliefs about the world around us. When I talk about beliefs about 
the world around us I mean beliefs about non-psychological reality - for example, the 
belief that the squirrel is on the fence, or that the toast is burning.43 Although this seems 
43 Berkeley also thought that perception was a source of justification for beliefs ‘about the world around 
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obviously true, it is something lots of philosophers have denied. 
There are two important components of the Broad View. One is its conception of the 
scope of perceptual justification, and the other is its insistence that the kind of perceptual 
justification it is talking about is non-inferential. What I want to do in this chapter is to 
defend both elements of the Broad View. I want to do that because I think that the Broad 
View is correct. But it’s also worth pointing out some of the other advantages of that 
view.
One is that it is at least arguably the ordinary or naïve view of perceptual justification. To 
the extent that we ordinarily have views about such matters it would seem that we have 
no difficulty with the idea that among the beliefs that perception can non-inferentially 
justify are ordinary beliefs about the world around us. So we could also call the Broad 
View the ‘naïve view’. By that I mean it’s the view that seems most natural and obvious 
to us prior to philosophical reflection. Obviously the fact that it is the naïve view is not a 
knock down argument in its favour. However, it does mean that the Broad View is much 
less revisionary than the traditional foundationalist conception of these things, and that’s 
a good thing.
A further advantage of the Broad View is that it  doesn’t  end up positing excessively 
narrow foundations – that is, foundational beliefs that are so restrictive in their scope as 
to be incapable of supporting the rest of what we know or justifiably believe. It thereby 
us’, he just thought that the world around us was mental or psychological (Berkeley 1964). I here mean to 
rule out that possibility. 
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promises to form the core of a more modest form of foundationalism – one that doesn’t 
have  the  sceptical  consequences  of  traditional  foundationalism.  Again  that  is  an 
advantage not to be sniffed at.
Having said all of this the most important question about the Broad View is whether it is 
actually true, not whether it’s what we ordinarily think anyway. I think that the Broad 
View is correct and I’m going to explain why I  think that  in this chapter.  But many 
philosophers – including those who are not foundationalists at all – have thought that the 
Broad  View just  can’t  be  right  and  that  there  are  decisive  philosophical  reasons  for 
revising what we ordinarily think.
What are these allegedly decisive objections to the Broad View? One is that perception 
only  fallibly  justifies  beliefs  about  non-psychological  reality  and  that  perceptual 
justification therefore can’t be non-inferential. I’m going to call that the Argument from 
Fallibility.  Another,  is  that  perception  only  defeasibly  justifies  beliefs  about  non-
psychological reality, and that perceptual justification therefore cannot be non-inferential. 
I  will call this the  Argument from Defeasibility. According to these arguments if one 
wants  perceptual  justification to be both infallible  and indefeasible  then it  had better 
pertain to a very special subject matter. This is just what the traditional foundationalists 
thought, the special subject matter being psychological.
Given these objections to the Broad View anyone who wants to defend that view is going 
to have to do several different things. The first thing which needs to be done, and which 
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I’ll  be  doing  in  the  next  section,  is  to  explain  in  what  sense  perception  can  non-
inferentially justify beliefs about the world around us. The second thing that one would 
need to do in order to defend the Broad View is to rebut the philosophical arguments 
against it.  In the final part of this chapter I will  tackle the Argument from Fallibility 
against the Broad View. One way of tackling this argument is to deny its premise: that is, 
to  deny  that  perceptual  justification  is  fallible,  even  if  its  subject  matter  is  non-
psychological. A more familiar strategy would be to accept its premise but to dispute that 
the conclusion follows; in other words, to argue that perceptual justification can be both 
fallible  and  non-inferential.  I  have  some  sympathy  for  both  these  responses  to  the 
fallibility objection and will explain why later on in this chapter. 
The Argument from Defeasibility against the Broad View will be the topic of the next 
chapter. Again the options are to deny that perceptual justification is defeasible, or to 
deny that it’s being defeasible entails that it’s inferential. In this case, only the second 
option looks plausible. So to recap: the object of the exercise in this chapter is to spell out 
and defend a broad conception of the scope of perceptual justification that is different 
both from traditional foundationalism’s narrow conception of perceptual justification, and 
from non-foundationalist conceptions of perceptual justification, such as those of Donald 
Davidson and Laurence BonJour. 
The plan for  this  chapter  is  as  follows:  in  the  next  section I’ll  give  a  more detailed 
account of the Broad View and explain the sense in which it  delivers non-inferential 
perceptual justification. In the following part I will tackle Davidson and BonJour, and 
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show that their conception of perceptual justification, to the extent that they have one, is 
inferior to mine. Then, in the final part, I will deal with the Argument from Fallibility. 
2. Propositional Perception
In the last chapter I claimed that a good, everyday answer to the question of why some 
subject believes as she does, or what justification she has for that belief, will often appeal 
to the fact she can see that things are so. Suppose Ann is doing the washing up and 
glances up to look out of the back window. When she looks out she sees that there is a 
squirrel sitting on the fence. If Ann believes that there’s a squirrel on the fence, on the 
basis of what she can see, a perfectly acceptable answer to our justificatory question will 
cite the fact that Ann can see that there is a squirrel on the fence: that is what makes her 
justified in believing that there is a squirrel on the fence. In all likelihood that is the 
answer that Ann herself would give us if we asked her.44
Seeing that the squirrel is on the fence is a case of what Fred Dretske called ‘epistemic 
seeing’ (Dretske 1969: Ch.3). Epistemic seeing, in turn, is a case of what we might call 
‘epistemic’ or ‘propositional’ perception.45 One can see that the squirrel is on the fence, 
but one can also hear that Ross is at the party - as when one overhears him talking to the 
host - and similarly for the other three sense modalities: one can feel that the dog is wet, 
smell that she is wearing perfume, and taste that the water is salty. Intuitively, just as we 
can explain what justifies Ann in believing that the squirrel is on the fence by citing the 
fact she can see that the squirrel is on the fence, so too can we explain my justification for 
44 The reply, ‘Because, I can see that there’s a squirrel’ is often given in response to what many sees as a 
more demanding epistemological question, viz. ‘How do you know that there’s squirrel on the fence?’.
45 This label is Cassam’s, not Dretske’s (Cassam 2007: esp. 27-70).
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believing that Ross is at the party by appealing to the fact I can hear that he is at the party. 
These sorts of explanations are completely commonplace. So the naïve or ordinary view 
at least, seems to be that epistemic perception in this broad sense, and not just epistemic 
seeing, is a way in which we can have justification for our beliefs about the world.
How does that bear on the question of whether or not perception can be a source of non-
inferential  justification for  beliefs  about  non-psychological  reality as  the Broad View 
maintains? Well, pretty directly - since epistemic perception is a form of perception (even 
if it is not the only form), and the sort of justification that it provides is non-inferential. 
What makes it non-inferential is that it appeals to the fact that the subject is in a certain 
perceptual state – a state in which she perceives that something is the case. It does not 
appeal to her beliefs about what sort of state she is in, or inferences she can make from 
those beliefs to a belief about the world. Ann is justified because she can see that the 
squirrel is on the fence, not because she believes she can see that the squirrel is on the 
fence. Indeed, in order to see that the squirrel is on the fence, or, more generally perceive 
that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that one believe that one perceives that p. So 
the sort of justification that seeing that p - and epistemic perception more generally – 
provide  is  not  inferential;  it  does  not  derive from the justification the subject  has  to 
believe other things. 
This is often overlooked in the literature. Two things make that easy to do. One is that 
talk of “the fact that” the subject sees that p sometimes misleads people – as if that fact 
were somehow different from, or over and above, the subject’s simply seeing that p. It is 
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not.  The  second  and  more  compelling  explanation  for  the  oversight  appeals  to  the 
dialectical  context  in  which  questions  about  justification  normally  get  raised.  Thus, 
suppose I ask Ann what justification she has for believing that the squirrel is on the fence, 
and she tells me,  saying ‘I  can see that  the squirrel  is  on the fence’.  In making that 
assertion Ann thereby gives expression to one of her beliefs - namely, a belief about what 
she thinks makes it the case that she is justified. This is an inevitable consequence of 
making sincere assertions, but it leads some people to think that, if Ann speaks truly, what 
makes her justified isn’t really her seeing that the squirrel is on the fence but rather her 
belief that she can see that the squirrel is on the fence. 
Again  this  is  a  mistake:  if  Ann speaks  truly,  what  justifies  her  in  believing that  the 
squirrel is on the fence is the fact she can see that the squirrel is on the fence, not her 
belief that she can see that is so. This is what her explanation actually cites and any 
impression to the contrary is just an artificial product of the dialectical context. Indeed, if 
this sort  of example were sufficient to show that Ann’s justification derives from her 
beliefs, then all justification would trivially so derive since in responding to justificatory 
challenges and making claims about what justifies one, one trivially gives expression to 
one’s beliefs about what justifies one. If this is the reason for thinking that all justification 
is ‘inferential’ it is not a very interesting one.
So we shouldn’t be mislead by these facts into supposing that the sort of justification that 
epistemic  perception  provides  is  tacitly  inferential.  Are  there  any  other  grounds  for 
doubt? Epistemic perception is conceptual: in order to see that the squirrel is on the fence 
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one needs the concepts that figure in the that-clause. One cannot see that the squirrel is on 
the  fence  if  one  lacks  the  concept  squirrel.  I  am not  claiming  that  all  perception  is 
conceptual in this way, or even that all perception insofar as it is a source of justification 
must be conceptual. I am merely claiming that epistemic perception is conceptual and 
that ought to be relatively uncontroversial.46
Does this raise a problem for the idea that epistemic perception can be a source of non-
inferential justification? Many have thought that it does. After all, having concepts often 
involves  having  beliefs.  Plausibly,  I  do  not  count  as  possessing  the  concept  squirrel 
unless I have certain kinds of beliefs about squirrels; I may have to believe that squirrels 
have tails.  So if  Ann cannot  see that  the squirrel  is  on the fence without  having the 
concept  squirrel, then she cannot see that the squirrel is on the fence without believing 
that squirrels have tails. Any justification that Ann gets for the belief that the squirrel is 
on the fence by seeing that the squirrel is on the fence therefore depends upon the fact 
that  Ann  also  believes  that  squirrels  have  tails.  Ann’s  justification  therefore  isn’t 
independent of her beliefs, but depends upon them, at least to this extent.
Lots of people think this a problem, since they assume it means Ann’s justification must 
be inferential. This is a mistake, but it is an easy one to make given how some people 
46 Epistemic perception is not necessarily conceptual on all readings of ‘conceptual’. I am claiming that it is 
conceptual because you need concepts in order to be in a state in which you perceive that p; I think that is 
pretty uncontroversial. A different reading of ‘conceptual’ has it that for a state to be conceptual it must be 
‘composed’ of concepts. I am silent about whether or not epistemic perception is conceptual in that sense. 
On the face of it, it is hard to see how it could be. One’s mental state itself is presumably not composed of 
concepts.  A different  suggestion  is  that  the  mental  state  that  is  ‘perceiving that  p’ is  an  attitude  to  a 
proposition, and that propositions are composed of concepts. In that case what you perceive is composed of 
concepts, even if your mental state itself is not. Whether epistemic perception is conceptual in any of these 
further senses depends on whether it really is an attitude to a proposition and if so, whether propositions are 
composed of concepts in the relevant sense. These are issues I cannot hope to resolve in this thesis. For 
more on this debate, see (Peacocke 1992).    
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define ‘inferential’ and ‘non-inferential’.  However,  in  cases of  inferential  justification 
one’s justification doesn’t just depend upon one’s beliefs, it derives from them. When I 
believe that England can no longer win the Ashes because I believe they have already lost 
3 of the 5 tests, my justification for believing they can’t win doesn’t just depend on the 
fact I believe they’ve lost 3 of the 5 tests; it comes from that belief. The latter belief is the 
source of my justification – it is where I inherit, or get, my justification from - and if it is 
not justified then my belief that they can no longer win will not be justified either.
This is clearly not what is going on in the case in which Ann is justified in believing that 
the squirrel is on the fence because she can see that the squirrel is on the fence. While it 
has  to  be  true  that  she  believes  that  squirrels  have  tails  this  belief  plays  no  role  in 
justifying  her  belief  that  the  squirrel  is  on  the  fence;  it  is  not  part  of  what  confers 
justification  on  that  belief.  Intuitively,  it  is  no  more  part  of  the  source  of  Ann’s 
justification than any of the very many other things that also have to be true for Ann to 
see that the squirrel is on the fence. Ann must exist, she must have properly functioning 
eyes, and a fence must have been erected in the garden at some stage. These are also all 
things which have to be true for Ann to see that the squirrel is on the fence but nobody 
would think that they play any role in justifying her in believing that there is a squirrel on 
the fence. Exactly the same is true of her belief that squirrels have tails.     
More generally, we can distinguish between sources of justification (those things which, 
intuitively speaking, confer justification upon a subject), and those things which merely 
have to be true for the subject to be justified, or  background conditions as I will call 
91
them. The latter enable the subject to take advantage of the justification on offer to her, 
without  themselves  being  what  is  justifying  her.  In  Ann’s  case  the  source  of  her 
justification is her seeing that the squirrel is on the fence. In the cricket case, the source 
of my justification is my belief about England’s poor performance in the first three tests, 
and the fact it supports a further belief. That is where the subject’s justification comes 
from in these cases; they are its sources. On the other hand, there are all those things 
which merely have to be true for those subjects to be justified; the squirrel must have 
somehow found its way onto the fence and cricket must be a game that England can just 
about play.  These aren’t  things which confer justification on their  beliefs; they aren’t 
sources of justification, they are mere enabling conditions.47 
What cases of inferential justification make clear is that beliefs can play the first role. 
Beliefs can be one’s source of justification and one can inherit one’s justification from 
them. In contrast, what the present example of Ann makes clear is that beliefs can also 
play the second role: they can be mere background conditions. In that case, there is no 
reason to think the justification involved is tacitly inferential.
There  is  nothing tricky about  this  distinction.  I  am not  trying to  pull  the  wool  over 
anyone’s eyes. It is a perfectly obvious and intuitive distinction to draw and one that we 
draw even in cases of inferential justification. To be justified in believing that England 
have lost 3 of the 5 tests, I need the concept  England. That may require I have certain 
sorts of beliefs about England; I may have to believe that England is a nation. Still, this 
belief does not justify me in believing that England cannot win the Ashes, it’s my belief 
47 For further discussion of this distinction see (Burge 1993) and (Cassam 2007: esp. 1-50).
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they’ve lost 3 of the 5 tests that does that.
So  epistemic  perception  may depend upon beliefs  (since  it  is  conceptual  and having 
concepts plausibly requires beliefs); but that doesn’t mean that it derives from beliefs, or, 
therefore, that it is inferential. Moreover, there is nothing objectionable about dependence 
per se. As we saw in the first chapter it is the derivation of justification from one belief to 
the next with which the epistemic regress is concerned. This is what the regress argument 
focuses on since it is only in these cases that we are threatened with a vicious regress of 
justification. If one’s justification for believing p derives from the belief that q, then not 
only must q be justified, but any justification one has for believing q must be antecedent 
to one’s justification for believing p. If it is not, then one’s justification will be vitiatingly 
circular and this is precisely what makes the regress vicious.
 
The same is not true in cases of mere dependence. Suppose I can’t be justified believing 
that I am in pain unless I also believe that someone is in pain (perhaps, as some have 
claimed, having the latter belief, or being disposed to infer it, is a condition on possession 
of the concepts requisite for believing that I am in pain.) In that case, being justified in 
believing that I am in pain depends upon my believing that someone is in pain. It must be 
true that I have the latter belief. But it is not plausible to require both that this belief be 
justified  and that  any justification I  have  for  it  be antecedent  to  my justification for 
believing  that  I  am in  pain.  There  is  absolutely nothing  objectionably circular  about 
getting justification for believing that someone is in pain by inferring that is so from 
one’s own case. In that case, unlike in the genuinely inferential case, one’s justification 
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will not be vitiatingly circular and the regress will not extend viciously backwards.
 
So not only is the sort of justification that epistemic perception provides not inferential. 
There is no other reason for a foundationalist, or anyone else interested in stopping the 
epistemic regress, to find it objectionable either.48
Epistemic perception is therefore one source of non-inferential justification for beliefs 
about the world around us, and that is enough for the purposes of defending the Broad 
View with which this chapter began. It is enough, since epistemic perception can be a 
source of justification for beliefs even where their subject matter is non-psychological. As 
we have seen it can be a source of justification for beliefs about squirrels, and people at 
parties, and other objects and events in the world around us. 
This is one way in which to defend a broad view of the scope of perceptual justification. 
This  view,  in  turn,  promises  to  constitute  the  core  of  a  more  modest  form  of 
foundationalism. It is not obvious though that this is the only way in which to defend the 
Broad  View.  In  the  next  section  I’m  going  to  consider  an  alternative  strategy  by 
considering an objection to the present line of thought. The objection, which derives from 
an argument of Davidson’s, is that the present line of thought is still too concessive to 
views on which all justification is inferential.
48 I am not suggesting that this is an obvious mistake or one that no one has ever made. On the contrary,  
this is undoubtedly one of the reasons traditional foundationalists wanted to privilege beliefs about our own 
psychological states. They thought they had to appeal to semantically encapsulated items of knowledge 
since any sort of dependence upon beliefs would be problematic. I am merely claiming that it is a mistake. 
It is certainly not essential to foundationalism. 
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3. Non-Propositional Perception
Davidson famously once claimed that only a belief can justify another belief. Writing in 
defence of that theory he claims:
What distinguishes a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count 
as  a  reason  for  holding  a  belief  except  another  belief.  Its  partisan  rejects  as 
unintelligible the request for a ground or source of justification of another ilk 
(Davidson 2000:156)
What Davidson is saying here is that all justification is  doxastic – it all derives from 
beliefs. On a strict reading of what he is saying, I have already refuted his view. Seeing 
that the squirrel is on the fence is not a belief, but it can still justify Ann in believing that 
the squirrel is on the fence. So what Davidson says is false: not all justification does 
derive from beliefs.
There is, however, a more charitable reading of what Davidson is saying. On this more 
charitable reading what he is saying is that justification is a relation that can only obtain 
between mental states with propositional content. Propositions can stand in what he calls 
‘logical  relations’ to  one  another  –  that  is,  inferential  relations  like  entailment  and 
probabilification. On this more charitable reading of Davidson’s view, justification is all 
still inferential, since it all derives from the inferential relations between propositions. It 
is just that it needn’t all be doxastic since it needn’t necessarily all derive from relations 
between propositions that are believed. 
This is what Davidson is saying on the more charitable reading of his position. In fact 
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other remarks make it  clear this really was his view, despite the provocative and oft-
quoted slogan with which we began. An obvious worry about my position therefore is 
that although what I say is inconsistent with Davidson’s view on a strict reading, it is not 
inconsistent with what he says on the more charitable reading. So Davidson could just 
accept everything that I have so far said about epistemic perception and its being a source 
of justification, but still insist that that’s consistent with thinking that all justification is 
inferential, contra the Broad View.
I think that this is not a genuine worry about my position. There are at least three reasons 
why it is not. First, when I say that perceptual justification is a source of non-inferential 
justification  I  do  not  mean  that  it  is  not  a  relation  between  mental  states  with 
propositional  content.  What  I  mean  when  I  say  that  perceptual  justification  is  non-
inferential is that it is not a relation between propositions believed and that it doesn’t have 
the form of a move from premises to conclusion. This can be true even if  epistemic 
perception is a mental state with propositional content.
On my view it is not the proposition that Ann sees that the squirrel is on the fence which 
makes her justified in believing that the squirrel is on the fence. Further, seeing that the 
squirrel is on the fence is not a premise in an argument giving Ann justification. It is the 
experience itself which makes her justified (whether or not this experience is a mental 
state  with  propositional  content).  Of  course,  someone else  reporting  Ann’s  epistemic 
position would have to use a proposition to specify Ann’s epistemic predicament and 
what it is that she thus sees. They could point out that what Ann’s sees in this sense 
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entails what she believes since what she sees is what she believes viz. that the squirrel is 
on the fence. But when Ann sees that the squirrel is on the fence she does not make a 
transition of that sort,  from a premise about what she sees to a conclusion about the 
world. It is the perception itself – her seeing that the squirrel is on the fence - and not 
some description of it, which justifies her in believing that the squirrel is on the fence.49
In the sense in which Davidson can agree with me, then, that is not a threat to the claim 
that perception is a source of non-inferential justification - as I understand it. Moreover, it 
is only as I would have us understand that claim that we have any reason to think not all 
justification can be inferential and that some of it must be non-inferential. This is what 
the regress argument teaches; there is  no parallel  reason to think that all  justification 
cannot be inferential in Davidson’s sense, so this is not a possibility we need to rule out. 
Second, there is in any case a more obvious thing to say about all this. I don’t think it is 
obviously  correct  to  think  that  epistemic  perception  is  propositional.  Still,  if  it  is 
propositional the sense in which that’s so is very different from the sense in which belief 
is propositional. The real point of Davidson’s picture though, is to assimilate them; to 
represent  perceiving  that  p  as  relevantly  similar  to  believing  that  p  from  an 
epistemological  point  of  view.  On my view they are  really  very different,  so  it  is  a 
mistake to think that our two pictures are fundamentally alike.
 
49 Any philosophical explanation of why seeing should be a source of justification will presumably appeal 
to  facts  about  seeing,  and  these  can  be  expressed  using  propositions  and  arranged  in  the  form of  a 
philosophical argument like the one I am now giving. This is true of anything that might be said to justify a 
subject (whether or not it is itself propositional) provided only that some minimal philosophical explanation 
is possible. This is not a reason for thinking that all justification is propositional in any interesting sense. 
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What I mean is this:  beliefs represent the world as being a certain way and they are 
capable of conferring justification insofar as we have some reason to believe that the 
world is as our beliefs represent as being. The world might not be the way our beliefs 
represent  it  after  all  and  that  is  precisely  why  reasons  are  required.  Nonetheless, 
representing the world in one way will entail or make it probable the world is a whole 
host  of other ways. If  I believe that Ross will  be out of surgery before 1pm, what I 
believe entails that Ross will be out of surgery before 2pm. So if I have reason to believe 
the world is as I initially represent it to be, I will also have reason to believe it is those 
further ways it can truly be described as being. This is how beliefs extend the reach of 
what we are justified in believing. 
But epistemic perception is not a source of justification because it represents the world as 
being a certain way, or represents it in anything like the way that beliefs do. Intuitively, 
perception is a source of justification because it actually puts us in touch with the objects 
about which we judge – it presents them to consciousness in a way that mere thought or 
imagination fail to do. So it is no good trying to understand why perception is a source of 
justification along the lines that we have for beliefs, even if they are both mental states 
with propositional content.
In  fact,  when  you  start  thinking  about  the  differences  between,  say,  seeing  that  the 
squirrel is on the fence and believing that the squirrel is on the fence, even the idea that 
the former is a mental state with propositional content starts  to come under pressure. 
Seeing  that  p  is  often  described  as  a  so-called  ‘propositional  attitude’;  where  other 
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examples of such attitudes are: hoping that p, fearing that p, and of course, believing that 
p. Presumably, the point of describing seeing in these terms is to capture the idea that 
what you see can (in some sense) be the same as what you believe. This is certainly true 
in the following sense: we can often describe what is seen using a proposition that could 
equally well express what is believed, hoped, or feared. You see that the squirrel is on the 
fence and that can also be something that you believe, hope, or fear. In another sense, 
though, what you see is not at all the same as what you believe. What you see is the 
squirrel on the fence – that is, some concrete 3-D scene in the physical world around you 
- and that is not in any obvious or natural sense ‘what’ you believe.
I  am not  denying  that  epistemic  perception  is  propositional  in  any  sense;  I  am just 
claiming the sense in which that is so is very different from the sense in which the more 
canonical  attitudes  like  belief  are  propositional.  Given  these  differences  it  is  hardly 
surprising that there is an epistemological difference between them. This is enough to 
mark a significant difference between my picture and the Davidsonian picture, since his 
picture is essentially an assimiliationist one: he wants to assimilate perception and belief. 
On my view, that is a mistake. They are really very different - so much so in fact, that 
even  lumping  them  together  under  the  single  heading  ‘propositional  attitudes’  is 
somewhat suspect.
This is the second reason not to worry about whether or not what Davidson and I say is 
consistent.  Lastly,  and  most  obviously,  when  I  say  that  perception  is  a  source  of 
justification I don’t just mean that epistemic perception is a source of justification. On my 
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view there is nothing wrong with thinking that  non-epistemic perception is a source of 
justification.  This  kind of perception is  not  propositional,  whatever  we say about  the 
epistemic case.
What I mean is this: Ann can be justified in believing that the squirrel is on the fence 
because she sees that the squirrel is on the face, but she can also be justified in believing 
that the squirrel is on the fence because she  sees the squirrel on the fence. Seeing the 
squirrel on the fence does not merely cause her to believe the squirrel is on the fence – it 
gives  her  justification  for  believing  that  the  squirrel  is  on  the  fence.  But  seeing  the 
squirrel on the fence is not a mental state with propositional content; it is not an attitude 
canonically  ascribed by means  of  a  that-clause.  I  ascribe  it  just  by saying ‘and Ann 
sees/saw/is about to see, the squirrel on the fence’. So Davidson is wrong to think that 
justification is always a relation between mental states with propositional content. It is 
not and seeing is a counterexample.
Of course, seeing will not always justify a subject in her beliefs about what she sees. If 
Ann sees a squirrel on the fence this will only justify Ann in believing that there is a 
squirrel  on the  fence  if  certain  other  things are  true.  Ann must  be  able  to  recognise 
squirrels when she sees them and she must be such that she could not easily have gone 
wrong in believing what she sees to be a squirrel. So seeing will only justify a subject in 
her beliefs in the right circumstances.  This does not mean that the obtaining of these 
circumstances is what is really doing the justifying. Those further things are certainly 
enabling conditions, but what this means is that they help spell out the conditions under 
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which seeing will justify Ann. If that is true, then it remains true that what is doing the 
justifying is her seeing and this - to repeat - is  not a mental state with propositional 
content. 
Thus, it is not just that I reject the assumption that only beliefs can justify other beliefs as 
the strict reading of Davidson claims. I am also rejecting the idea that justification is a 
relation that can only obtain between mental states with propositional content. This is 
what the charitable reading says Davidson says. So even if you read Davidson charitably 
my position is still inconsistent with his. 
Someone wanting to defend Davidson has basically got three options available to them. 
The first option is to deny that non-epistemic perception can be a source of justification. 
The prospects for this response look pretty bleak since the idea that it is, is one with 
which we are ordinarily perfectly happy. It is as natural to appeal to the fact that Ann sees 
the squirrel on the fence, as it is to appeal to the fact she sees that the squirrel is on the 
fence. Anyone wanting to reject the first of these options had therefore better have some 
pretty good arguments. 
Are there any such arguments? Here is what Davidson has to say in defence:
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical, since sensations 
are not beliefs or other  propositional  attitudes.  What then is  the relation? The 
answer is, I think, obvious: the relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs 
and in this sense are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation 
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of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified (Davidson 2000:157)
This is not an argument. Davidson just denies that non-propositionally structured items 
like sensations, can stand in justificatory relations to beliefs; he doesn’t refute that view. 
Moreover the embedded suggestion - that we cannot really make sense of the idea such 
items might justify beliefs (also implicit in the earlier quote where he claims that idea is 
“unintelligible”) is wholly unconvincing. The idea that Ann is justified in believing the 
squirrel  is  on the fence because she sees it  on the fence is not one that most people 
struggle to understand, and there is no evidence we secretly translate that explanation into 
one that appeals to something propositional in form.
Of course when philosophers try and explain to Ann why she is justified – when I give 
her chapter 3 of this thesis, say, and she reads all about non-epistemic perception and how 
it gives us reasons for our beliefs about non-psychological reality because it puts us in 
touch with the objects about which we judge and so on - my explanation is propositional 
in form; it has the form of premises and conclusions (I hope). All explanations have that 
form. So if that is all Davidson is saying then what he is saying is unobjectionable. But 
this  is  not  a  good  reason  for  thinking  that  what  justifies  Ann  is  itself something 
propositional - any more than the fact that Gordon Ramsay can explain to me what makes 
something taste delicious by saying something propositional in form means that what 
makes it taste delicious it itself something propositional in form. 
So Davidson is either saying something true but completely unremarkable or he is saying 
something philosophical interesting and substantive but false.
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 Williamson offers a different defence of the same basic idea. He claims that some of the 
central functions of what he calls ‘evidence’ can only be sub-served by things which are 
propositional in form. He writes:
Only  propositions  which  we  grasp  serve  the  central  evidential  functions  of 
inference to the best explanation, probabilistic confirmation, and the ruling out of 
hypotheses (Williamson 2000: 196-7).
Suppose this is true and we assume that what Williamson means by ‘evidence’ lines up 
with  what  I  am calling ‘justification’.  Still,  it  is  unclear  why everything that  can  be 
evidence must be able to play all the roles that evidence is capable of playing – even all 
its central roles. A central function of games is to promote team spirit and a sense of 
collective endeavour. This is a function that cricket sub-serves well, though it is not one 
that chess, let alone solitaire, do much to promote. This does not mean that chess and 
solitaire are not games or that we have any great difficulty in understanding how they can 
be  games.  On  the  face  of  it  exactly  the  same  is  true  in  the  case  of  evidence  or 
justification: something can be among the central functions of evidence without its being 
the case that actually fulfilling that function is essential to something’s being evidence in 
the first place.50
I  am not  claiming that  nothing could lead us  rationally to  revise  the  view that  non-
propositional perception can be a source of justification, merely that we had better have 
good reasons for doing so, given the presumption in its favour. That restriction is, after 
50 Matters  would  be  different  if  ‘central  function’  meant  ‘essential  function’.  In  that  case  all  the 
philosophical work remains to be done in showing that the selected functions really are essential.  That now 
looks as hard to defend as the original claim that simple seeing cannot be a source of justification.
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all, not one that we ordinarily feel compelled to make. My point is just that so far the 
reasons offered aren’t that good.
The  second  option  for  someone  wanting  to  defend  Davidson  is  to  accept  that  non-
epistemic perception is a source of justification, but to insist that is only because it is 
epistemic perception in disguise. Of course, even if that is true it is not a threat to my 
position for the reasons I went into earlier in the discussion of epistemic perception. But 
it is not true in any case; there is no good reason to think non-epistemic perception is only 
a source of justification because it is un-obviously epistemic. For all that has been said so 
far,  the circumstances in  which the two confer  perceptual  justification need not  even 
coincide.  However,  even  if  they  did,  the  conclusion  still  would  not  follow.  On  the 
contrary, we might as well just argue the converse: why isn’t all talk of ‘perceiving that 
something is the case’ merely elliptical for talk of perceiving in certain circumstances? If 
so  then  perceptual  justification  is  never a  relation  between  mental  states  with 
propositional content since perceiving is not such a state.
If anything, that is the more plausible line to take. As we saw earlier there is something 
independently odd about thinking that even epistemic perception is propositional. Unlike 
the more canonical propositional attitudes, seeing seems much too passive for talk of its 
being an ‘attitude’ to seem at all natural. Intuitively, seeing that the squirrel is on the 
fence is not a stance that I actively adopt towards the squirrel’s being on the fence in the 
way in which believing or even hoping that the squirrel is on the fence are. It is simply 
something that I take in. Moreover while epistemic seeing is relational, what it relates us 
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to is intuitively not something abstract like a proposition. When one sees that the squirrel 
is on the fence what one is related to is a concrete state of affairs in the physical world 
that is literally made up of the squirrel,  and the fence, and their relation. As we saw 
earlier, this is not in any obvious sense ‘what’ one believes. 
Finally, epistemic constructions describe a specific way in which the world is perceived: 
one sees that the squirrel is on the fence. Yet it is natural to think that one and the same 
episode of seeing can justify an indefinite range of beliefs.  Normally when I see the 
squirrel on the fence I take in more than just the squirrel’s being on the fence and what I 
see may accordingly justify me in a range of further beliefs – that is, beliefs other than 
that  the squirrel  is  on the fence.  When I  see that  the squirrel  on the fence that  very 
episode  may  also  justify  me  in  believing  that  Mr  Squirrel  Nutkins  is  on  the  fence, 
assuming I am sufficiently familiar with Mr Nutkins, the family pet. If so, it seems to be 
the non-epistemic construction - talk of seeing and the circumstances in which we see – 
which ground attributions of the epistemic, and not vice versa. Again this makes it natural 
to think of the former locution as the more basic of the two. 
So the second strategy,  which says that  non-epistemic perception is  only a source of 
justification because it is un-obviously epistemic, is also no good. Only the third option 
remains  for  someone  wanting  to  defend  Davidson.  This  option  agrees  that  simple 
perception  isn’t  epistemic  perception  in  disguise  and  so  agrees  that  non-epistemic 
perception isn’t a source of propositional justification. Nevertheless, it insists that non-
epistemic perception cannot justify our beliefs about the world all by itself. According to 
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this response, non-epistemic perception merely functions as a sign which, in the presence 
of other justified beliefs, the subject can use to infer a belief about the world, in much the 
same way that if I am at sea and see a lighthouse flashing, I can infer that the surrounding 
water is shallow - provided I know that flashing lights indicate shallow water. 
In the lighthouse case, what I see does not justify my belief about the depth of the water 
all by itself.  It  merely functions as a sign which, in the context of my knowledge or 
justified belief that flashing lights mean shallow water, I can use to establish that the 
water  is  shallow. According to the final  response this is  precisely how non-epistemic 
perception works and it  is therefore not the autonomous source of justification that I 
claim. 
What I mean is that the sort of justification it provides isn’t genuinely independent of 
beliefs.  This  is  easy  to  see  in  the  lighthouse  case.  In  this  case,  it  is  true  that  my 
justification does not derive exclusively from what I believe (the fact I see the lighthouse 
flashing is also meant to be relevant, and this is not a belief); but it is not as if my belief 
that flashing lights means shallow water is a mere enabling condition or that it plays no 
role in justifying me in believing that the water is shallow. On the contrary, this belief is 
playing a justificatory role. My justification seems to partly derive from it,  even if it 
doesn’t play that role by figuring as a premise in an argument from which the conclusion 
follows.51 
51 This shows that there is a gap between whether or not a justification is ‘inferential’ in the traditional 
sense (i.e. exclusively belief-based) and whether or not it partly derives from beliefs. In the lighthouse case 
my justification isn’t inferential in the traditional sense: I do not infer that the water is shallow from my 
belief that I see that the lights flashing and that flashing lights mean shallow water; part of my justification 
comes from the fact that I actually see the lights flashing, and seeing the lights flashing is not it a belief. 
Still,  my justification  is  also  partly belief-based.  This  seems to  be  more  widespread than  is  normally 
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While this sort of dependence is not inferential in the traditional sense, it seems to be 
objectionable  in  much  the  same  way  that  regular  inferential  justification  is 
objectionable.52 So it would be worrying if non-epistemic perception worked like that. 
This is precisely what the third response alleges.
Non-epistemic perception does not work like that though and the lighthouse analogy is a 
bad one. It’s a bad analogy since there is nothing in the case in which I believe that there 
is a squirrel sitting on the fence when I see the squirrel sitting on it that plays a role 
analogous to the role that seeing the lighthouse plays. Seeing the lighthouse flashing is a 
‘sign’ that the water is shallow and if I know that it is a sign I can be justified in believing 
that the water is shallow when I see the lighthouse flashing. This is something I can 
conclude given what I see. But seeing the squirrel on the fence is not a sign that there is a 
squirrel on the fence; it is not something I am permitted to conclude on the basis of what I 
see. This is just a misuse of what we mean by something’s being a sign. 
It would be appropriate to talk of signs if I saw a pile of nut husks, or some bristly red 
hairs caught in the slates of the fence. In that case I might be justified in concluding that a 
squirrel had been sitting on the fence - they would be ‘signs’ that a squirrel had been 
recognised. Take a standard case of enumerative induction: having observed the sun rising ‘n’ number of 
times I conclude it will rise tomorrow. As it is normally reconstructed, I reason from beliefs about what I 
have observed to a conclusion about the world. But why must we reconstruct my reasoning in this way? 
The natural view, surely, is that, in this case, as in the lighthouse case, part of my justification comes from 
my observations themselves, not beliefs about what I have observed. This suggests we may need to modify 
the notion of ‘inference’ and what it is from which we can ‘infer’.
52 As we saw previously, if my justification partly derives from the belief that flashing lights means shallow 
water, then that belief had better be justified and justified in a way that is independent of the belief it is 
meant to justify. Otherwise my justification will be vitiatingly circular in the very same way that it would 
be in more traditional cases of inferential justification.
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about for one who knows a bit about squirrels. But it would be bizarre to say the same in 
the case in which I literally  see the squirrel sitting there. Similarly, I might look at the 
toaster and see smoke pouring out. That might be a sign that the toast is burning. But if I 
look  at  a  piece  of  toast  in  flames,  carbonizing  before  my  very  eyes,  I  do  not  see 
something that is a sign that the toast is burning: I literally see the burning toast.53 This is 
quite unlike the lighthouse case: in this case I needn’t even be looking at the water, and 
even if I do see the water, I needn’t see its shallowness. This may just not be something I 
can see from where I stand. This is why it is plausible to think that the fact that the 
lighthouse is flashing does function as a genuine sign and that my beliefs about what 
flashing means do play a justificatory role. This is how I have access to the fact that the 
water is shallow. In the squirrel case though, it is not; I have access to the fact that the 
squirrel is on the fence because I actually see it sitting there.
I have claimed that in the case in which I see the squirrel sitting on the fence it also has to 
be true that I have certain recognitional capacities and beliefs. If I didn’t have them, the 
fact I see the squirrel on the fence would not make me justified in believing the squirrel is 
on the fence. But it doesn’t follow from this that it’s my possession of those capacities 
that is doing the justifying or that those beliefs and capacities are playing anything more 
than a mere enabling role as I have claimed. 
I think that this is the most intuitive thing to say in these cases and if that is right there is 
no  reason  for  a  foundationalist,  or  anyone  else  interested  in  stopping  the  epistemic 
regress,  to  find  non-epistemic  perception  any more  problematic  in  principle  than  its 




To sum up: in this section I have argued that my picture of perceptual justification is 
fundamentally different from Davidson’s both because my conception of how epistemic 
perception  can  be  a  source  of  justification  is  fundamentally  different  from  his  and 
because I allow that non-epistemic perception, that’s to say non-propositional perception, 
can be a source of justification. This is not something Davidson could say even on a 
charitable reading of his position. In the next section I am going to consider another 
influential challenge to my view. This time the challenge comes from Laurence BonJour.
4. Having Reasons 
I have claimed that perceiving is a way of acquiring justification for our beliefs about the 
world  that  is  fundamentally distinct  from inference  or  reasoning.  Crudely,  BonJour’s 
view is that there is no such thing as distinctively perceptual justification in this sense. 
Like Davidson he thinks that our only real model of what it  is for a subject  to have 
justification for one of her beliefs – in his terms, for her to be ‘in cognitive possession of 
a reason’ (BonJour 1985: 31) – is for her to believe the premises of an argument from 
which it follows that what she believes is (or is likely) to be true. This is very clear in his 
central anti-foundationalist argument. 
Here is how BonJour formulates that argument (and here I quote):
(1) Suppose that there are basic empirical beliefs, that is empirical beliefs (a) 
which  are  epistemically  justified,  and  (b)  whose  justification  does  not 
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depend on that of any further empirical beliefs
(2) For a belief to be epistemically justified requires that there be a reason 
why it is likely to be true.
(3) For a belief to be epistemically justified for a particular person requires 
that this person be himself in cognitive possession of such a reason.
(4) The only way to be in cognitive possession of such a reason is to believe 
with justification the premises from which it  follows that this belief  is 
likely to be true.
(5) The premises of such a justifying argument for an empirical belief cannot 
be entirely apriori; at least one such premise must be empirical.
Therefore, the justification for a supposed basic empirical belief must depend on 
the justification of at least one other empirical belief, contradicting (1); it follows 
that there can be no basic empirical beliefs (BonJour 1985: 32). 
Here, BonJour just assumes that the only way in which a subject can have a reason for 
what she believes is by possessing ‘a justificatory argument’ in its favour (Premise 4). If 
she lacks such an argument, or fails to believe its premises, the belief won’t be justified 
for her. That is why BonJour thinks that no belief could be ‘epistemically basic’ since to 
be epistemically basic a belief would have to be both justified and such that the subject’s 
justification for it does not consist in her possession of a justificatory argument.
This is just to deny what I have so far claimed. I have claimed that perception provides a 
fundamentally different model of what it is for a subject to have reason or justification for 
her beliefs. Ann has reason for believing that there is a squirrel on the fence because she 
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sees or sees that there is a squirrel sitting on the fence. This is not a matter of Ann’s 
believing the premises of some argument from which it follows that there is a squirrel 
sitting on the fence. It cannot be reduced to that or explained in those terms. If that is 
right  then it  is  false  that  we can only have reason or justification for our  beliefs  by 
possessing a justificatory argument of the sort BonJour describes. Perceiving something 
(in the context of certain abilities and environmental facts) or perceiving that something 
is the case is another way in which we can be justified.
In other words I am claiming that we should be permissive when it comes to justification. 
I am not just claiming that we have two different models of the way in which perception 
can be a source of justification. I am claiming that we have two different models of what 
it is to be justified at all – that is, two different models of what, at the most basic level, it 
is to have reasons for one’s beliefs. This is to deny what BonJour assumes. On this view 
inference does not furnish us with our only understanding of justification;  perception 
provides  another  model.  Moreover,  just  as  inferential  justification  does  not  demand 
supplementation via perception in order to be intelligible as a source of justification on 
BonJour’s view, the same is true of perception on mine. Perception does not demand the 
support  of  what  Locke  called  ‘concurrent  reasons’ though  we  frequently  have  such 
reasons (Ayers 1991: 166-72); and it is not secretly constituted by such reasons in the 
way BonJour assumes.
This is what I mean when I say that perception offers a fundamentally different model of 
what it is to have reasons for one’s beliefs. An obvious question therefore is this: why 
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should these both be models of what it is to have reasons or justification? If inference and 
perception are as different as I have claimed, how can we make sense of them both being 
models of the same underlying thing? This is an important question and it is one that I 
will return to in chapter 5.54 My point at this stage is that we do succeed in making sense 
of them as such, whatever the difficulties of doing so may be. So it must be possible to do 
so, whatever people like BonJour say. In actual fact, of course, we have no more trouble 
with the idea that there is more than one way in which to acquire justification than we do 
with the idea that there is more than one way to play a game. It might be difficult to say 
exactly why different games – games perhaps as diverse as cricket and chess – both count 
as  games, but it is not as if there is any doubt about whether or not they do. I think 
exactly the same is true in the case of justification. In both cases, it is the philosophical 
project of describing our practice that is difficult, not the practice itself.
I have claimed that this insight – that is to say, the idea that perception does furnish us 
with a distinctive model of justification – is central to foundationalism. This is partly why 
it is so odd to think of Descartes as a foundationalist, since he did not think of perception 
in this way. For Descartes, it is just as true as for BonJour, that ‘the senses’ per se lack 
independent authority. They are useful signs for one who has concurrent reasons, but they 
have  no  intrinsic  epistemic  authority  (Descartes  1996:  Sixth  Meditation).  This  is 
fundamentally  opposed  to  what  the  foundationalist  thinks  on  my  account  of 
foundationalism.55 Of course, Descartes may count as a foundationalist because of the 
54 It might be thought that a Davidsonian - who countenances only epistemic perception - has less trouble 
on this score since he can appeal to the fact that all justification is ‘inferential’ (in some suitably broad 
sense) in accounting for the unity of the concept. It  would be a mistake to think this makes things any 
easier. It would merely shift the problem to inferential justification: what makes that a concept with any 
significant internal unity, given than variety of cases that it covers? 
55 It might be argued that Locke ought not to count as a foundationalist on that basis either since there is  
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structural  similarities  his  view bears  to  more traditional  forms of  foundationalism, or 
because of his quasi-perceptual view of the source of apriori justification; so perhaps he 
is  a  foundationalist  of  sorts.  But  he  certainly  shouldn’t  be  seen  as  a  paradigm 
foundationalist. This is not the reductio of my characterisation that some may suspect. 
Descartes is hard to classify as a historical thinker in more respects than one and we 
should no more balk at refusing to call him a foundationalist, than we should at refusing 
to think of him as a so-called Cartesian about the mind.56
I have claimed that a foundationalist is someone who thinks that perception is a genuine 
source of justification and that is what BonJour denies. He claims we cannot really make 
sense of that idea and that is very hard to believe. Again I am not claiming nothing could 
lead us to rationally revise that view, merely that we had better have good reasons for 
doing so given the presumption in its favour. This is what BonJour has so far failed to 
provide and that just leaves him denying the seemingly obvious. 
In fact, BonJour does have one argument for thinking we can’t make sense of a non-
inferential model of justification. This is what I will call the argument from clairvoyance. 
BonJour asks us to imagine Norman, who:
some sense in which the senses also function as mere signs for claims about the world on his view too. But 
that  had  more  to  do  with  Locke’s  metaphysical  picture  of  the  objects  of  perception  than  any 
epistemological qualms about perception per se. Unlike Descartes, Locke thought that the direct objects of 
perception were our own ideas and he certainly didn’t think that the senses were mere signs for beliefs 
about them. Moreover, it’s not obvious Locke did think the senses functioned as ‘signs’ for beliefs about the 
world. He certainly did not on the whole think we needed concurrent reasons for believing they were a 
reliable  or  accurate  guide  to  reality.  On  the  contrary,  he  thought  the  status  of  so-called  ‘sensitive 
knowledge’ was sui generis. This may not be sustainable, given Locke’s overall metaphysical picture. But it 
is a sign of the pressure that he evidently felt, and that Descartes did not, to do justice to the idea that the 
senses are a source of knowledge or justification for our beliefs about the world, unaided by reason. This 
view simply struggled to receive its full and proper expression under the weight of his other metaphysical 
commitments. 
56 Cassam argues for the latter view in (Cassam, forthcoming).
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…under  certain  conditions  which  usually  obtain,  is  a  completely  reliable 
clairvoyant  with  respect  to  certain  kinds  of  subject  matter.  He  possesses  no 
evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a 
cognitive power or for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman 
comes  to  believe  that  the  President  is  in  New  York  City,  though  he  has  no 
evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from 
his  clairvoyant  power  under  circumstances  in  which  it  is  completely  reliable 
(BonJour 1985: 41)
The argument  from clairvoyance claims that  in  this  case Norman does  not  have any 
reasons for the beliefs he forms on the basis of his clairvoyant powers. If Norman had 
such reasons they would be genuinely non-inferential, but he does not. So clairvoyance 
isn’t a source of non-inferential justification. 
This is meant to be an argument against the possibility of non-inferential justification 
more  generally,  on  the  assumption  that  any  picture  of  what  the  source  of  such 
justification would be, or what such reasons would be like, would have to be relevantly 
like clairvoyance, and hence (given our assumptions) not a source of justification at all. 
Although BonJour does not make that assumption explicit it is clearly his view. 
One  familiar  response  to  this  argument  is  to  question  the  opening  assumption  –  the 
assumption that Norman does not have any reason or justification for the beliefs he forms 
on the basis of his clairvoyant powers. So called ‘externalists’ about justification often 
complain  that  in  denying  Norman has  justification  BonJour  merely parades  his  own 
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opposing intuitions and in doing so simply begs the question against their  externalist 
alternative. A more concessive externalist response is to accept that Norman does lack 
reasons  or  justification  for  his  clairvoyant  beliefs,  but  to  deny  that  ‘reasons’  or 
‘justification’ are required for knowledge. According to this line of thought, ‘reasons’ in 
the sense in which BonJour is interested in them, are of little epistemological interest to 
the rest of us. 
Clearly, the second response is only more effective as a strategy if our intuitions that 
Norman knows are any less congenial to BonJour than our intuitions that Norman has 
reasons  or  justification.  I  doubt  whether  that  is  so.  Either  way,  neither  of  these  two 
externalist  options is  an entirely cost-free strategy and both leave us  having to deny 
something seemingly intuitive. 
A much more obvious response is to agree with BonJour that Norman lacks reasons or 
justification for the beliefs he forms with his clairvoyant powers, but to deny that that 
shows anything about the possibility of non-inferential justification in general. It doesn’t 
show any such thing because clairvoyance is a just bad picture of what the alternative 
must look like. BonJour’s whole analogy therefore fails to get off the ground and the 
spreading step fails. 
That is  surely especially plausible in the present context,  where we are talking about 
perception  and  whether  it can  furnish  us  with  an  alternative  model  of  justification. 
Perception is nothing like clairvoyance. When one perceives an object or state of affairs 
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one is related to it in a very special way – a way that mere thought or imagination do not 
provide,  let  alone clairvoyance.  In  perception,  one is  made consciously aware  of  the 
objects and events in the world around one that one perceives and their properties: it is 
that very squirrel with which one is presented and of which one is aware. This simply has 
no analogue in the case of clairvoyance; our best gloss on what clairvoyance is like is that 
it involves a strong hunch. 
This  is  why it  is  so  hard  to  believe  that  clairvoyance  is  a  way in  which  to  acquire 
justification for our beliefs.57 But we can agree with BonJour that clairvoyance isn’t a 
source of justification and agree that seems genuinely intuitive, contra the externalist. Yet 
still  that  that  shows  anything  about  whether  there  could  be  other  sources  of  non-
inferential justification, in particular, whether perception could be one of them.
I think that this is a much more plausible line to take. How plausible it is in the final 
analysis will no doubt depend on how we think about perception. On certain ways of 
thinking about perception, it is much less readily intelligible why it should be a source of 
justification or provide a truly distinctive or basic model of what it is to have reasons. 
Against those views, BonJour’s complaints have more force. 
Consider what James Pryor has to say about the epistemological role of perception:
My  view  is  that  our  perceptual  experiences  have  the  epistemic  powers  the 
57 I mean a source of non-inferential justification. Clearly, we could have excellent reason for thinking that 
clairvoyance is reliable, in which case ‘it’ may very well give us reasons for the beliefs about the world that 
we form on its basis. In that case, however, our justification will not be non-inferential; it will derive at 
least in part from the belief that clairvoyance is reliable.
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dogmatist says they have because of what the phenomenology of perception is 
like. I think there’s a distinctive phenomenology: the feeling of seeing to ascertain 
that  a  proposition  is  true.  This  is  present  when  the  way  a  mental  episode 
represents its content makes it feel as though, by enjoying that episode, you can 
thereby  just  tell  that  that  content  obtains.  We  find  this  phenomenology  in 
perception…When  you  have  a  perceptual  experience  of  your  hands,  that 
experience makes it feel as though you can just see that hands are present. It feels 
as those hands are being shown or revealed to you. This phenomenology may be 
present in other mental episodes too...My view is that our perceptual justification 
comes  from  that  phenomenology.  Having  the  phenomenology  of  seeming  to 
ascertain P is what makes us have prima facie justification to believe P (Pryor 
2004: 356-7). 
I think that this view is incredible. Here, BonJour’s complaints really do seem to have 
force. Why should states in which you merely ‘seem to ascertain’ that a proposition is 
true give you any reason to believe that things actually are so? That seems a perfectly 
legitimate question to my ear.
I am not denying that we couldn’t have a model like Pryor’s, or that we couldn’t try and 
explain why perception is a source of justification in these terms. Faced with BonJour, 
Pryor should say precisely the sort of thing that I say; namely, there is nothing more to be 
said about  why states in  which you ‘seem to ascertain that  a  proposition is  true’ are 
reason-giving. He should just insist that those sorts of states provide one of our most 
fundamental grips on what it is to have reason. FULL STOP. But it is striking just how 
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implausible this sounds. Intuitively, BonJour’s question really does get a grip; it’s just not 
at all obvious or natural to say that these sorts of states just are cases in which you have 
reason. End of story. On the contrary, that fact cries out for further explanation. 
The view that I defend does better in that respect. My view appeals to the fact that the 
subject perceives or perceives that things are a certain way in explaining what justifies 
her beliefs. These states consciously relate the subject to the objects and events in the 
world that her beliefs concern and make her consciously aware of their properties; it is 
the very squirrel that Ann believes is on the fence which she actually sees sitting there. 
And it is surely no great mystery how that can put Ann in a position to know something 
about  the  squirrel.  Intuitively,  that  just  is  what  it  is  to  have  a  reason  for  believing 
something about the world.
This view is so natural that even Pryor eventually falls back on it. This is effectively what 
he appeals to when it comes to explaining why the phenomenology of perception should 
be reason giving: it is because “that experience makes it feel as though you can just see 
that hands are present. It feels as those hands are being shown or revealed to you as he 
claims” (Pryor, ibid.). On my view those hands really are being shown or revealed to you 
and  that  is  precisely  why you  have  reason  for  judging.  So  Pryor’s  explanation  is 
ultimately parasitic on mine.58 
58 I think that is significant given how intuitive Pryor-style views are often thought to be. This assumption 
places a crucial role in framing the contemporary debate. It is used to put pressure on views like mine and 
suggest that somehow the burden of proof in this area really lies with me – my view is the counter-intuitive 
view and so I am the one that need to provide all the reasons. I think that gets things exactly the wrong way 
round. What I hope to have brought out above is how very counter-intuitive the Pryor style view is at the 
most fundamental level. That should help us redress the dialectical balance.
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Pryor is a so-called ‘common factor’ theorist about perception. So does this make me a 
‘disjunctivist’ about perception? Some will suspect that it does and some will want to 
reject my view on those grounds. Even those who don’t object to disjunctivism, per se, 
may find it hard to believe that our common sense views about the epistemological role 
of  perception  could  commit  us  to  such  substantive  claims  about  its  underlying 
metaphysical nature. 
I  agree.  But  I  am not  committed  to  disjunctivism.  I  am claiming that  perceiving  or 
perceiving that something is the case is a source of justification for our beliefs about the 
things we perceive and that perception does that by consciously relating us to those very 
things; when one sees the squirrel on the fence, it is that very squirrel of which one is 
aware. It should be relatively uncontroversial that that very state (your seeing) couldn’t 
exist unless the squirrel existed and you were related to it in that very way. 
This is not what disjunctivists claim; even people as opposed to disjunctivism as Searle or 
Davidson or Pryor could agree with that. What they dispute is whether a mental state of 
the same fundamental kind could occur in the absence of the squirrel. They think it could 
and indeed would occur, even if you were hallucinating. That is what the disjunctivist 
denies. He denies that there is some ‘narrow’ psychological state in common between 
cases of illusion and hallucination and cases of veridical perception in virtue of which 
these three states count as being the fundamental kind of psychological states that they 
are (Snowdon 1981, 2005; Martin 2002). 
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My view is simply silent about this. It  might be true, it might not, and what I say is 
compatible with either since even if there is a common factor of the sort just described it 
does not follow that whether or not one is justified is a function solely of the presence or 
absence of that factor. Indeed, even if a subject’s justification is just a function of what 
mental  or  psychological  states  she  is  in,  it  may  be  function  of  more  than  what 
fundamental kind of psychological state she is in. This is especially plausible when we 
consider  the  grounds  upon  which  philosophers  of  perception  tend  to  individuate  the 
mental or carve out its fundamental kinds. They think that what ‘fundamental’ kind of 
psychological state a subject is in is fixed by how things seem to the subject of that state: 
by that state’s ‘phenomenal character’ (Martin 2002; Soteriou 2005). There is no obvious 
reason to think that what is epistemically important – that is, what confers justification - 
is just a factor of how things seem to the subject in this sense. 
Having said that all that, it may turn out that disjunctivism is ultimately the best way of 
holding onto the view I defend. Perhaps once we concede the existence of a common 
factor between the case in which one perceives and merely seems to perceive, it would be 
impossible to believe that factor wouldn’t also fix the epistemological facts or leave any 
genuine explanatory work for perceiving to do; or perhaps it’s implausible to suppose that 
what is epistemically significant isn’t determined by how things seem to the subject in the 
sense in which philosophers of perception are interested.59 If so, we will have to adopt a 
disjunctive view of the phenomenal character of perceiving and seeming to perceive in 
order  to  hold  onto  the  view that  perceiving the  world  is,  as  I  maintain,  a  genuinely 
59 Williamson argues against a parallel claim in the case of knowledge and belief (Williamson 2000: esp. 
2.4).
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distinctive source of justification for beliefs about it. 
However, establishing any of these claims would require lots more work and all go far 
beyond  what  I  am  claiming.  I  am  merely  claiming  that  perceiving  is  a  source  of 
justification for beliefs about the world and that is so because it consciously relates us to 
the objects and events  in the world about which we judge.  On the face of it,  that is 
compatible with lots of different views about what it is to be related to an object in this 
way and whether that state has anything significant in common with a state in which one 
merely seems to be related to the world. 
So if you don’t like the idea that perceiving is a source of justification in this sense, you 
should go ahead and reject my view. But don’t reject it because you think it commits you 
to disjunctivism. 
To sum up: in this chapter I have claimed both that perception is a source of justification, 
genuinely  distinct  from  inference,  contra  BonJour;  and  that  the  most  natural  and 
straightforward explanation of this  fact  appeals to the relational  nature of perceiving, 
contra Pryor - the fact that perception, unlike clairvoyance, say, consciously relates us to 
objects and events in the world around us about which we form beliefs. I have claimed 
that states in which we perceive and perceive that things are the case are states in which 
we are actually in touch (sometimes literally) with the things in the world that our beliefs 
concern; we are made aware of those very objects and their properties. Given that this is 
so, it is no mystery why perception is a source of justification for our beliefs about them.
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That  is  what  I  have  claimed.  As  we have seen,  not  everyone agrees.  I  have  already 
discussed BonJour’s view. In the final section I will look at what people like Pryor have 
to say. Unlike BonJour, Pryor’s view is not completely lacking in all motivation. Pryor 
and others like him want to do justice to that idea that a subject unknowingly suffering an 
illusion or hallucination has the same justification as one who is perceiving the world 
around her. On the face of it, this is an idea to which my view will struggle to do justice. 
If one is justified because one actually perceives that things are a certain way, why should 
one be justified when one is  not,  and merely seems to be related to the objects  and 
properties in the world about which one endeavours to judge? Many philosophers claim 
to  find that  counter-intuitive  and opt  for  a  Pryor-style  view on these grounds.60 This 
further  challenge to my view is  one I  will  address in  the next  and final  part  of  this 
chapter. 
5. The Argument from Fallibility
I have explained what the Broad View of perceptual justification is and why that is a 
pretty plausible, commonsensical thing to think. It solves the epistemic regress problem 
and it doesn’t have the restrictive consequences of traditional foundationalism. So why is 
it that philosophers haven’t on the whole seen this? Historically,  two main arguments 
have  prevented  them  taking  that  view  sufficiently  seriously.  The  Argument  from 
Fallibility claims that perception only fallibly justifies beliefs about non-psychological 
60 These are not the only options in this area. Tyler Burge has a view that is intermediate between Pryor’s 
and mine in many respects. He wants to allow that subjects can be justified when they suffer certain sorts of 
perceptual illusions provided that perception is in general reliably veridical. This might be thought less 
implausible:  maybe  it  is  more  readily  intelligible  that  a  source  of  representations,  which  is  reliably 
veridical, should be a source of reasons for beliefs about what is represented. For more on Burge’s view, 
see (Burge 2003).
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reality and that it therefore cannot non-inferentially justify them, contra the Broad View. 
The Argument from Defeasibility claims that perception only defeasibly justifies beliefs 
about non-psychological reality and that it therefore cannot non-inferentially justify them, 
contra the Broad view. Unlike the views discussed so far these are actual arguments; they 
don’t just  deny that perception could non-inferentially justify beliefs about the world, 
they give concrete philosophical reasons for thinking that this can’t be so. Moreover these 
are reasons that many philosophers have been moved by.  According to what I earlier 
called  the  ‘Simple  Reading’,  it  is  precisely  because  beliefs  about  non-psychological 
reality can be mistaken that  traditional  foundationalists  were lead to privilege beliefs 
about our own minds. So these are the arguments we really need to engage with. In the 
rest of this chapter I’ll tackle the Argument from Fallibility, defeasibility will then be the 
topic of the next.
The Argument from Fallibility claims that it follows from the fact that perception only 
fallibly justifies beliefs about non-psychological reality that it must inferentially justify 
them.  Faced  with  that  argument  there  are  two basic  moves  available  to  those  of  us 
wanting to hold  onto the Broad View:  we can either  deny that  perception does  only 
fallibly justify beliefs about non-psychological reality; or we can deny that the conclusion 
follows, that is, deny that it follows from the fact that perceptual justification is fallible 
that it must be inferential. I’m going to start off by looking at the second response, that is, 
questioning the argument’s validity. This will strike many as the more obvious of the two 
responses and it leads very naturally into questions the first response addresses. As we are 
about to see in thinking about why validity might be a problem it will emerge that the 
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argument’s premise is much less straightforward than most people assume. 
Why should anyone think that it  follows from the fact that perceptual justification is 
fallible  that  it  is  inferential?61 Let’s  agree  straight  off  that  there  are  fallibly justified 
beliefs and that some of those beliefs are also inferentially justified – inductively justified 
beliefs seem to be a case in point. If my justification for believing that Captain Molski 
will win derives from the fact I believe that she is the fastest dog on the track and that this 
makes  it  probable  she  will  win,  then  my  justification  for  believing  she  will  win  is 
inferential.  It  is  also fallible;  intuitively,  I  may be  justified  in  believing that  Captain 
Molski will win on those grounds and yet, for all that, she does not. 
However, it is not enough for a defender of the Argument from Fallibility merely to point 
out that there are fallibly justified beliefs that are also inferentially justified. She needs to 
show us  that  there  is  some connection  between  these  two things  –  that  it  somehow 
follows from the fact that a belief is only fallibly justified that it is inferentially justified, 
or that it is inferentially justified in virtue of being fallible. 
So the question remains: what has fallibility got to do with inference in this sense? To see 
the intuitive connection here, think again about the inductive case. In this case what it 
means to say that my belief that Captain Molski will win is only ‘fallibly’ justified is that 
61 There is something slightly odd about concluding that ‘perceptual’ justification is inferential. In that case, 
what makes that justification  perceptual? To call a justification perceptual is to make a claim about the 
epistemic source of that  justification;  not  just  it’s  causal origin or the causal origin of the beliefs it  is 
claimed to justify. Thus, in the event this argument succeeds in showing that perceptual justification cannot 
be non-inferential. I think it would be more natural to conclude that there is no such thing as properly 
perceptual justification. On this view, the epistemic role that I claim perception plays is instead played by 
beliefs about what we perceive and how that makes it likely the world is arranged in such and such ways. 
124
my justification for that belief leaves open the possibility that I am mistaken. I can be 
justified in believing that she will win and it still be false that she does win. If that is 
possible  though, am I  really justified in believing that  she will  win? I  might  still  be 
justified in believing that she will probably win in those circumstances, but I surely can’t 
be  justified  in  believing  that  she  will  actually  win  if  my  grounds  leave  open  the 
possibility that she will not.62 Intuitively, to be justified in taking this further step and 
believing that she really will win I need to exclude the possibility that she will not and I 
can only do that by inferring that is so from other justified beliefs.63 
I  think that is the intuitive thought connecting inference and fallibility. In the case of 
induction, however, I cannot rule out the possibility of mistake – that is precisely makes 
my inductive reasons ‘inductive’ rather than ‘deductive’. What someone who wants to 
press this worry really ends up calling into question is how there can be such a thing as 
inductively justified beliefs – that is, how inductive reasons can be genuine reasons given 
that  they leave  open the  possibility  of  mistake.64 If  so,  this  argument  isn’t  really  an 
argument  for  thinking  that  fallible  justification  must  be  inferential.  Really,  it  is  an 
argument for thinking that there is no such thing as fallible justification, since the only 
62 This is an intuition McDowell claims to be moved by (McDowell 1998a, 1998b). It  is certainly not 
without appeal though it is hard to see how to reconcile it with the equally intuitive idea that induction is a 
genuine source of knowledge. 
63 Presumably even that is no good if those beliefs in turn leave open the possibility of mistake.  Why 
should  it  be  acceptable  to  allow that  one’s  grounds  for  ruling  out  the  possibility  of  mistake,  do  not 
themselves rule out the possibility of mistake, when it is not acceptable to claim that is so in the original 
case? Thus this line is immediately regressive. It could only be stopped by appealing to infallibly justified 
beliefs. 
64 This line of thought is familiar from Hume (Hume 1975: esp. sec. IV). I am assuming that induction 
needn’t be grounded in metaphysical necessities and hence that there is genuinely room for the possibility 
of mistake on a intuitive understanding of what one’s grounds are in the inductive case. Perhaps some will 
deny that.  They need  to  give  us  a  different  understanding  of  the  distinction  between  ‘inductive’ and 
‘deductive’ reasons, and a different account of what exactly one’s grounds are in the inductive case. None 
of this is to deny that good inductive arguments rule out the possibility I could easily have been wrong. 
That is a different matter to the issue of whether or not they logically exclude the possibility of error. 
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grounds for thinking that fallible justification must be inferential turn out to be grounds 
for thinking that there is something funny about fallible justification. What started out as 
an argument for a pretty commonsensical thought has therefore ended up as an argument 
for ‘infallibilism’.
In  that  case,  maybe  a  better  question  is  whether  the  premise  of  the  Argument  from 
Fallibility is true, not whether the argument is valid.65 So far I’ve assumed that perception 
does  only fallibly justify beliefs about  non-psychological  reality.  This  is  the standard 
view in the literature, but is it true? Not on the face of it. What justifies Ann in believing 
that there is a squirrel on the fence is the fact Ann sees or sees that there is a squirrel on 
the fence. Those grounds do not leave open the possibility that Ann is mistaken: Ann 
cannot see a squirrel on the fence unless it is true that there is a squirrel on the fence and 
she cannot see that there is a squirrel on the fence if she could be mistaken in believing 
that there is a squirrel on the fence. ‘See’ is a ‘success’ verb: one cannot see the squirrel 
on the fence unless the squirrel on the fence exists. Similarly, ‘sees that’ is ‘factive’: one 
cannot see that the squirrel is on the fence unless the squirrel is on the fence. So if that is 
what justifies Ann in believing that there is a squirrel on the fence, and I claim it is, then 
Ann’s justification is not fallible. 
Exactly the same is true of perception more generally – I cannot perceive ‘a’ unless ‘a’ 
65 Notice, I am not endorsing this line of thought or suggesting that the argument  is valid. One could as 
easily claim that  this  line  of  thought has  therefore failed to  establish  any link between inference and 
fallibility since the only grounds for thinking that fallible justification must be inferential turn out to be 
grounds for thinking there is no such thing as fallible justification. And there is such a thing as fallible 
justification. So, the argument is no good. In that case we can allow perceptual justification is both fallible 
and non-inferential. This is the response Pollock and Cruz favour (Pollock and Cruz 1999: 43-44). On this 
model, perceptual reasons need not be inductive reasons. They simply figure alongside such reasons, as 
equally basic constituents of our ratiocentive framework. 
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exists and I cannot perceive that ‘a is F’ unless a is F. So the justification that perception 
more generally provides is not such as to leave open the possibility of mistake. If this is 
right then the Argument from Fallibility is unsound and we can reject it on those grounds, 
quite aside from any worries we might have about its validity.
This response claims that perception is a source of  infallible justification, and that the 
beliefs that it infallibly justifies are or include beliefs about non-psychological reality, 
like the belief that the squirrel is on the fence. On this view – which I have also claimed 
is  the  naïve  view –  ordinary  perceptual  beliefs  about  the  world  around  us  count  as 
infallible,  and  not  just  beliefs  about  our  own  psychological  states  as  the  traditional 
foundationalists  maintained.  This  will  strike  many  philosophers  as  so  obviously 
incredible that I had better say a bit more. 
Perhaps the first thing I should say is this: I am not claming that what you believe when 
you believe something about the world around you on the basis of perception – that is, 
the proposition believed – is incapable of being false or mistaken. What Ann believes is 
that the squirrel is on the fence and clearly it could be false that the squirrel is on the 
fence. It is a contingent truth, after all, that the squirrel is anywhere near the fence. So 
ordinary perceptual beliefs are not infallible or incapable or being mistaken in that sense. 
This is how some philosophers characterise the notion of infallibility. Bernard Williams is 
a  case in  point.  He claims that  the belief  that  p  is  ‘incorrigible’ (in  his  terms)  iff  S 
believes that p, entails p (Williams 1978: 306). As we have just seen, that is a test that 
ordinary perceptual beliefs do not pass. 
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However. that is not the relevant notion of infallibility. What I mean by this is that people 
who traditionally  appealed to  the  notion of  infallibility  wanted  it  to  be  epistemically 
relevant. But the fact that a belief is infallible was meant to figure in the explanation of 
why that belief was justified. This is certainly what the traditional foundationalists were 
after. The mere fact that a belief is infallible in Williams’s sense tells us nothing about 
how or whether the subject is justified in that belief. If I believe any necessary truth my 
belief will  be infallible in his sense,  but  I  can certainly be unjustified in believing a 
necessary truth. 
Williams’s  characterisation  therefore  doesn’t  serve  the  epistemological  function  that 
infallibility  was  historically  designed  to  serve.  This  has  lead  most  contemporary 
philosophers to jettison the notion of infallibility altogether, but this is a mistake. The 
problem is that infallibility is a modal notion: to say one believes p infallibly is to say one 
cannot be mistaken in believing p. The problem with Williams’s formulation is that the 
modality attaches to the wrong thing; on his formulation it attaches to the proposition 
believed. Intuitively, though, we want the modality to attach to the subject. We want her 
to  be such that  whatever she believes,  what  she believes cannot  be mistaken.  Unlike 
Williams’s notion this is not a test that all necessary truths pass, and it does seem to be 
genuinely epistemic relevant. So it is a mistake to dismiss the whole notion of infallibility 
– we just need to understand it in the right way. 
This is how the notion of infallibility was traditionally understood. Moreover, this is the 
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sense in which I am claiming that ordinary perceptual beliefs are infallible: Ann’s belief 
that  the  squirrel  is  on  the  fence  is  infallible  because  Ann is  such  that  whatever  she 
believes on that score what she believes cannot be mistaken. That is what I am claiming 
at least, but I can see that some will require more convincing.
Perhaps  it  will  help  to  start  by  saying  something  about  how  any  subject  could  be 
infallible  in  this  sense.  One possibility is  that  the  subject’s  belief  concerns  a  special 
subject matter: perhaps, as with Descartes’ cogito, what the subject believes is such that 
merely entertaining the thought  it  expresses is  sufficient  for  the subject  to  determine 
whether  or not what  she believes is  true.  This is  what many philosophers have been 
tempted about so-called self-evident truths, like whoever is tall is tall. I am going to call 
that the Subject-Matter Reading.66 
Another possibility is that the subject’s belief has a certain source and that that explains 
why she cannot go wrong. If the Pope believes that p because God has told him that p, 
then the Pope is equally such that what he believes cannot be mistaken. That is not due to 
some special feature of the content of his beliefs: the Pope might know that the end is 
nigh because God has told him, but it is not a self-evident truth that the end is nigh. If he 
knows that  the end is  nigh,  it  is  because (and only because)  his  belief  has  a  special 
source. I am therefore going to call that the Source Reading.
66 This is somewhat closer to the Williams characterisation, since it at least appeals to an aspect of the 
proposition  believed.  Even  so,  it  is  not  identical  with  that  characterisation.  Necessary  truths  all  pass 
Williams’s test but most of them are not self-evident in this sense (mathematics would be a lot easier if they 
were). Conversely, many things which are self-evident are not necessarily true. Unless you are Timothy 
Williamson you probably will not think that ‘I exist’ is a necessary truth, but many philosophers think it is a 
self-evident truth.
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We now have two different explanations of how a subject’s beliefs could be infallible in 
the sense that I have claimed is relevant to our discussion. Both have played a role in the 
history of philosophy: Descartes favoured the first and traditional foundationalists the 
second. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that it is in the second sense that I think that 
ordinary, perceptually justified beliefs are infallible. Ann’s belief that there is a squirrel 
on the fence is infallible not because it is self-evident that there is a squirrel on the fence, 
but because her belief has a certain source, namely her seeing or seeing that there is a 
squirrel on the fence. Those grounds exclude the possibility that what Ann believes is 
mistaken and they are the grounds upon which she judges. 
That is what I am claiming. I hope it now seems less obviously false than before, but it is 
still not trivial. I have not made it true at the expense of its philosophical interest. Not 
everyone will agree that our perceptual beliefs are infallible in even this sense, since not 
everyone will agree that these are the grounds upon which we are justified in holding 
those beliefs. We saw earlier that people like James Pryor think that what justifies Ann in 
believing that the squirrel is on the fence is the fact she is in a state in which ‘she seems 
to ascertain’ that it is true that there is a squirrel on the fence. Those grounds do not rule 
out the possibility of mistake; Ann can seem to ascertain that the squirrel is on the fence 
and yet fail to actually ascertain that the squirrel  is on the fence since the squirrel  is 
elsewhere. In that case Ann will be justified in believing that the squirrel is on the fence 
even though it is false that the squirrel is on the fence. So Ann’s belief is at best fallibly 
justified.
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I have not rejected that view because I think that the Argument from Fallibility is valid 
and that this view would make perceptual justification inferential, given that all fallible 
justification must be inferential if that Argument is valid. I have rejected it because I 
think it is a very strange and baroque account of what actually justifies our perceptual 
beliefs. I think there is no good philosophical reason for abandoning the naïve view that 
what justifies our perceptual beliefs is the fact that we are in states that consciously relate 
us to the things about which we judge. Those states are flatly incompatible with things 
not being as we judge.
So I am not arguing for a generalised ‘infallibilism’. I am not saying that any justification 
worth  its  salt  must  exclude  the  possibility  of  mistake.  There  is  certainly  something 
intuitive about that, but it is hard to reconcile with the equally intuitive idea that induction 
can be a genuine source of knowledge or justification despite the fact it does not thus 
exclude the possibility of mistake.67 You do not have to be an infallibilist in any more 
general sense to accept my story. I am merely claiming that it is an interesting fact about 
our perceptually justified beliefs that what actually justifies those beliefs does, in fact, 
rule  out  the possibility of mistake -  quite  aside from whether  or not  if  it  didn’t  that 
67 McDowell claims otherwise. He writes: “induction can have a confusing effect here: it can seem to be a 
counter-example  to  the  principle.  But  demanding  that  an  argument  be  conclusive  is  not  the  same  as 
demanding that  it  be deductive.”  (McDowell  1998b:  421).  That  is  certainly true  on some readings of 
‘conclusive’. (It is true on Dretske’s theory of conclusive reasons. Indeed, this is the whole point of his 
theory,  see  (Dretske  2000b).  But  it  doesn’t  look like  a  live  option  on McDowell’s  own reading.  The 
principle he appeals to says, (and here I quote) “the argument would need to be conclusive. If you know 
something, you cannot be wrong about it” (ibid.). Only deductive arguments ensure that you cannot be 
mistaken;  inductive  arguments  do  not.  Whether  or  not  I  will  be  mistaken  is  a  different  matter;  good 
inductive  arguments  may certainly  rule  that  out  but  even  the  highest  common  factor  theorist  whom 
McDowell claims to being opposing can require that our epistemic standings rule out the possibility we will 
be mistaken or that we could easily be mistaken. Of course, McDowell might just be making the point that 
if you know, you cannot be mistaken (whether or not your grounds make it the case that you couldn’t be 
mistaken). This is certainly true; but trivially so. Anyone can agree with that. Indeed, anyone must agree 
with that since knowledge is ‘factive’: there is a deductive argument from S knows that p, to p. So at best 
what McDowell says here is highly misleading.
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justification would still be worth the name.
Of course even on my view having such grounds doesn’t rule out every way in which the 
subject  could  go  wrong.  Suppose  Ann  sees  the  squirrel  on  the  fence  but  believes 
irrationally that there is no squirrel on the fence or that squirrels do not exist. Or suppose 
she is careless and forms the belief that there is a cat on the fence, rather than the squirrel 
that  she quite plainly sees.  In those cases, what Ann believes may well  be mistaken. 
Clearly these are logical possibilities; seeing the squirrel on the fence does not exclude 
the possibility that Ann’s belief could be mistaken for these reasons. But this sort of error 
is not peculiar to perceptual beliefs. If Ann is negligent in forming her beliefs, doesn’t 
properly attend to what she perceives, or if her beliefs are not appropriately related to 
what it is that she perceives, then Ann’s beliefs may very well be mistaken. But all beliefs 
are subject to mistakes of these kinds and no notion of infallibility could reasonably be 
expected to exclude them. Even so-called self-evident  truths  are  not  infallible  in  this 
sense  and  nor  are  beliefs  about  one’s  own  psychological  states.  One  can  believe 
irrationally that it does not follow from the fact that if A is taller than B, and B taller than 
C, that A is taller than C; and if I do not properly attend to my sensations I may mistake a 
tickle  for  an  itch.  These  are  not  reasons  for  thinking  that  beliefs  about  our  own 
psychological states are not infallible or that belief in self-evident truths is not infallible – 
at  least  not  when one  properly attends,  is  not  being  irrational,  and  one’s  beliefs  are 
appropriately related to one’s grounds. Why can’t exactly the same caveat be allowed to 
apply in the perceptual case? 
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Perceptual beliefs are vulnerable to a certain sort of mistake to which the others are often 
thought to be immune. Ann might believe that the squirrel is on the fence because she 
seems to see a squirrel on the fence but where, because she is hallucinating, there is really 
no squirrel there to be seen. In that case, if Ann believes that there is a squirrel on the 
fence her belief will be mistaken. However, this is not a case in which Ann is justified in 
believing that the squirrel is on the fence because she sees that there is a squirrel on the 
fence and in which her belief is mistaken.68 In this case Ann does not see the squirrel on 
the fence. So this fact has no power to show that Ann’s belief that there is a squirrel on 
the fence is not infallible in the sense in which I  claim it  is.  That belief is  infallible 
because of its source and in this case the source is different.69
Exactly the same is true of any belief that is infallible because of its source. If I believe 
that I am depressed because of what my analyst tells me, or that I am in pain because that 
is what the doctor has told me I will feel when the needle goes in – then my belief may 
also be mistaken.70 Beliefs about one’s own psychological states are therefore no more 
immune from error  in  this  sense  than more ordinary beliefs  about  non-psychological 
reality.  If  they  seem  different  it  is  only  because  we  typically  forms  beliefs  about 
psychological reality on a certain basis, namely on the basis of being presented with the 
68 I am not even committed to thinking this is a case in which Ann is justified in believing that the squirrel 
is on the fence. After all she doesn’t see the squirrel, she merely seems to see one. For all that has been said 
so far Ann therefore has no reason at all to believe that there is a squirrel on the fence. Of course, she might  
have inductive grounds for believing that things which look like squirrels normally are squirrels, but that is 
a different matter altogether. 
69 One might try a similar move in the case of induction, though it would be a lot harder to pull off. In that 
case it’s much harder to come up with a plausible alternative for one’s grounds, in such a way that they do 
not leave open the possibility of mistake.
70 Some philosophers think it is sufficient for one to be in pain that one sincerely believe that one is in pain.  
I think this is mistake. It  may be that we never believe that we are in pain unless we are in pain. That 
doesn’t show that the belief that one’s in pain is sufficient for one to be in the pain. It may just be that we 
never form the belief that we are in pain other than because we feel our own pain. 
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facts these beliefs concern. What normally justifies me in believing that I am in pain is 
the fact that I feel my own pain and believe I am in pain on that basis.71 In that case it 
remains true that I cannot be mistaken. But there is no more guarantee in this case than in 
the perceptual case that if I believe that I am in pain on some other basis my belief will be 
similarly immune from mistake. Beliefs about non-psychological reality therefore have at 
least as good a claim to be infallible as beliefs about psychological reality, contra the 
traditional foundationalist.72
This is what I am claiming, at least. Having said that I don’t want to go to the stake for 
the view that beliefs about psychological reality really are infallible. Perhaps if you really 
press matters we cannot isolate a subset of mistakes as those that involve purely ‘verbal 
slips’ or  that  result  from irrationality,  insufficient  attention,  or  that  are  not  properly 
grounded in what it is that one perceives. Maybe these mistakes are all substantive, as 
Austin liked to claim (Austin 1962: 112-3).73 What I do want to go to the stake for is the 
71 At least, that is the sort of thing that people in the literature say. As a statistical claim it is surely false. 
Indeed, it gets things precisely the wrong way round. I think it is very common to form beliefs about one’s 
own psychological  states  on others  grounds – I  normally form them on the basis of  others  say-so.  In 
contrast, for those of us who didn’t ground up in the 1960’s, it is very rare that we ever form beliefs about 
the world on the basis of hallucinations.  
72 Of course one can be ignorant of the layout of non-psychological reality in a way in which many think 
one cannot be with respect to psychological reality. But ignorance is not a form of error. If Ann refuses to 
believe anything when presented with the squirrel on the fence she is not in error; she merely fails to know 
something she might otherwise have known. That is not a reason to think that ordinary perceptual beliefs 
aren’t incapable of being mistaken. 
73 Austin poured scorn on the idea that such mistakes involve merely ‘verbal slips’ He writes: “Ayer tries, 
as it were to laugh this off as a quite trivial qualification; he evidently thinks that he is conceding here only 
the possibility of slips of the tongue, purely ‘verbal’ slips (or of course of lying). But this is not so. There 
are more ways than these of bringing out the wrong word. I may say ‘Magenta’ wrongly either by a mere 
slip, having meant to say ‘Vermilion’; or because I don’t quite know what ‘magenta’ means, what shade of 
colour is called magenta; or again, because I was unable to, or perhaps just didn’t really notice or attend to 
or properly size up the colour before me. Thus, there is always the possibility,  not only that I may be 
brought to admit that ‘magenta’ wasn’t the right word to pick on for the colour before me, but also that I 
may be brought to see, or perhaps remember, that the colour before me wasn’t magenta. And this hold for 
the case in which I say, “It seems, to me personally, here and now, as if I were seeing something magenta’, 
just as much as for the case in which I say, ‘That is magenta.’ The first formula may be more cautious, but it 
isn’t incorrigible.” (Austin 1962: 112-113) 
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